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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
Meeting the moral and political challenges posed by genocide and mass atrocity 
requires historical clarity and conceptual acuity. Raphael Lemkin, famous for coining the 
term genocide, and for securing the prohibition of this crime in international law, well 
understood these needs. Concerning the need for historical clarity, Lemkin wrote, “one 
cannot describe a crime by one example; one must rather draw on all available 
experiences of the past.”1 Concerning the need for conceptual acuity, Lemkin observed, 
“when people think about [a] new phenomenon, when they speak about it fervently, when 
they finally reach out for action in connection with this phenomenon, they must have a 
name for it.”2  
During his life, Lemkin devoted strenuous efforts to making sense of mass 
atrocity. Since his death, scholars working in a wide range of disciplines have 
substantially improved our understanding of genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against 
humanity, and other types of large-scale crimes. They have done so largely by following 
the two lines of inquiry Lemkin laid down: first, expanding our store of historical 
knowledge of such crimes via archival research, oral histories, and ethnographic studies; 
second, developing concepts capable of capturing the distinct qualities of different kinds 
of mass atrocity. 
In this study, I use the tools of analytic moral and political philosophy to address 
pressing questions in the theory of mass atrocity and transitional justice. I introduce the 
conceptual framework of social norms, and show how this conceptual framework can aid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Donna-­‐Lee	  Frieze	  (ed.),	  Totally	  Unofficial:	  The	  Autobiography	  of	  Raphael	  Lemkin,	  New	  Haven,	  CT:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2013,	  152.	  2	  Raphael	  Lemkin,	  “Introduction	  to	  Genocide,”	  in	  Steven	  Leonard	  Jacobs	  (ed.),	  
Lemkin	  on	  Genocide,	  New	  York:	  Lexington	  Books,	  2012,	  21;	  24.	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scholars and practitioners in their efforts to explain, prevent, and pursue accountability 
for individual and group participation in mass atrocities.  
While scholars of mass atrocity increasingly credit changes in moral norms with 
making possible widespread popular participation in such crimes, and while theorists of 
transitional justice assert the importance of changing legal norms in accordance with rule 
of law principles, researchers in both fields have for the most part failed to consider 
concurrent changes in social norms. It is not difficult to explain this comparative 
inattention to social norms. Social norms are less extensively theorized than either legal 
or moral norms. Social norms stand in less manifest connections with questions of justice 
than either legal or moral norms. Finally, social norms may simply strike us as less 
weighty than either legal or moral norms.  
I believe a proper understanding of social norms – one that identifies the 
pathways of emergence and transformation of such norms; clarifies the grounds of the 
normativity of such norms; and reconstructs the operation of such norms from within the 
practical point of view – can indeed help us to resolve pressing problems in the theory of 
mass atrocity and transitional justice. In this study I seek to substantiate these claims. In 
this introduction I identify the main concepts this study employs, explain the basic 
methods it adopts, and review the principal questions it addresses. 
 
1.1  Key Concepts 
1.1.1 Social Norms 
Social norms form a distinct class of action-guiding prescriptions, prohibitions, 
and permissions. Over the last half-century, philosophers have paid social norms the kind 
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of careful attention formerly reserved for moral and legal norms. They have clarified core 
features of social norms and identified conditions for the emergence, persistence, and 
transformation of social norms. More recently, philosophers have begun to integrate the 
conceptual framework of social norms into longstanding inquiries in moral and political 
philosophy – including inquiries into the grounds of political authority and inquiries into 
the scope and sources of public reason. So far, these integrative efforts have focused 
chiefly on determining the normative significance of social norms under conditions of 
social and political stability. This study, by contrast, considers the normative significance 
of social norms in contexts of severe social and political upheaval.  
In this study, I present a four-feature account of social norms, according to which 
social norms are (1) particular, (2) practice grounded, (3) group intentional, and (4) 
accountability creating. On this account, social norms: 
(1) Circulate within particular groups or populations; 
(2) Are normatively grounded in real or perceived social practices; 
(3) Are sustained by particular profiles of beliefs and intentions amongst 
members of the groups in which they circulate; and  
(4) Serve group members as shared standards of accountability for         
decisions and actions.    
 
I believe these four features, properly specified, are at least jointly sufficient to 
distinguish social norms from moral norms. Moral norms, I claim, are not practice-
grounded, and may not be particular in the way that social norms are. Legal norms, I 
suggest, may not be group-intentional, and differ from social norms with respect to the 
specific forms of accountability they create. The following chart summarizes what I take 
to be the key differences between social norms and legal and moral norms – while 
leaving open a number of meta-normative questions that I cannot address here.  
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Table 1: Distinguishing Social, Moral, and Legal Norms 
________________________________________________________________________ 
      Social Norms Moral Norms  Legal Norms 
Particular (not Universal)          Yes           ?            Yes 
Practice-Grounded           Yes          No           Yes 
Group-Intentional           Yes          No             ? 
Accountability-Creating           Yes (Informal)              Yes                 Yes (Formal) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In elucidating these four features of social norms, it is helpful to compare and 
contrast them not only with legal and moral norms, but also with other kinds of informal 
principles of social order, such as conventions and traditions. Conventions, I suggest, lack 
the specifically normative character of social norms, and perform their action-guiding 
function essentially by engaging the interests, rather than the normative attitudes, of 
individual actors. Traditions, I contend, operate in a manner distinct from social norms 
more generally within practical reasoning: traditions serve as sources of exclusionary 
reasons, rather than reasons weighed in the usual fashion against reasons supplied by 
moral and legal norms.  
Each of these different types of norms and informal principles belongs to the full 
picture of political society – and to the full theory of mass atrocity and transitional 
justice. The aim of this study is to demonstrate the contributions that the conceptual 
framework of social norms, specifically, can make to ongoing efforts to understand and 
prevent mass atrocities and to achieve justice in transitions.  
 
 
	   	  5	  
1.1.2 Mass Atrocity 
The term “mass atrocity” picks out a complex array of crimes, including 
genocide, mass killing, mass rape, forced relocation, and forced sterilization. These 
crimes are linked to each other by their large scale and by their extreme – or, on some 
views, manifest – injustice. In this study I understand ‘mass atrocity’ principally as a term 
of descriptive social science, rather than as a legal term of art or an instrument of moral 
suasion. For stylistic purposes, I will use the phrase ‘large-scale crimes’ as a synonym for 
mass atrocity. This substitution may seem to blur the descriptive/normative boundary by 
attaching the quality of crime to the acts and deeds that are the objects of this study. 
However, there is already intrinsic normative content in the concept of ‘atrocity,’ and I do 
not think the perplexities we face on this front are made any greater by explicitly 
referring to mass atrocities as large-scale crimes. 
With respect to the scale of mass atrocities, no simple numerical threshold can be 
relied on to distinguish between mass atrocities and other kinds of collective crimes. 
Some authors stipulate 100,000 killed as the lower threshold for mass killing; other 
analysts adopt the number 1,000 killed, with qualifications, as the threshold for mass 
atrocity. For my purposes, the key features of mass atrocity are qualitative, not 
quantitative. Mass atrocities involve large numbers of people imposing significant harms 
on other large numbers of people in coordinated fashion, and over significant 
geographical and temporal extents. While it is possible to construct hypothetical 
scenarios that lack one or more of these aspects (such as the example of a lone individual 
committing genocide with a biological weapon) historical mass atrocities exhibit the 
several qualitative features I have identified. It is these historical cases that supply the 
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empirical background for my analysis of the action-guiding function of social norms 
before, during, and after atrocities.  
 
1.1.3 Norm Transformation 
Historical and social scientific inquiries into mass atrocities typically focus on the 
actors who plan and perpetrate them, the institutions and structures that support them, and 
the identities and ideals that are pursued through them. This emphasis on actors, 
structures, and meanings has led quite naturally to claims about norms, and especially the 
action-guiding power of norms, amongst perpetrators, bystanders, and resisters of 
atrocities. During the past two decades, as investigators have come to stress the 
importance of widespread participation by ‘ordinary’ individuals in atrocities, scholars 
have increasingly endorsed a particular claim about the explanatory role of norms before 
and during, and after mass atrocities, which I call the thesis of norm transformation.  
The thesis of norm transformation holds that participation by large numbers of 
morally competent individuals in mass atrocities is at least partially explained by 
transformations in basic norms that structure social and political life. So far, this thesis 
has been advanced, and evaluated, only with regard to legal and moral norms. It is easy to 
see why priority has been given to norms of these kinds. Mass atrocities are striking for 
the way in which they require large numbers of individuals to act in ways sharply 
contrary to legal and moral norms they previously affirmed – norms proscribing murder, 
or the intentional imposition of suffering, or appropriation of another persons’ property 
without consent. The central explanatory puzzle is therefore to explain how such deeply 
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engrained legal and moral norms could be selectively altered, or inverted, so that actions 
previously prohibited should come to be permitted, or prescribed. 
I believe the thesis of norm transformation should be extended to include social 
norms. I believe that changes in social norms can and do play an important role in 
precipitating, and prolonging, mass atrocities, and so must be studied alongside changes 
in legal and moral norms. Of course, as I have already suggested, not all social norms 
undergo transformations before or during mass atrocities. This provides a second reason 
for scholars who embrace the hypothesis of norm transformation to attend to social 
norms. The persistence of social norms during mass atrocities, I shall argue, conditions 
the effects that transformations in legal and moral norms have on the decisions and 
actions of particular individuals caught up in such catastrophes. This applies to 
professionals and members of elite organizations as well as to ‘ordinary’ individuals who 
perpetrate, or attempt to resist, mass atrocities.  
By exploring the influence of social norms – and changes in social norms – upon 
individuals and groups before, during, and after mass atrocities, this dissertation seeks to 
achieve three main goals. First, it seeks to show how attention to social norms can 
increase our understanding of the decisions and actions of particular individuals and 
groups during mass atrocities. Second, it seeks to support the claim that different modes 
and distributions of individual and collective accountability may be appropriate in cases 
where social norms exert a determinate influence on such actors. Finally, it seeks to show 
that efforts to change social norms, like efforts to change legal norms, are central to the 
practical challenges faced by individuals and groups working to secure just political 
transitions in the wake of large-scale crimes. 
	   	  8	  
1.2 Methodology 
Social norms have a dual character. They present both “normative” and “socio-
empirical aspects.”3 This dual character contributes substantially to the power of social 
norms to structure social reality. At the same time, this dual character raises 
methodological questions that must be addressed if the conceptual framework of social 
norms is to be successfully integrated into the philosophical, historical, and social 
scientific literatures on mass atrocity. These methodological questions fall under three 
main headings: some are meta-descriptive, some are meta-normative, and some are 
normative.  
 
1.2.1 Meta-Descriptive Questions 
Meta-descriptive methodological questions about social norms focus on the 
forensic methods by which social norms are identified and individuated, and on the 
epistemic criteria by which claims about the action-guiding influence of social norms can 
be corroborated. The forensic methods available for detecting the existence of social 
norms within particular populations differ according to whether the domain of inquiry 
covers contemporary or historical groups, organizations, and collectivities. The epistemic 
criteria by which claims about the action-guiding power of social norms can be 
corroborated do not differ qualitatively across temporal domains of description, though 
they may differ in the degree of stringency with which they may be applied, resulting in 
different degrees of credence for the particular claims assessed. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Geoffrey	  Brennan,	  Lina	  Eriksson,	  Robert	  Goodin,	  and	  Nicholas	  Southwood,	  
Explaining	  Norms	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  3.	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Although experimental approaches are currently being devised for the descriptive 
study of social norms, this study focuses chiefly on evidence drawn from non-
experimental, discursive sources. Methods employed include: studying historical records 
for patterns of behavior that have persisted over time in particular groups; listening to the 
reflections of individuals concerning past, present, and prospective decisions and actions; 
and focusing in on cases of apparent application of social sanctions against individuals 
and organizations. The epistemic criteria employed for corroborating claims about the 
action-guiding influence social norms are similar to those adopted in experimentally-
oriented work – though the focus on social norms within historical groups and 
populations adopted here conditions the degree to which these criteria can be satisfied. 
Such epistemic include: avoiding circularity; seeking independent confirmation of first-
personal norm claims; distinguishing clearly between social norms and other related 
social facts (such as conventions); and judiciously using counterfactuals to clarify the 
significance of particular sightings of social norms.   
 
 1.2.2 Meta-Normative Questions 
Meta-normative questions about social norms concern the normative grounding of 
social norms, the dynamics of persistence and change in social norms, and the 
accessibility of social norms for both theoretical reflection and practical deliberation by 
human agents. With respect to grounding of social norms, some theorists reduce social 
norms to descriptive facts, while other theorists seek to ground them in properly 
normative structures or considerations. Likewise, some theorists seek a common 
grounding for social norms, legal norms, and (or) moral norms, while others assert 
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differences in grounding across these categories of norms. With respect to the dynamics 
of social norms, some theorists rely on qualitative descriptions and observations to 
explain the processes by which norms emerge, persist, and change, while other theorists 
employ sophisticated quantitative models in order to trace (or more commonly 
reconstruct) processes of norm transformation. With respect to the accessibility of norms, 
some theorists focus on showing how social norms can guide human action without ever 
rising to the level of conscious reflection, while other theorists focus on identifying 
deliberative principles suitable for guiding practical deliberations involving social norms. 
As noted above, this study distinguishes social norms from moral and legal norms 
on the basis of four core features of social norms. Many elements of this four-feature 
account are reflected in the work of other theorists of social norms. What is distinctive 
about the meta-normative approach to social norms adopted in this study is the emphasis 
on reconstructing the influence of social norms from within the practical point of view, 
i.e. the point of view of individuals deliberating about action. Whereas in ordinary 
circumstances social norms often operate without rising to the level of conscious 
reflection or deliberation, the circumstances of mass atrocity seem likely often to provoke 
such reflections, due to the conflicts that commonly arise in such circumstances between 
emerging social norms and previously accepted legal or moral norms. To be sure, even 
the best forensic efforts do not permit us to “get in side the heads” of historical actors, 
and so the accounts provided of practical deliberations involving social norms will be 
necessarily reconstructive. Nevertheless, simply attempting to reconstruct the shape of 
those deliberations can provide insights into meta-normative aspects of social norms.  
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1.2.3 Normative Questions 
Reconstructing the role of social norms in practical deliberations requires not only 
meta-normative, but also normative reflection. It requires us to consider questions about 
when social norms should be followed, and should not be followed; should be altered, or 
should not be altered; and should be instituted, or should not be instituted. Further 
normative questions concern the ways in which social norms should be instituted or 
altered – e.g. through transparent and consensual or through manipulative means.  
Some historians and social scientists who study mass atrocity prefer to set aside 
such normative questions. Others acknowledge that the concepts and categories at the 
core of this literature – such as ‘perpetrators’, ‘bystanding’, ‘resistance’, and, indeed, 
‘atrocity’ itself – are laden with normative content, and so are bound to dispose readers 
and auditors to make normative judgments. I believe responsible research on mass 
atrocities and political transitions cannot evade, but must confront, difficult questions 
about the distinction between description and evaluation of historical and contemporary 
actors and actions. This is the approach I adopt in this study.  
 
1.3  Chapter Summaries 
The five substantive chapters of this study develop a continuing argument about 
normative significance of social norms during mass atrocities and liberal political 
transitions. At the same time, each chapter makes a distinctive contribution to particular 
debates in the philosophical and social scientific literature, and it has been my aim to 
render each chapter readable on its own terms. By way of concluding this introduction I 
will provide a brief summary of the aims and arguments of each chapter.    
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Present-day inquiries into the contributions of norms, and changes in norms, to 
mass atrocities are rooted in earlier, post-WWII investigations and exchanges. One of the 
most important philosophical precedents for such inquiries is the mid-century debate 
between American legal scholar Lon Fuller and English legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart. 
CHAPTER TWO reconstructs – and reflects critically upon – the main points at issue in 
this debate. I begin by briefly sketching the ‘Grudge Informer case,’ and arguing that the 
Hart-Fuller debate should be understood as an exchange of conflicting meta-normative 
claims concerning the action-guiding power of legal and moral norms during periods of 
deep social and political turmoil. Next, I suggest that the differences between Hart and 
Fuller’s views on law as a system of norms can be used to elucidate three general features 
of normative systems: (1) cognitive and conative accessibility, (2) concurrent functioning 
with other norms and normative systems, and (3) the creation of social meanings and 
identities. After this, I show that, although both Hart and Fuller avowed an interest in 
extra-legal and extra-moral norms principles of social order – e.g. customs, conventions, 
and social norms – neither Hart nor Fuller seems to have considered the practical 
importance that such principles acquire, or retain, in the context of “wicked legal 
systems.” I conclude by offering reasons to think that such principles deserve greater 
attention from scholars seeking to make sense of mass atrocities. 
The category of informal principles of social order is broad. The category of 
social norms is considerably narrower. CHAPTER THREE sets out the basic account of 
social norms adopted in this dissertation. I first distinguish between three different kinds 
of informal principles of social order: conventions, traditions, and social norms. Next, I 
develop and defend my own four feature account of social norms, according to which 
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social norms are (1) particular (2) practice-grounded (3) group-intentional and (4) 
accountability creating. In the third section of the chapter I explain why I believe it is 
important for an account of social norms to be able to represent such norms from within 
the practical point of view – i.e. the point of view of individual agents deliberating about 
action. I conclude by addressing some methodological questions about the identification 
of social norms in historical contexts.  
Historical and social scientific explanations of genocide and mass atrocity 
typically advance some version of the thesis of norm transformation. This is the thesis 
that large‐scale crimes, involving participation by large numbers of morally competent 
individuals, must be explained in whole or in part by fundamental transformations in the 
norms that govern the particular social and political relationships in which those 
individuals stand. CHAPTER FOUR analyses this thesis as it has been applied to highly 
structured groups found to have been complicit in, or direct perpetrators of, mass atrocity. 
The chapter takes as its chief historical example the widespread participation by German 
professionals – including doctors, lawyers, and teachers – in the crimes of the Holocaust. 
I first consider the definition of professions and professional groups, and reviews 
prominent accounts of the normative grounds and status of professional codes. It then 
provide a brief overview of the extensive historiographical literature on professional 
collaboration and complicity in the Holocaust. Finally, I review a range of concrete 
historical examples of social norms contributing to participation, or occasionally 
resistance, by individual legal, medical, and academic professionals in the Holocaust. 
These examples, I argue, provide reasons for extending the thesis of norm transformation 
to include social, as well as legal and moral, norms.  
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Professionals and other social elites are not the only actors whose decisions and 
actions may be influenced by social norms, and changes in social norms, during mass 
atrocities. Many perpetrators, bystanders, resisters, and targets of mass atrocities belong 
to the class of “ordinary men” (and, less frequently, women). CHAPTER FIVE examines 
the influence of social norms amongst each of the standard actor-types of perpetrators, 
bystanders, resisters, and targets or victims – while also showing how the framework of 
social norms can be used to put those actor-types in question. I first identify four different 
modes of categorization that commonly appear in theories of mass atrocity: 
administrative categorization, cognitive categorization, historical categorization, and 
juridical categorization. I then examine some abiding questions concerning each of these 
forms of categorization – considered individually, and in relation to each other. Some of 
these questions are meta-descriptive, some are meta-normative, and some are normative. 
The framework of social norms, I suggest, can help to resolve some of these questions.  
Transformations in social norms are not only critical to understanding large‐ scale 
crimes. They are also crucial for the success of political transitions undertaken in the 
wake of such crimes. CHAPTER SIX explains the normative significance of transitional 
changes in social norms. I begin by distinguishing between the two principal aims of 
liberal political transitions—securing stability going forward, and pursuing accountability 
for past crimes—and explaining why many theorists consider these aims to be in tension. 
Next, I examine several competing models of norm transformation proposed by 
philosophers and legal scholars for resolving this tension, and argue that each of these 
models needs to be extended to include attention to changes in social norms. I then 
present two new principles of transitional justice, which I suggest ought to govern the 
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kinds of transitional transformations in social norms commonly undertaken by 
international non-governmental actors. The chapter closes with a case study of efforts by 
the UN and other international organizaations to build the rule of law and reform the 
justice sector in transitional East Timor.  
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Chapter 2. The Hart-Fuller Debate and the Nature of Normative Systems 
 
On July 27, 1949, the Provincial Court of Appeals in Bamberg, West Germany 
delivered a finding of guilt against a woman accused of having denounced her husband, a 
soldier, to Party authorities in late 1944 for remarks belittling Hitler and the German war 
effort.1 The Bamberg Court overturned a local West German court’s acquittal of the 
woman on the specific charge of illegal deprivation of liberty.2 The Bamberg Court 
affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the judge presiding in the 1944 court martial had 
not acted illegally, but in accordance with his judicial duty, in recognizing the Nazi law 
against ‘treacherous utterances’ as valid and sentencing the denounced husband to death.3 
The full record of domestic German courts’ efforts to try crimes committed during 
the Nazi era has only recently begun to receive serious scholarly scrutiny. During the past 
decade, historians have studied the structure, legal foundations, and decisions of domestic 
German trials of Nazi crimes in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s – a period marked by the 
termination of Allied military tribunals and by the escalation of Cold War tensions.4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  describing	  this	  case	  here	  and	  below	  I	  have	  relied	  on	  H.O.	  Pappe,	  ‘On	  the	  Validity	  of	  Judicial	  Decisions	  in	  the	  Nazi	  Era,’	  The	  Modern	  Law	  Review	  23	  n.	  3	  (May	  1960),	  260-­‐274;	  Thomas	  Mertens,	  “Radbruch	  and	  Hart	  on	  the	  Grudge	  Informer:	  A	  Reconsideration,”	  Ratio	  Juris	  15	  n.	  2	  (June	  2002)	  186-­‐205;	  and	  David	  Dyzenhaus,	  “The	  Grudge	  Informer	  Case	  Revisited,”	  1000	  New	  York	  University	  Law	  Review	  83	  (October	  2008).	  Dyzenhaus’s	  essay	  includes	  as	  an	  appendix	  an	  English	  translation	  of	  the	  Appeals	  Court’s	  judgment.	  2	  ‘Illegal	  deprivation	  of	  liberty’	  had	  been	  recognized	  as	  an	  offense	  under	  the	  1871	  German	  Criminal	  Code.	  The	  judgment’s	  characterization	  of	  the	  woman	  as	  an	  	  	  ‘indirect	  perpetrator’	  of	  this	  crime	  was	  just	  one	  of	  several	  constructions	  available	  to	  the	  court;	  the	  choice	  of	  a	  different	  construction	  might	  have	  required	  a	  different	  (i.e.	  more	  extensive)	  distribution	  of	  guilt,	  as	  will	  be	  explained	  below.	  3	  Though	  sentenced	  to	  death,	  the	  husband	  was,	  according	  to	  the	  Bamberg	  court’s	  judgment,	  sent	  to	  the	  front	  instead.	  Cf.	  Dyzenhaus	  2008,	  	  Appendix,	  1032.	  	  4	  Cf.	  Alan	  Steinweis	  and	  Robert	  Rachlin	  (eds.),	  The	  Law	  in	  Nazi	  Germany:	  Ideology,	  
Opportunism,	  and	  the	  Perversion	  of	  Justice	  (New	  York:	  Berghahn	  Books,	  2013);	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Scholars have also investigated specific legal-historical questions: such as why so many 
judges implicated in the wartime breakdown of procedural and substantive justice 
remained on the bench during the 1950’s, and how the legal fates of male and female 
defendants charged with comparable crimes differed.5  
Viewed against this background, the case reviewed by the Bamberg Appeals 
Court in 1949 is interesting, but not exceptional. Viewed from the perspective of legal 
and political philosophy, the case has acquired a significance surpassing almost any trial 
from this period. Typically referred to as the “Grudge Informer” case, it featured 
prominently in one of the most famous debates in 20th century Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. This was the midcentury debate between the American Lon Fuller and the 
Englishman H.L.A. Hart over the problem – or possibility – of ‘wicked law’.6 
Launched in lectures and articles, and continued in substantial books, the Hart-Fuller 
debate broaches large questions of legal philosophy: questions about the foundations of 
legal rules, the texture of legal reasoning, and the legal and moral obligations that obtain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Nathan	  Stoltzfus	  and	  Henry	  Friedlander	  (eds.),	  Nazi	  Crimes	  and	  the	  Law	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  5	  For	  the	  continuation	  of	  National	  Socialist-­‐era	  judges	  in	  East	  and	  West	  German	  Courts	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  see	  Annette	  Weinke,	  “The	  German-­‐German	  Rivalry	  and	  the	  Prosecution	  of	  Nazi	  War	  Criminals	  During	  the	  Cold	  War,	  1958-­‐1965,”	  in	  Stoltzfus	  and	  Friedlander	  2008,	  151-­‐172.	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  different	  characterizations	  and	  charges	  brought	  against	  male	  and	  female	  perpetrators	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period,	  see	  Ulrike	  Weckel	  and	  Edgar	  Wolfrum	  (eds.),	  ‘Bestien’	  und	  ‘Befehlsempfänger’:	  
Frauen	  und	  Männer	  in	  NS-­‐Prozessen	  nach	  1945	  (Göttingen:	  Vandenhoeck	  und	  Ruprecht,	  2003).	  The University of Amsterdam’s series Justiz und NS-Verbrechen 
[published in English as Nazi Crimes on Trial] offers the most complete record of 
postwar trials of murder-related crimes in East and West German courts. The series 
devotes fifteen volumes to the years 1949-1954	  6	  The	  Amsterdam	  Series	  does	  not	  digest	  the	  specific	  case	  Hart	  and	  Fuller	  cite,	  possibly	  because	  it	  did	  not	  ultimately	  result	  in	  death	  of	  the	  husband	  of	  the	  grudge	  informer	  –	  though	  some	  other	  cases	  included	  in	  this	  series	  have	  a	  similar	  result.	  The	  series	  does	  include	  the	  1952	  West	  German	  Supreme	  Court	  case	  cited	  by	  Pappe	  as	  a	  more	  representative,	  and	  helpful	  case	  in	  his	  1960	  article.	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between differently positioned legal actors. At the same time, the debate focuses attention 
on pathologies of practical reasoning that arise in the context of severely unjust legal 
systems. Due to the gravity of the jurisprudential questions it raises, and due also to the 
sensational quality of the Grudge Informer case itself, the Hart-Fuller debate remains a 
staple of law school syllabi, and is regularly re-opened by latter-day legal philosophers. 
In this chapter, I use the Hart-Fuller debate to introduce the basic normative, 
meta-normative, and meta-descriptive questions addressed in this study. These are 
questions about the contribution of norms generally, and social norms particularly, to the 
explanation and prevention of mass atrocities, and to efforts to secure accountability for 
such large-scale crimes in the context of liberalizing political transitions.  
The Hart-Fuller debate illuminates the problems of practical reasoning that 
confront individual and institutional agents in situations where legal and moral norms 
diverge dramatically, or change radically. At the same time, Hart and Fuller’s 
jurisprudential writings offer important insights into the ontology and action-guiding 
power of what I call ‘informal principles of social order’ – e.g. customs, conventions, 
traditions, and social norms. Neither Hart nor Fuller ever substantially connected these 
two strands of research. Neither theorist seriously considered what contributions such 
informal principles might make to our understanding of large-scale crimes. My aim in 
this chapter, and in this study generally, is to show that such informal principles 
generally, and social norms particularly, can and do play an important action-guiding role 
before, during, and after mass atrocities – and so deserve the attention of scholars and 
practitioners seeking to make sense of, and to secure accountability for, such large-scale 
crimes. 
	   	  19	  
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.1 I briefly review the context, 
content, and influence of the Hart-Fuller debate. In the Section 2.2 I discuss three general 
features of normative systems illuminated by the Hart-Fuller debate. These features are: 
cognitive and conative accessibility; concurrent functioning with other normative 
systems; and the creation and maintenance of social meanings and identities. In Section 
2.3 I introduce the notion of informal principles of social order, and show that both Fuller 
and Hart were keenly interested in the way such informal principles function concurrently 
with positive or “enacted” laws within modern political societies. Finally, in Section 2.4, 
I argue that historical cases like the Grudge Informer case give us good reason to 
consider how such informal principles contribute to circumstances Hart described as 
cases of “Hell created on earth by men for other men.”7  
 
2.1 The Hart-Fuller Debate: Context, Content, Influence 
The Hart-Fuller debate began with a lecture given to an American audience by an 
English legal philosopher who chose to illustrate his thesis using a West German court 
case. Each of these contextual factors helped to shape the content of this debate. Each 
also helps to explain the standing this debate has retained within Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.  
In this section I briefly review the context, content, and influence of the Hart-
Fuller debate. My goal is not to give a comprehensive overview of that debate (a task 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  H.L.A.	  Hart,	  “Positivism	  and	  the	  Separation	  of	  Law	  and	  Morals,”	  Harvard	  Law	  
Review	  71	  (February	  1958),	  616.	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already excellently performed by others) 8, but rather to highlight questions and claims 
about the relationship between law and other normative systems that are integral to my 
own study. Along the way, I will explain Hart and Fuller’s interest in the Grudge 
Informer case, and note several few points on which their information about that case was 
inaccurate.  
 
2.1.1 Context 
The Hart-Fuller debate is widely agreed to have begun with H.L.A. Hart’s 1957 
Holmes Lecture, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” delivered to a large 
audience at the Harvard Law School. Lon Fuller, co-sponsor of Hart’s invitation to spend 
a year as a visiting professor at Harvard, had been a member of the Law School faculty 
since 1939.9 Fuller knew in advance that Hart’s developing positivist conception of law 
and legal systems differed substantially from his own purposive theory of law. 
Nevertheless, Hart’s Holmes Lecture prompted Fuller to respond directly to Hart’s 
jurisprudential position. Fuller’s reply, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law,” directly follows 
Hart’s lecture in the February 1958 number of the Harvard Law Review.10 
Postwar developments in West German law feature prominently in both Hart and 
Fuller’s 1958 papers, and it is particularly important to understand this contextual factor. 
Both papers engage with the claims of the German legal scholar Gustav Radbruch, before 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  For	  an	  excellent	  overview	  of	  the	  Hart-­‐Fuller	  debate,	  cf.	  Nicola	  Lacey,	  “Out	  of	  the	  ‘Witches’	  Cauldron?’:	  Reinterpreting	  the	  Context	  and	  Reasssessing	  the	  Significance	  of	  the	  Hart-­‐Fuller	  Debate,”	  in	  Peter	  Cane	  (ed.),	  The	  Hart-­‐Fuller	  Deate	  in	  the	  Twenty-­‐
First	  Century	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2010),	  1-­‐42.	  	  9	  Nicola	  Lacey,	  A	  Life	  of	  H.L.A.	  Hart:	  The	  Nightmare	  and	  the	  Noble	  Dream	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  Publishing,	  2006),	  179.	  	  10	  Hart	  1958;	  Lon	  Fuller,	  “Positivism	  and	  Fidelity	  to	  Law,”	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  71	  (February	  1958),	  630-­‐672.	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the war a leading legal positivist, who afterwards came to hold that “supra-positive” law, 
or ultimate principles of justice, stand above and can invalidate enacted law in severely 
unjust legal systems.11 Fuller himself had partially translated Radbruch’s key writings on 
this topic, which include discussion of wartime denunciation cases; he shared his 
translations with Hart, who evidently used them as the basis for his critique of Radbruch.  
Hart and Fuller also shared a second common source: an English summary of the 
Bamberg Court’s 1949 decision in the Grudge Informer case, which was published in 
1951 in the Harvard Law Review. As H.O. Pappe pointed out in 1960, and as scholars 
such as David Dyzenhaus and Thomas Mertens have more recently explained, this early 
summary of the Grudge Informer case misrepresented both the facts of that case and the 
reasoning behind the Bamberg Court’s decision.12 These misrepresentations were 
consequential for Hart and Fuller’s illustrative invocations of this real-world case in their 
papers, as we shall see. 
 
2.1.2 Content 
It is easy to identify the start of the Hart-Fuller debate. It is more difficult to say 
precisely when that debate ended, or to state categorically which publications it 
comprehends. After their initial Harvard Law Review exchange, Hart and Fuller 
continued to critique each other’s views on issues of fundamental jurisprudence for at 
least a decade. In this section I briefly introduce the various books and articles I consider 
salient to this debate.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  See Robert Alexy, “A Defence of Radbruch’s Formula,” in Recrafting the Rule of Law, 
ed. David Dyzenhaus (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 1999), 15-39.	  12	  Pappe	  1960;	  Mertens	  2002;	  Dyzenhaus	  2008.	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Hart’s principal response to Fuller’s 1958 paper appears in his 1961 book, The 
Concept of Law. In that book, Hart famously argues that the rule of law is compatible 
with “great iniquity.”13 Later, in his review of Fuller’s 1964 book The Morality of Law, 
Hart deploys the example of a “morality of poisoning” – i.e. a set of rules adopted by 
assassins for the regulation of their manifestly immoral craft – in order to refute Fuller’s 
claim that there is a necessary connection between the formal properties of a code of 
conduct and the moral character of the content of that code.14  
Within The Morality of Law Fuller offers his own further criticisms of Hart’s 
novel form of legal positivism. Here Fuller sets forth his fable of Rex, the unsuccessful 
lawgiver, in order to illustrate the many ways in which disregard for legality obstructs the 
creation of valid law.15 In the same book Fuller emphasizes the notion of reciprocity 
between lawgivers and law subjects as an important, quasi-sociological requirement for 
the endurance of legal systems over time – and suggests that Hart’s analysis of the 
concept of law unjustifiably neglects this significant dimension of legal systems.16 
Beyond these key texts, it is difficult to say how much further the Hart-Fuller 
debate extends. My own view is that at least some later texts are crucial for understanding 
that debate. I have in mind particularly Fuller’s 1969 essay “Human Interaction and the 
Law,” which never names Hart directly, but clearly critiques positions on custom and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  H.L.A.	  Hart,	  The	  Concept	  of	  Law	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press	  1961),	  202.	  	  14	  H.L.A.	  Hart,	  “Review	  of	  Lon	  Fuller’s	  The	  Morality	  of	  Law,”	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  78,	  n.	  6	  (April	  1965),	  1281-­‐1296.	  15	  Lon	  Fuller,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Law	  (New	  Haven,	  CT:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1964),	  33-­‐38.	  	  16	  Fuller	  1964,	  139-­‐140.	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convention found in The Concept of Law.17 By including this and other additional texts in 
my basic background for the Hart-Fuller debate, I suppose I am commiting myself to a 
broad interpretation of this jurisprudential exchange.18 As we shall see, this broad view is 
crucial for comparing Hart and Fuller’s respective views on the nature and dynamics of 
informal principles of social order.  
 
2.1.3 Influence         
The influence of the Hart-Fuller debate within legal philosophy, and within 
analytical political philosophy more generally, has been considerable. Many leading 
figures in Anglo-American jurisprudence today – including Jeremy Waldron, Joseph Raz, 
Leslie Greene, Gerald Postema, and Scott Shapiro – have written extensively on the 
substantive points at issue in that debate. Many of those substantive points, in turn, have 
taken on new relevance in light of various legal, political, and philosophical 
developments of the late 20th and early 21st century. 
In the first place, Fuller’s attempt to specify desiderata, or perhaps criteria, for 
determining when the rule of law is satisfied, has been taken up and extended by scholars 
studying the defining problems of transitional justice. 
In the second place, Hart’s account of social rules and Fuller’s account of 
informal principles that help to structure social interactions continue to be studied by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Lon	  Fuller,	  “Human	  Interaction	  and	  the	  Law,”	  in	  Kenneth	  Winston	  (ed.),	  The	  
Principles	  of	  Social	  Order	  (Durham,	  NC:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  1981),	  211-­‐246.	  18	  Insofar as Hart’s posthumously published postscript to The Concept of Law contains 
modifications of his earlier conception of the moral domain in general, it too can 
plausibly be said to bear on the Hart-Fuller debate. Additionally, newly discovered texts, 
such as Hart’s newly discovered essay on “Discretion,” written while he was visiting at 
Harvard, seem salient. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, “Discretion,” Harvard Law Review 125 n. 2 
(December 2013), 652-665.	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philosophers working on conventions, social norms, and other informal rules and 
principles that constitute the stuff of first-personal reflection and practical deliberation. 
As stated above, I believe these two strands of influence from the Hart-Fuller 
debate ought to be more thoroughly combined and brought to bear on the normative and 
meta-normative problems arising from mass atrocities and political transitions. In order to 
make this argument, I must now undertake a more in-depth interpretation of the main 
points at issue in the Hart-Fuller debate. In the next section, I will consider what the Hart-
Fuller debate over law and legality can tell us about norms and normative systems 
generally. After that, I will turn to consider their specific claims about norms and 
principles the fall outside the boundaries of law and morality, and belong instead to the 
general category of informal principles of social order. 
 
2.2 Hart and Fuller on the Nature of Normative Systems 
I understand norms as practical prescriptions, prohibitions, or permissions 
accepted by members of particular groups or populations, and capable of guiding the 
actions of those members.19 I understand normative systems as sets or collections of 
norms that stand in certain ordered relationships with each other, and which are 
characterized as a body by certain formal qualities, such as non-redundancy, non-
contradiction, and commensurability. Different normative systems may be grounded in 
different kinds of facts or considerations, and the norms they comprise may apply to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  I	  should	  note	  that	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  here	  the	  normative,	  rather	  than	  the	  merely	  statistical,	  concept	  of	  a	  norm.	  That	  is,	  I	  am	  concerned	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  norm	  that	  contains	  an	  intrinsic	  connection	  to	  guiding	  action,	  rather	  than	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  norm	  that	  simply	  picks	  out	  a	  feature	  or	  behavior	  that	  is	  exhibited	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  objects	  or	  actors	  in	  some	  collectivity.	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distinct groups or collections of agents, engaged in distinct activities. Sometimes, as with 
chess, we say that a particular normative system is constitutive of – i.e. makes possible – 
a particular activity, and thus must be accepted by all who take part in that activity.20 
Other times, as with war, we say that, although particular normative systems can and 
frequently do regulate an activity, they are not constitutive of that activity – which could 
be, and may have been, regulated by different norms and normative systems than those 
currently in force.21  
Despite the diversity of normative systems, there are some features that all such 
systems share in common. Some of these features have to do with the ways in which 
normative systems operate – the ways in which they help guide the actions and 
deliberations of the agents to whom the norms they contain apply. Other features have to 
do with the values, identities, and meanings that such norms and normative systems 
create and sustain.  
Legal systems are useful as models for thinking about these shared features of 
normative systems. This is true no matter whether the particular legal system selected for 
study is well formed or, as may be more instructive, defective. When legal systems are 
seriously defective across one or more dimensions, they are said to suffer failures of the 
rule of law, or legality. 22 The Hart-Fuller debate was in large part a debate about the 
degree to which a legal system can be defective, and still satisfy the rule of law. But it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  As	  this	  example	  indicates,	  I	  do	  not	  mark	  a	  major	  distinction	  between	  norms	  and	  rules,	  insofar	  as	  both	  are	  accepted	  by	  some	  person(s)	  –	  though	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  at	  least	  some	  rules	  remain	  rules	  even	  when	  not	  accepted	  by	  anyone.	  	  21John	  Rawls,	  “Two	  Concepts	  of	  Rules,”	  Philosophical	  Review	  64,	  n.	  1	  (1955),	  3-­‐32;	  Andrei	  Marmor,	  Social	  Convention,	  Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2005.	  	  22	  Legal	  theorists	  sometimes	  use	  the	  term	  ‘legality’	  in	  a	  technical	  sense.	  In	  this	  study,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  more	  or	  less	  interchangeably	  with	  the	  term	  ‘rule	  of	  law,’	  i.e.	  as	  an	  evaluative	  term	  used	  for	  assessing	  qualitative	  features	  of	  laws	  and	  legal	  systems.	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was also a debate about the best way to reconstruct the practical dilemmas faced by 
particular actors in cases where two normative systems – law and morality – conflict. 
In this section, I use the Hart-Fuller debate to highlight three general features of 
normative systems. These are the features of (1) cognitive and conative accessibility; (2) 
concurrent functioning with other normative systems; and (3) creation and expression of 
social meanings and identities. Although I consider these features necessary (though 
perhaps not sufficient) conditions for the existence of normative systems, I will not seek 
to defend that claim here. Instead, I want to show that different normative systems 
manifest these features in different ways, and to different degrees. This is a claim that 
both Hart and Fuller would accept, despite their different views on the relationship 
between law and morality. 
 
2.2.1 Cognitive and Conative Accessibility 
A first general feature of normative systems is that of cognitive and conative 
accessibility. According to this feature, normative systems – along with the particular 
norms they comprise– are generally available as possible objects of belief and desire for 
individuals to whom those normative systems apply. 
Particular theories of particular kinds of normative system often differ in their 
accounts of to whom, to what extent, and in what way those systems must be accessible 
to the various agents to whom they apply. Within ethics, major divisions exist concerning 
how moral norms become objects of belief and desire (notably, on whether cognitive 
attitudes towards moral norms entail conative attitudes towards those same norms). 
Within jurisprudence, questions abound about which particularly positioned actors need 
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to have cognitive and conative access to legal norms. Within both spheres, it is disputed 
how complete any given individual’s access to relevant norms at any particular time must 
be in order for the particular normative system to maintain its action-guiding role.  
Hart and Fuller differed significantly in their views on the cognitive and conative 
accessibility of normative systems generally, and legal systems specifically. 
Characteristically, Hart was more inclined than Fuller to frame questions about cognitive 
and conative accessibility in terms of necessary conditions for the existence of legal and 
other normative systems. Here I will first consider Hart’s account of the cognitive and 
conative accessibility of legal systems, and then try to reconstruct Fuller’s view. 
Two distinctions are central to understanding Hart’s views on the cognitive and 
conative accessibility of legal systems. First, Hart distinguished between “primary” and 
“secondary” rules within legal systems; second, he distinguished between the “internal” 
and “external” perspectives that legal officials and law subjects can and do take on such 
rules. I will discuss each of these distinctions in turn.  
Primary rules, on Hart’s view, are rules according to which “human beings are 
required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to or not.”23 Secondary 
rules are rules that specify conditions for introducing, modifying, or in other ways 
controlling the application of primary rules.24 Primary rules are the constituent elements 
of many different kinds of normative orders and normative systems, including rules of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Hart	  1961,	  78-­‐9.	  	  24	  ibid.,	  79.	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etiquette, cultural traditions, and so forth.25 Hart thought it was the central characteristic 
of legal systems to be composed of a union of primary and secondary rules.  
Hart’s claim that primary rules require agents subject to them to perform or 
abstain from actions “whether they wish to or not” directly raises the question about the 
conative accessibility of the norms composing legal systems – i.e. the ability of agents to 
arrive at the right sort of motivational states with respect to such rules. Here Hart’s 
distinction between “internal” and “external” perspectives on primary and secondary 
rules becomes crucial. The external perspective on legal (or other) rules, Hart contends, 
regards the power of those rules to guide (and ultimately, explain) action as arising 
chiefly from the penalties or sanctions typically meted out for infractions. To take the 
internal perspective on a rule is to accept that rule in such a way that one will be disposed 
to treat infractions (by oneself or others to whom the rule applies) not only as triggering, 
but as justifying sanctions.26  
Hart suggests that in most actually existing legal systems a combination of 
internal and external perspectives on legal rules prevails amongst law subjects.27 It should 
be clear that both perspectives help to solve the problem of conative accessibility – since 
the desire to guide one’s action according to a rule can, plausibly, be founded on either 
acceptance of that rule, and full acknowledgment of its power to create obligations, or on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  As	  I	  explain	  in	  Section	  2.3	  below,	  Hart	  did	  not	  think	  rules	  of	  etiquette	  rose	  to	  the	  level	  of	  a	  system,	  referring	  to	  these	  instead	  as	  a	  ‘set’	  of	  primary	  rules.	  Hart	  did,	  however,	  believe	  that	  other	  kinds	  of	  non-­‐legal	  rules	  could	  constitute	  genuine	  normative	  systems.	  He	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  even	  a	  rudimentary	  rule	  of	  recognition	  –	  such	  as	  ‘consult	  this	  or	  that	  list	  or	  text’	  –	  was	  sufficient	  for	  a	  set	  of	  norms	  to	  become	  a	  system;	  whether	  he	  also	  considered	  this	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  systematicity	  is	  less	  clear.	  Cf.	  Hart	  1961,	  93.	  	  26	  ibid.	  88.	  	  27	  ibid.,	  113.	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the threat of sanctions for violations of that rule, once these become sufficiently severe.28 
It is less clear that either of these distinctions adequately addresses the problem of the 
cognitive accessibility of legal rules – i.e. provides insights into the ability of law-
subjects to reliably form beliefs about what the norms are that apply to them. Indeed, 
recent critics of Hart’s account have suggested that it is implausible to suppose that all 
those subject to a legal system could enjoy either an internal or an external perspective on 
all the rules of that system. Rather than trying to respond as Hart might to this critique, I 
want to turn now to consider what Fuller’s significantly different jurisprudence can tell us 
about the cognitive and conative accessibility of normative systems.  
Fuller’s best-known contribution to legal theory is his proposal of a set of 
conditions, or as he called them, desiderata for legal systems satisfying the rule of law. 
Sometimes described as developing a “laundry list” account of the rule of law,29 Fuller 
identified eight such desiderata in his 1964 book The Morality of Law. These are: (1) 
clarity  (2) prospectivity (3) publicity (4) generality (5) non-contradictoriness (6) 
possibility of fulfillment (7) constancy and (8) congruence of official words and 
actions.30  
These eight desiderata go far towards securing, but do not guarantee, the cognitive 
accessibility of legal norms. One reason they do not guarantee such accessibility, as 
Fuller saw it, is that formal features of norms themselves cannot guarantee that 
individuals subject to them will be able to form clear beliefs about them. Instead, Fuller 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Importantly,	  Hart	  believed	  that	  legal	  systems	  could	  not	  exist,	  or	  persist,	  in	  which	  the	  external	  perspective	  prevailed	  universally.	  	  29	  Jeremy	  Waldron,	  “The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  and	  the	  Importance	  of	  Procedure,”	  NOMOS	  L:	  
Getting	  to	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  (New	  York:	  NYU	  Press,	  2011),	  5.	  	  30	  Fuller	  1964,	  Ch.	  2.	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believed that social conditions of reciprocity, or mutual responsiveness of legal officials 
and law subjects to each others actions under law, are necessary in order for individuals 
to form beliefs appropriate for guiding their actions according to legal norms. As we will 
see below, Fuller eventually expanded this idea of reciprocity into a larger claim about 
the interactive character of law as a system of norms. 
Fuller also considered these eight desiderata crucial to the conative accessibility 
of legal norms, i.e. the ability of individuals to form desires to guide their actions 
according to them. The central concept of Fuller’s jurisprudence related to conative 
accessibility is the notion of “fidelity” to law. Fidelity to law means, most generally, a 
disposition to act in ways that support or sustain law as a form of governance. Exactly 
what actions manifest fidelity to law differ depending on the particular position a legal 
actor occupies – whether legislator, judge, or law-subject. In each case, however, the 
ability of particular legal actors to maintain fidelity depends, in part, on the commitment 
of differently positioned legal actors to do the same. It is for this reason, I think, that 
Fuller claims that Hart’s 1957 Holmes lecture raises the question of fidelity to law. What 
Fuller suggests in his response to Hart is that the violations of legality under the National 
Socialist legal system were so extreme that not only the ability to know what laws there 
were, but the ability to form desires to guide one’s actions according to those laws, were 
dramatically undermined.  
 
2.2.2 Concurrent Functioning  
A second general feature of normative systems is that they function concurrently 
with other normative systems to regulate individual and group conduct. Concurrent 
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functioning does not mean mere parallel operation, or co-existence without precedence. 
Most normative systems make claims of priority, superiority, or exclusion against the 
norms of certain alternate systems. Philosophical work on the concurrency of normative 
systems focuses on assessing the grounds of such claims, and on identifying critical 
standards for settling conflicts. Another major philosophical line of inquiry consists in 
trying to reconcile apparently distinct normative systems by showing that they reduce to 
the same fundamental principles, such as principles of rationality, or fundamental values, 
such as autonomy.  
Methodologically, it is possible to describe the concurrency of normative systems 
from a number of different perspectives. One perspective describes normative systems – 
and their interactions – substantially, as “things in the world” continuously available for 
study and description. A second perspective approaches normative systems and their 
interactions subjectively, that is, from the point of view of an agent engaged in practical 
reasoning. Within the context of the Hart-Fuller debate, Hart generally worked from the 
former perspective, while Fuller tended towards the latter. As above, I will first discuss 
Hart’s views on the concurrency of normative systems, then turn to Fuller’s.  
As Peter Cane has observed, the analytical power of Hart’s theory of law and 
legal systems stems chiefly from the fact that it “deploys a set of relatively clear criteria 
that can be used to identify specific similarities and differences between various 
normative regimes.”31 Crane has in mind both the criteria Hart uses to distinguish modern 
from “primitive” legal systems (i.e. the existence in union of both primary and secondary 
rules) and the criteria Hart offers for distinguishing moral norms from legal norms. Since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Peter	  Crane,	  “Morality,	  Law	  and	  Conflicting	  Reasons	  for	  Action,”	  Cambridge	  Law	  
Journal	  71	  no.	  1	  (March	  2012),	  68.	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I discussed the distinction between primary and secondary rules above, I will focus here 
on Hart’s distinction between legal and moral norms. 
Hart clearly believed that legal and moral norms, and the normative systems to 
which they belong, operate concurrently; he also, famously, believed that those normative 
systems were separable. Both of these claims are implicated in Hart’s analysis of the 
Grudge Informer case (according to which the law under which the Informer’s husband 
was convicted was legally valid, but morally unconscionable), and both claims are 
implicated in the principle of “candor” he recommends for judges and analysts of unjust 
laws.32 But what, if anything, distinguishes the specific kinds of norms that compose 
legal and moral normative systems?  
Hart highlights four (but in fact mentions five) distinguishing features of 
specifically moral norms. Moral norms, he claims, are characterized by (1) “importance” 
(2) “immunity from deliberate change” (3) the “voluntary character of moral offences” 
and (4) the “forms of moral pressure” surrounding them.33 In fact, it is doubtful whether 
any of these features (properly spelled out) are really distinctive of moral norms; and 
since even an affirmative answer seems to rely on claims borrowed from substantive 
theories of moral ontology (a sphere on which Hart declares a desire to remain largely 
agnostic) the discussion appears to fail on its own terms. We should take from this the 
cautionary point that even if we are strongly convinced that two normative systems are 
concurrent but separate (or separable), explaining precisely the qualitative differences 
that distinguish the norms they contain is difficult.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Hart	  1958,	  619-­‐21.	  33	  Hart	  1961,	  164;	  Crane	  2012.	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One further, fifth distinguishing feature of moral norms is briefly mentioned in 
The Concept of Law. Hart makes the point in connection with his claim that moral norms 
are immune from deliberate change, and particularly legislative change; he suggests that, 
at a conceptual level, the “repugnan[ce]” of proposals to legislate morals derives from the 
fact that “we conceive of morality as the ultimate standard by which human actions 
(legislative or otherwise) are evaluated.”34 If correct, this claim implies a very specific 
kind of concurrent relationship between law and morality: a relationship in which, as 
Crane puts it, moral norms serve as “trumps” on legal norms – overriding legal norms in 
every case where there is an irreconcilable conflict between legal and moral norms.35 
I will not argue here one way or another on whether Hart considered moral norms 
to “trump” legal norms everywhere and in all cases where they conflict. It is clear 
enough, from his discussion of the Grudge Informer case, that he believed that moral 
norms do trump at least in scenarios where legal actors face extremely unjust laws. I do 
want to point out, however, that there are at least two ways to construe how moral norms 
trump legal norms in such cases. On the one hand, moral norms might outweigh legal 
norms – meaning that, although defeated, legal norms do carry some weight, and 
specifically, that legal norms cannot simply be excluded from agents’ practical reasoning. 
On the other hand, in some cases, moral norms might exclude legal norms – meaning that 
agents make a mistake of reasoning if they even include those legal norms in their 
practical deliberations.  
Fuller’s views on the concurrent functioning of legal and other normative systems 
are more difficult to summarize. The main point, which is in some ways the heart of his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  ibid.,	  225.	  	  35	  Crane	  2012.	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debate with Hart, is that Fuller believes the eight formal principles of the rule of law 
discussed above constituted the “internal morality of law.” Exactly how this phrase 
should be interpreted is disputed; but one way is to say that Fuller believed that legal 
systems that satisfy the principles of legality would for that reason alone be less likely to 
be compromised by unjust laws. 
Many positivists, including most prominently Hart and Joseph Raz, flatly denied 
the kind of necessary connection between the form and content of the law that this 
interpretation of Fuller’s “internal morality of law” entails. Hart famously used the case 
of the Grudge Informer, along with other examples real and hypothetical, to show that 
law is compatible with “great iniquity.”36 Raz analogized law to a knife, arguing that both 
entities are instruments equally compatible with serving benign or malignant purposes.37 
On these views, while law and morality are necessarily concurrent normative systems (at 
least so long as law exists at all), they are not necessarily complementary normative 
systems, for they are quite capable of guiding agents in fully opposite directions. 
It is easier to dismiss than to clearly explain exactly what the complementarity of 
law and morality would look like on Fuller’s view. David Dyzenhaus has recently 
provided an epistemic account of this complementarity, suggesting that failures of 
legality in legal systems should prompt us to reconsider the morality of the law or laws 
that seem responsible for those failures.38 So, for example, when a legal system treats 
individuals as fully competent adults for some purposes, but not for others (as was the 
case in the United States at that time when draft-eligibility began at 18, but eligibility to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Hart	  1961,	  202.	  	  37	  Joseph	  Raz,	  “The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  and	  Its	  Virtue,”	  in	  The	  Authority	  of	  Law:	  Essays	  on	  
Law	  and	  Morality	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  225-­‐226.	  38	  David	  Dyzenhaus,	  “Unjust	  Law	  in	  Legal	  Theory,”	  Unpublished	  Manuscript.	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vote at 21), we might be prompted by the failure of generality of the legal system with 
respect to the age of majority to consider whether it is morally suspect to separate 
eligibility to die for one’s country from eligibility to vote for one’s leaders in this way. 
I do not know if Fuller would endorse this interpretation of his notion of the 
internal morality of law. I do think Dyzenhaus’s interpretation helps us to understand one 
particular way in which law and morality, or indeed any two normative systems, can be 
both concurrent and complementary.  We might call the relationship Dyzenhaus describes 
one of epistemic complementarity between normative systems – in which the cognitive 
processes involved in determining what norms belonging to one normative systems are or 
require leads non-coincidentally to discoveries about what the norms of a different 
normative system are or require. In the next section, I will consider a different 
interpretation of the internal morality of law; one based on the morally valuable social 
meanings and identities that government by law helps sustain. 
 
2.2.3 Social Meanings and Identities 
A third general feature of normative systems is that they create and maintain 
social meanings and social identities.39 ‘Social meaning’ refers to the ways in which 
individual and group actors construe the purpose and the value of their actions – whether 
norm-guided or norm-rejecting – within an arena where those actions are also visible to 
other actors. ‘Social identity’ refers to the ways in which individual and group actors 
perceive themselves in relation to other actors. Thus defined, social meanings and social 
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  I	  borrow	  this	  terminology	  from	  Geoffrey	  Brennan,	  Lina	  Eriksson,	  Robert	  Goodin,	  and	  Nicholas	  Southwood,	  Explaining	  Norms	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  156.	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identities are mutually determining: the actions that actors are seen to take affect the 
identities they claim, and the identities actors claim often dispose, and sometimes 
compel, them to take certain actions.  
Social meanings and identities spring from numerous sources, and it is difficult to 
specify precisely the importance of norms and normative systems in creating or 
maintaining them. Likewise problematic are attempts to quantify the significance of 
social meanings and identities in motivating, and consequently explaining, action. Within 
political science, constructivists convincingly argue that social meanings and identities 
rightly belong among the utility functions that rational choice theorists use to model and 
explain action, but it is hard to attain any greater specificity than this.  
Narrowing our focus to legal systems specifically, we should distinguish between 
two different levels of inquiry about the power of such systems to create and maintain 
social meanings and identities. At one level, we might ask what meanings and identities 
the laws and legal systems of particular jurisdictions create and maintain. This is the sort 
of question pundits and politicians presume to answer when they say that the laws of 
England preserve liberty; the laws of America, freedom; the laws of France, equality.40 
Pronouncements of this kind are common, but they are not particularly philosophical, and 
neither Hart nor Fuller spends much energy discussing them. 
At another level, we can ask what meanings and identities, if any, are created or 
maintained by law considered in itself – that is, by the sheer kind of normative system 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Many considerably darker claims about connections between the laws of particular 
political societies and social meanings and identities within those societies can be found 
in history. These include the National Socialist claim that law organized around the 
Führerprinzip supports Volkisch-ness, and the claim that race laws in antebellum 
America supported the preservation of God’s ordering of humanity.	  
	   	  37	  
that law is, regardless of jurisdictional variations in form and content. Asking this 
question leads us to perceive one further substantive difference between Hart and Fuller, 
which is of considerable consequence for their positions on the problem of unjust law. 
For Fuller, legal systems that meet the minimal requirements of legality 
necessarily create and sustain important social meanings and identities for both legal 
officials and law-subjects. In particular, legal systems that meet the test of legality 
express and preserve an image of human beings as “responsible agents” bearing 
“dignity.”41  
This is a feature of Fuller’s thought that has lately been much emphasized, most 
notably by Kristen Rundle and Jeremy Waldron.42 How exactly does law support dignity? 
Fuller’s answer seems to be that law is distinguished from many other kinds of normative 
systems in that it does not generally seek to prescribe goals or objectives for law subjects, 
but rather creates a sphere of regulated freedom in which law subjects can pursue their 
own goals and objectives. This may seem close to the Hayekian idea that the value of law 
lies centrally in the creation of predictability, and consequently of liberty. However, 
Fuller also believed that part of having dignity was in being able to enter into direct 
discursive relations with legal officials, e.g. by explaining one’s own actions in court, or 
by asking officials for reasons for their own actions.43 Not all normative systems have 
this feature. Indeed, we can think of many such systems, including the regulations of 
some clubs or fraternal organizations, which deny some or all members the opportunity to 	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  Fuller	  1964,	  162.	  	  42	  Kristen	  Rundle,	  Forms	  Liberate:	  Reclaiming	  the	  Jurisprudence	  of	  Lon	  Fuller	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2012);	  Waldron	  2011.	  43	  This	  is	  a	  point	  that	  Jeremy	  Waldron	  has	  stressed	  in	  a	  number	  of	  recent	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  on	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  Cf.	  Jeremy	  Waldron,	  “The	  Concept	  and	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law,”	  43	  Georgia	  Law	  Review	  1,	  2008-­‐2009;	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  2011.	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ask for explanations or justifications of rules. Those normative systems may create or 
secure many different kinds of meanings or identities. But they do not preserve dignity in 
the way Fuller thought law did, by allowing persons subject to norms to enter into direct 
discursive relations with persons responsible for creating and upholding them. 
It is tempting to draw a sharp contrast between Hart and Fuller on this point, and 
to say that Hart believed legal systems do not, at the most general level, necessarily 
create or maintain any particular identity for those who fall within their various 
jurisdictions. To say this would be to ignore Hart’s discussion, in The Concept of Law, of 
the “minimum content of natural law.”44 In this section, Hart suggests that, as a matter of 
natural necessity, all legal systems rest on a certain minimal conception of human nature 
and capacities, characterized by five elements. These are: (1) human vulnerability, (2) 
approximate equality, (3) limited altruism, (4) limited resources, and (5) limited 
understanding and strength of will. 
These five minimal constraints on legal systems clearly arise from, and help to 
sustain, a certain notion of human identity. This is not a conception of human identity 
that can easily be celebrated or made into a creed, but it is not a negative or pessimistic 
picture, either. Indeed, although Fuller would insinuate that Hart’s conception of law 
would allow that title to be applied to a system of mere “managerial direction,” that claim 
is hard to square with this account of the minimal content of natural law, and so it is not 
surprising to find Hart’s expositors bristling at this claim.45 
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2.3 Law’s ‘Extended Sense’: Hart and Fuller on Informal Principles of Social Order 
Toward the end of his 2011 book, Legality, Scott Shapiro suggests that Fuller 
overlooked one very important benefit officials and citizens get from governance, or 
“social planning,” according to law. This is: 
 the enormous cognitive energy saved by not having to think about the best way to 
 regulate our lives and to convince others about the rectitude of our judgments. Even  
 when the rules are misguided or corrupt, we are at least spared from having to 
 deliberate and debate about what should be done.”46 
 
Such a characterization of Fuller’s jurisprudence is only possible if one ignores 
Fuller’s 1969 essay, “Human Interaction and the Law.”47 In the essay, Fuller identifies 
calculability, or cognitive economy, as central to the functional value of law, and integral 
to the explanation of law’s origins in other, informal principles of social order. 
Fuller does not mention Hart directly in “Human Interaction and the Law.” 
Nevertheless, that essay is very clearly a continuation of Fuller’s earlier criticisms of 
Hart’s positivism generally, and Hart’s The Concept of Law specifically. An important 
strand of Fuller’s criticism targets Hart’s own account of the relationship between 
informal principles of social order – i.e. customs, conventions, traditions, and social 
norms – and law properly so called. 
In this section I discuss Hart and Fuller’s respective understandings of the 
ontology and action-guiding power of such informal principles of social order. Both 
theorists thought such informal principles could be called law, in an “extended sense,” 
but they differed as to what that qualification meant.48 I will not be able to discuss all the 
interesting aspects of their respective views here. Instead, I will focus on explaining to 	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  1969.	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what extent both men believed that such informal principles constituted normative 
systems, and on considering how both theorists conceived of the concurrency of such 
informal principles with the normative systems of law and morality.  
 
2.3.1 Fuller on Customary Law 
In his 1969 essay, Fuller joins together under the term “customary law” a range of 
informal principles of social order, including customs, conventions, traditions, and social 
norms.49 Philosophers today will be inclined to hold these different kinds of principles 
distinct, on the basis of analysis of their differing structures, sources, and forms of 
normativity. I myself am committed to such distinctions, as will become clear in the next 
chapter. Nevertheless, I believe Fuller’s less specialized account stands as a good 
introduction to thinking about the varieties of normative systems composed of such 
informal principles.  
Three basic claims about customary law, so understood, are defended in “Human 
Interaction and the Law.” First, Fuller argues that customary law is epistemically prior to 
positive, or ‘enacted’ law. That is, positive law cannot properly be understood except 
when customary law is properly understood. Second, Fuller argues that a functional 
understanding of customary law, rooted in the notion of “interactional expectancy,” is 
superior to an understanding based either on mere habit or on habit plus felt obligation. 
Third, Fuller argues that customary law is not diminished, but rather pervasive, in 
political societies featuring extensive positive legislation. 
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To illustrate the savings in mental calculation that customs commonly secure, 
Fuller cites the example of a developing custom (we would call it a convention) of 
reciprocal, one-to-one expulsion of diplomats from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Fuller 
suggests that the value of this convention lies in its easy calculability; “any responsible 
official,” he writes, “would reflect a long time” before choosing to alter the proportion of 
the exchange, since doing so would render not only the opposing nation’s interpretation 
of this action, but also their likely future responses to this action, less predictable.50 As 
Fuller concludes, “this is a case where both sides would probably be well-advised to stick 
with the familiar ritual.”51 
This example is offered by Fuller to illustrate the general interactive quality of 
customs, contracts, and enacted law, and it succeeds on those terms. Some commentators 
have sought to show that law rests in its foundations on certain interconnected 
conventions.52 One challenge in doing this is to show how conventions, which commonly 
regulate interactions of a very specific and limited kind, can support broader normative 
systems, including legal systems. Fuller certainly thought that some areas of customary 
law were much more systematized than this particular example; in both The Morality of 
Law and “Human Interaction and the Law” he describes the rules of clubs, colleges, labor 
unions, and so on as being both systematic and customary.53  
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Studying Fuller’s account of customary law enhances our understanding of his 
views on the concurrency of normative systems. Fuller sees customary law not as being 
superseded, but rather as continuing to pervade, societies that also feature enacted law. 
Studying this account also helps to clarify what kinds of identities Fuller thought formal 
law creates, as compared to custom. As he remarks, whereas customs and conventions 
commonly prescribe very precise roles and spheres of action for those who are party to 
them, statutory laws typically leave a wide sphere of possible actions and identities open, 
ruling out only some of the most prejudicial to a shared social life.54 If the general 
framework orienting this study is correct, then such differences in the kinds of actions 
prescribed and identities established by informal rules and by enacted laws will be just as 
consequential for understanding situations of several social and political unrest and 
violence as they are for understanding the ordinary, orderly functioning of societies.  
 
2.3.2 Hart on Customs, Traditions, and Social Rules 
Hart has had a more substantial influence than Fuller on subsequent philosophical 
work on informal principles of social order. Philosophers including Margaret Gilbert, 
Philip Pettit, and Geoffrey Brennan have adopted and expanded the account of social 
rules that Hart provides in The Concept of Law. Within legal theory, Hart has become 
associated, since the posthumous publication of his uncompleted postscript to The 
Concept of Law, with the thesis of conventionalism – in particular, with claiming that the 
rule of recognition judges rely on in determining what is law is conventional. Besides 
these kinds of informal principles, Hart also discusses customs and traditions in his work, 
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as informal principles that often operate alongside, but do not themselves have the 
character of law.  
One notable claim Hart makes about social rules, such as rules of etiquette, in The 
Concept of Law is that social rules do not typically display the systematic quality 
typically found in legal or moral systems. Instead, he suggests, social rules – of etiquette, 
and perhaps of other things – typically form “sets” rather than “systems.” Hart goes on to 
suggest that it is in various ways inconvenient for rules of this kind to lack the qualities of 
systematicity – which seems to mean, to lack secondary rules – but that this lack of 
systematicity hardly bars these rules from being properly accepted, obligatory rules. 
It is possible to press a similar point against both Hart and Fuller’s accounts of 
informal principles of social order.  Namely, if we look more closely at the nature and 
dynamics of social rules, and at the kinds of practical problems they help to solve, it may 
turn out that a lack of systematicity, like a lack of generality, or prospectivity, or one of 
the other principles associated with legality, allows such norms to emerge and spread 
with the speed necessary to resolve those problems, in the sense of assigning 
responsibilities for tasks, of penalties for exploiting common resources. Just because 
social norms often lack these qualities, however, they seem to be particularly suspect 
from the standpoint of justice. And this may be something like a negative demonstration 
of Fuller’s notion of the internal morality of law: if it could be shown that systems or sets 
of norms that are not commonly reviewed in the aspirational sense for accordance with 
the rule of law require stricter scrutiny from the standpoint of justice, then the conclusion 
that formal principles of legality do, as a practical matter at least, incline a system 
towards justice (as opposed to pure instrumental success or efficiency) seems to follow. 
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2.3.3 Informal Principles and the Full Picture of Political Society 
In this section, I have shown that both Hart and Fuller, as a direct corollary of 
their theoretical work on law, undertook to understand the ontology and action-guiding 
power of informal principles of social order. Hart’s investigation of social rules, 
especially, remains influential today; but neither his account of social rules nor Fuller’s 
study of customary law is commonly treated as part of the Hart-Fuller debate. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that either Hart or Fuller saw his interest in informal 
principles of social order as meaningfully connected to the questions raised by unjust 
laws and legal systems.  
In my view, this represents a missed connection. In order fully to understand the 
problems of practical reasoning that confront individual actors in the context of extremely 
unjust political societies, we need to ask not only whether and how political leaders or 
factions use law to achieve and sustain immoral policies, but also how they create or 
exploit informal principles of social order for this purpose. In the next, and final, section I 
will suggest that the retrospective, prospective, and present-oriented aims of research on 
mass atrocity and transitional justice requires attending more closely to such informal 
principles.  
 
2.4 The Message of Cain and the Testimony of Ulysses 
One of the most trenchant observations in Fuller’s 1969 account of informal 
principles of social order is his claim that such principles do not become less, but indeed 
become more, significant in contexts of war and conflict. We already saw hints of this in 
Fuller’s example of the developing convention of reciprocal expulsion of diplomats; this 
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example provides a clear reminder of the Cold War context of Fuller’s essay. Towards 
the end of “Human Interaction and the Law,” Fuller suggests that such principles are still 
more likely to arise during ‘hot’ wars, remarking: 
 Paradoxically the tacit constraints of customary law between enemies are more likely to 
 develop during active warfare than during a hostile stalemate of relations; fighting one 
 another is itself in this sense a social relation since it involves communication.55 
 
Fuller seems to have in mind war in its traditional form– i.e. conflict between 
hostile parties that do not antecedently share common enacted or customary laws. It is 
less clear whether he would agree that informal principles of order also arise and guide 
action within less traditional kinds of conflict, such as civil wars or state-sponsored 
attacks on particular groups of citizens. I believe that informal principles of the kind both 
Hart and Fuller wrote about do help to structure and sustain such non-traditional forms of 
conflict. In this final section of this chapter, I want to return to the Grudge Informer case, 
and argue that a proper reconstruction of this case (and cases like it) requires attending to 
informal principles of social order, as well as to legal and moral norms.     
When historians study denunciation cases from the National Socialist period, or 
comparable episodes from other instances of mass atrocity, they take such cases to form 
part of (but only part of) a complete explanation of how such large-scale crimes occur. 
The particular problems of explanation that historians of mass atrocity concern 
themselves with are (1) problems of capturing and describing the full scale of such large-
scale crimes, and (2) problems of explaining widespread participation by ordinary 
individuals in such crimes. Studies of informers, like studies of killers or studies of 
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bystanders, generally aim at addressing both of these questions – though they often give 
priority to one or the other. 
In order to explain the decisions and actions of informers and killers, bystanders 
and rescuers in historical contexts, historians typically bring to bear a broad range of 
tools for social explanation, looking not only at laws and legal sanctions but also at 
informal principles, rules, and sanctions. Within the literature on mass atrocity, more so 
than in other areas of study, there is also a tendency to include moral norms, and 
transformations such norms, within the set of explanatory factors used to make sense of 
such large-scale crimes.  
In their mid-century reflections on the Grudge Informer case, Hart and Fuller 
were less concerned with providing a full reconstruction of the normative and descriptive 
dimensions of the decisions and actions made by the different historical actors in that 
case than they were with singling out dimensions relevant to their respective theories of 
the relationship between law and morality. Nevertheless, I believe that their accounts, 
elsewhere, of informal principles of social order provided them with the necessary 
conceptual tools to give an account of the broader normative dimensions of this case. 
What would such an account, such a reconstruction, look like? It would include 
attention not only to the points of law that the judge presiding in the original court martial 
deliberated over, but also to the professional rights and duties that judges in this 
particular historical context accepted, and did or did not act upon. This would allow us to 
make more considered judgments about whether the Grudge Informer case is primarily a 
case of malfeasance on the part of law-subjects, or on the part of legal officials. A full 
account would also consider the actions (or inactions) of the neighbors and friends of the 
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couple in question, who apparently did not provide testimony on the accused soldier’s 
behalf. This would allow us to better understand how bystanding, or failure to act to 
prevent unjust actions, helped maintain a criminal state. A full account would, 
furthermore, consider sexual and gender conventions or norms that the Informer in this 
case apparently defied, not only by denouncing her husband but also by entering into an 
affair while he was away in the war. This would allow us to reflect more critically on our 
own initial intuitions concerning the distribution of moral and legal accountability among 
the various actors in this and comparable denunciation cases.56 
What broader goals does a perspective on large-scale crime that includes attention 
to informal principles of social order serve? First and foremost, it allows us better to 
understand the conditions that structure and sustain what Hart aptly described as “Hell 
created on earth by men for other men.” It helps us, that is, to understand how mass 
atrocities begin, and how they can continue over time with direct or direct participation 
from large numbers of morally competent individuals It also holds out the promise of two 
kinds of consequences from that better understanding: first, an opportunity to develop 
better warning signs for mass atrocities; second, an opportunity for thinking critically 
about the proper distribution of responsibility for such crimes. Together, these are the 
three aims that orient this study.  
How can we can acquire knowledge of the contributions that informal principles 
make and have made to mass atrocities? Here again a phrase from Hart is suggestive, 
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though in this case it must be supplemented. Hart suggests there is inherent value in the 
“testimony of Ulysses,” i.e. the testimony of those who have been caught up in unjust 
legal systems, have been persecuted by those systems, and have survived. Hart had in 
mind Gustav Radbruch; it is natural to extend this category to include individuals like 
Primo Levi (who eloquently adopted the figure of Ulysses in his If This Be a Man) and 
indeed all those who have been persecuted by or have resisted, at significant risk, unjust 
regimes. 
There is another important source of testimony about the informal principles that 
help to structure large-scale crimes. That testimony comes from the perpetrators 
themselves – as well as those who, by their actions or non-action, aid them. It is this well 
of testimony that historians such as Christopher Browning and Jean Hatzfeld, as well as 
political scientists such as James Waller and Kristen Renwick Monroe, have relied on in 
their efforts to make sense of mass atrocity. Rather than the testimony of Ulysses, we 
might call this, to borrow a trope from a different tradition, the message of Cain: the 
message, that is, of individuals who have caused great suffering to their families, 
neighbors, or colleagues by taking part in large-scale crimes. Both of these strands of 
testimony, I submit, are necessary in order to understand fully the contribution of 
informal principles to the precipitation, prolongation, and prevention of mass atrocities. 
In this section I have argued that, when we attempt to model or reconstruct the 
practical deliberations and actions of specific individuals in specific social and political 
contexts, we need to consider those deliberations and actions in light of the whole picture 
of political society. This is true whether our aim is to explain how particular patterns of 
intention and action could have arisen in particular historical social and political contexts; 
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to critique, from a normative perspective, intentions and actions that have arisen or might 
arise in current social and political contexts; or to predict what patterns of intention and 
action are likely to arise given prospective (or proposed) changes in social and political 
contexts. Although I have given reasons for employing this approach here, I expect its 
real value to be borne out through its application in subsequent chapters of this study. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller, along with most of the scholars who subsequently 
developed and extended their debate, looked to unjust legal systems, and to particular 
cases considered characteristic of such systems, in hopes of resolving questions arising 
independently within legal philosophy. My order of inquiry in this study is almost exactly 
the reverse. I want to consider how conceptual frameworks developed within philosophy 
– specifically, the framework of social norms – can be used to resolve meta-descriptive 
and meta-normative questions arising independently within theoretical work on mass 
atrocity and transitional justice. These include questions about the validity of the thesis of 
norm transformation as an explanatory factor in mass atrocities, as well as questions 
about the appropriate distribution of legal and moral responsibility to individual and 
institutional agents in the wake of large-scale crimes.  
The discussion of the Hart-Fuller debate provided in this chapter helps to 
introduce those meta-normative and meta-descriptive questions in a way that should be 
accessible to philosophers and social scientists alike. In the chapter, I have highlighted 
three general features of normative systems – cognitive and conative accessibility; 
concurrent functioning; and the creation of social meanings and identities – that are 
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crucial to understanding the action-guiding power of social norms. At the same time, I 
have suggested that many different kinds of informal principles of social order may be 
detected in societies undergoing large-scale violence – including customs, conventions, 
and traditions, as well as social norms. The aim of the next chapter will be to explain 
exactly what features or qualities distinguish social norms from these other kinds of 
informal principles of social order, and to consider in more detail the methods we can use 
to reconstruct the action-guiding influence of social norms within particular groups and 
populations in contexts of mass atrocity and political transitions.  
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Chapter 3. Social Norms: Conceptual and Methodological Issues 
 
Three great English memoirists of the First World War attest to the influence of 
informal principles of social order upon the lives and fates of combatants in that conflict. 
Robert Graves, in his acerbic Goodbye to All That, analogizes the “strict caste system” 
and “social code” of his elite boarding school with the jealously guarded traditions of his 
adopted army regiment.1 Siegfried Sassoon, in his Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, recalls 
one commander’s gambit to win distinction for his division by laying down discretionary 
rules against rum and cigarettes, and by prohibiting his men from wearing new – and 
lifesaving – steel helmets.2 Edmund Blunden, in his Undertones of War, devotes an early 
chapter to the topic of “trench education,” and generally represents himself as an innocent 
overwhelmed by a raft of unfamiliar – and unfathomable – army protocols.3  
Blunden’s description of his conflicting feelings upon demobilization indicates 
the strength of the social meanings and identities grounded in martial customs and norms: 
 Looking back over 1918 and this opening quarter of 1919, I became  
 desperately confused over war and peace. Clearly, no man who knew and felt 
 could wish for a second that the war should have lasted a second longer. But,  
 where it was not, and where the traditions and government which had called it  
 into being had ceased to be, we who had been brought up to it were lost men.   
 Strangers surrounded me. No tried values existed now.4 
 
Regimental traditions and army regulations were not the only practical prescriptions, 
prohibitions, and permissions accepted by officers and soldiers during the First World 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Robert	  Graves,	  Goodbye	  to	  All	  That	  (New	  York:	  Jonathon	  Cape	  &	  Harrison	  Smith,	  1930).	  	  2	  Siegfried	  Sassoon,	  Memoirs	  of	  an	  Infantry	  Officer,	  in	  The	  Complete	  Memoirs	  of	  
George	  Sherston	  (London:	  Faber	  and	  Faber,	  1937),	  408.	  	  3	  Edmund	  Blunden,	  Undertones	  of	  War	  (Garden	  City,	  NY:	  Doubleday,	  1929).	  4	  Edmund	  Blunden,	  “Aftertones	  of	  War,”	  in	  The	  Mind’s	  Eye	  (London:	  Jonathon	  Cape,	  1934),	  34.	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War. Literary theorist Paul Fussell famously called that conflict “more ironic than any 
before or since;” many of the specific ironies he cites stem from the intrusion of “social 
norms” and “social usages” familiar from civilian life into the trenches.5 These 
transplanted social norms and informal principles frequently had the effect of insulating 
civilians and convalescing soldiers from the realities of the front. One case Fussell cites 
concerns the practice of acknowledging lifesaving aid in battle with the kind of trifling 
gifts customarily used to repay favors at home.6 Another concerns the “conventional[ly] 
phlegmatic” epistolary style adopted by soldiers at the front – a style prescribing that the 
“maximum number of clichés” be used in order to “fill the page by saying nothing.”7  
Reflecting on these reports and reminiscences, we might ask what features 
distinguish social norms from the other types of informal principles, such as conventions 
and traditions. We might ask whether these same features distinguish social norms from 
legal and moral norms. And we might ask whether there is any principled way of 
reconstructing the action-guiding influence of particular social norms in historical 
contexts – including contexts of war and contexts of mass atrocity.  
In this chapter, I address these questions. In Section 3.1 I distinguish social norms 
from conventions and traditions on the basis of their intrinsically normative character and 
their status as sources of non-exclusionary, rather than exclusionary, reasons for action. 
In Section 3.2 I lay out my basic, four-feature account of social norms, according to 
which social norms are (1) particular, (2) practice-grounded, (3) group intentional, and 
(4) accountability-creating. In order to illustrate these features, I develop a hypothetical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Paul	  Fussell,	  The	  Great	  War	  and	  Modern	  Memory	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1975),	  8.	  	  6	  ibid.,	  67-­‐68.	  7	  ibid.,	  181-­‐183.	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example based on Robert Graves’s description of a particularly striking trench practice. 
Finally, in Section 3.3, I address some methodological questions about the identification 
of social norms in historical contexts. Here, as elsewhere in this study, I engage closely 
with the work of Cristina Bicchieri, Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert Goodin, 
and Nicholas Southwood on the nature and dynamics of social norms. 
Finally, a word on examples. Throughout this chapter, I employ examples drawn 
from the English experience of the First World War. This approach is motivated by two 
main aims. First, it helps to show that social norms play an important role in structuring 
situations of conflict and violence, as well as situations of peace and stability. Second, 
this strategy highlights both the promise and the perils of relying on testimonial materials 
for evidence of the operation of social norms in historical contexts. The significance of 
such issues will become clearer towards the end of the chapter.  
 
3.1 Social Norms, Conventions, and Traditions 
Conventions, traditions, and social norms constitute three major categories of 
informal principles of social order. Each of these different types of informal principles 
helps to secure coordination or cooperation within groups and collectives, often in the 
absence of formal agreements, promises, or regulations. Each supplies a portion of what 
political theorist Jon Elster calls “the cement of society.”8  
Despite their overlapping functions within social and political life, conventions, 
traditions, and social norms can be distinguished on the basis of the three features of 
norms and normative systems identified in the previous chapter. They can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Jon	  Elster,	  The	  Cement	  of	  Society:	  A	  Survey	  of	  Social	  Order	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1989).	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distinguished, that is, on the basis of their cognitive and conative accessibility; their 
concurrent functioning with other norms and normative systems; and their ability to 
create and sustain social meaning and identities. In this section I distinguish conventions, 
traditions, and social norms along these lines. In the next section I outline my basic, four-
feature account of social norms.    
 
3.1.1 Conventions 
Conventions are informal practical principles that sustain behavioral regularities 
within groups and collectivities across distance and over time. Conventions are grounded 
in shared interests and shared expectations amongst the various actors who compose the 
groups and collectivities in which they circulate. Conventions do not, as a general matter, 
support the kinds of social meanings or identities associated with traditions and social 
norms. Nor do they require the kinds of genuinely normative attitudes, such as attitudes 
of felt obligation and justified sanctioning, essential to traditions and social norms.   
My discussion of Fuller’s jurisprudence in the last chapter introduced several 
different examples of conventions. One was the common example of the convention, in 
America and many other parts of the world, of driving on the right hand side of the road, 
rather than the left. Another was the example of the convention amongst sovereign 
nations of reciprocally ejecting each other’s diplomats. Both conventions serve to 
coordinate action among parties whose opportunities for communication are constrained, 
but whose interests overlap. Both conventions are made possible by the fact that the 
parties involved share interests in being able to predict other parties’ actions under set 
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circumstances, and in having their own actions, under such circumstances, match other 
parties’ expectations.   
The practical problems that both of these sample conventions help to resolve 
belong to a broad class of scenarios known generally as coordination problems. 
Coordination problems are a species of collective action problems; they are solved (as in 
the examples offered) when the decisions and actions of individual actors achieve 
equilibrium with the decisions and actions of other actors.9 Some philosophers  – notably, 
David Lewis – build the concept of coordination problems directly into their accounts of 
convention.10 Others – notably, Margaret Gilbert – deny that coordination problems are 
necessary or sufficient conditions for the existence of conventions.11  
In this study, I withhold judgment as to whether the existence of a coordination 
problem, however specified, is a necessary or sufficient condition for the existence of a 
convention. I will likewise withhold judgment on the question of whether conventions 
must be “arbitrary”.12 I will instead use examples – both real and hypothetical – to draw 
attention to features that I do take to be essential to conventions.  
Consider the WWI example of ‘stand-to.’ ‘Stand-to’ occurred twice daily along 
the front-line trenches in France and Belgium. Soldiers on both sides of the line would, at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  A	  great	  deal	  of	  technical	  work	  has	  been	  done	  on	  coordination	  problems	  and	  their	  solutions,	  as	  on	  the	  broader	  category	  of	  collective	  action	  problems.	  Because	  I	  don’t	  consider	  this	  technical	  work	  to	  essential	  to	  explaining	  the	  distinction	  between	  conventions	  and	  social	  norms,	  I	  will	  not	  address	  this	  work	  in	  detail	  here.	  10	  David	  Lewis,	  Convention:	  A	  Philosophical	  Study	  (Malden,	  MA:	  Blackwell	  Publishing,	  2002	  [1969]).	  	  11	  Margaret	  Gilbert,	  On	  Social	  Facts	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1992),	  343-­‐344.	  	  12	  Arbitrariness	  is	  another	  feature	  that	  Lewis	  takes	  to	  be	  central	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  convention,	  and	  which	  Gilbert	  denies.	  See	  Lewis	  2002	  [1969],	  70;	  Gilbert	  1992,	  399-­‐403.	  
	   	  56	  
dawn and at sunset, take up positions of readiness in anticipation of a possible enemy 
attack.  
There were, as Paul Fussell notes, important strategic reasons for heightened 
readiness for attack at dawn and at sunset. The east-west division of the front entailed 
that, in the morning, soldiers on the western side of no-man’s-land might remain in 
darkness a few minutes longer than the enemy soldiers along the eastern side, giving 
them a slight advantage in firing accuracy and so an opportunity for attack; the reverse 
was true at sunset.13  
If we look past strategic reasons for the practice of stand-to, however, we can see 
that a number of conventional practices could also be coordinated on the basis of the 
predictable rising and setting of the sun. The distribution of alcohol at a time when all 
soldiers could easily be assembled to receive it offers one example – for the moments of 
stand-to were typically also the moments when soldiers would receive their daily ‘tot’ of 
rum.14 The transition from one cycle of rest or duties to another before and after stand-to 
is a second example of a trench practice conventionally organized around stand-to.  
To use the term introduced by economist Thomas Schelling, we can say that 
sunrise and sunset furnished WWI soldiers and officers with focal points around which a 
wide variety of activities could be coordinated up and down the lines, without the need 
for repeated or long-distance communication amongst different divisions and 
companies.15 This informal arrangement served the purpose of reliably coordinating 
action in the same way a standing policy of convening on the last Thursday of the month 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  ibid.	  	  14	  Fussell	  1975,	  51-­‐52.	  	  15	  Thomas	  Schelling,	  The	  Strategy	  of	  Conflict	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1981).	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might serve an academic department’s common interest in effortlessly coordinating 
regular departmental meetings.  
What general points can we draw from this example of trench conventions? I 
believe there are several. The first point is that conventions do not necessarily create or 
sustain social meanings or identities. Compare, for example, the statements “a soldier is a 
person who confronts danger without undue concern for his (or her) bodily safety” and “a 
soldier is a person who always gets his (or her) tot of rum at sunrise.” The former 
statement has a plausible claim to saying something true about what it means to be a 
soldier, about the identity of a soldier. The latter statement makes sense only as satire – 
prompting us to question whether there is any substantial meaning or identity involved in 
being a soldier. The success of the joke depends on our intuition that no serious meaning 
or identity can be found in, or founded upon, this type of trench convention.16  
A second point concerns the normative character or quality of conventions. As 
defined in the rational choice literature, conventions are, by definition, efficient (insofar 
as they provide solutions to coordination problems) and although different conventions 
may be more or less efficient it is generally supposed that the efficiency of any given 
conventions supplies at least a pro tanto reason for relevant parties to follow it, rather 
than following none. But to say that parties have an instrumental reason to follow a 
convention is not yet (or is not obviously) to say that parties have an obligation to follow 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  This	  argument	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  show	  that	  conventions	  cannot	  support	  social	  meanings	  or	  identities,	  but	  only	  that	  this	  is	  not	  an	  essential	  feature	  of	  conventions.	  We	  should	  also	  be	  cautious	  about	  being	  too	  narrow	  in	  our	  judgments	  about	  what	  kinds	  of	  experiences	  can	  be	  invested	  with	  meaning	  of	  this	  kind.	  Fussell	  notes	  that	  the	  policy	  of	  ‘stand-­‐to,’	  whatever	  its	  strategic	  or	  coordinating	  functions,	  also	  had	  the	  consequence	  that	  soldiers	  regularly	  experience	  brilliant	  sunrises	  and	  sunsets,	  and	  notes	  that	  these	  experiences	  were	  in	  fact	  frequently	  endowed	  with	  great,	  though	  nebulous,	  significance	  in	  war	  memoirs	  and	  war	  poetry.	  See	  Fussell	  1975,	  52-­‐60.	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that convention, or would be justified in sanctioning other parties for failing to follow it. 
Indeed, much of the explanatory power of conventions, within this literature, resides in 
the fact that conventions can explain behavioral regularities by way of the self-interest of 
individuals, without having to appeal to normative beliefs or attitudes of this kind. The 
conative accessibility of conventions, on this view, can be explained most simply in 
terms of self-interest, without reference to associated normative attitudes. We are left to 
ask whether there are any significant normative attitudes that are intrinsic to conventions, 
or whether such normative attitudes must be derived from external considerations.  
This is a question that has divided philosophers studying convention. David Lewis 
claimed that whatever normative status conventions have comes from external 
considerations, i.e. from utilitarian assessments of the value of coordination.17 Margaret 
Gilbert has argued that normative attitudes of the kind mentioned above are in fact 
intrinsic to the concept of conventions; she distinguishes between so-called ‘Lewis 
conventions’ and conventions proper.18 Gerald Postema, while disputing specific features 
of Gilbert’s account of convention, similarly holds that conventions are intrinsically 
linked to normative attitudes, and impose genuinely normative requirements upon 
particularly positioned actors.19 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Lewis	  2002	  [1969],	  98-­‐99.	  18	  Gilbert	  1992.	  19	  Gerald	  Postema,	  “Conventions	  and	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Law,”	  in	  Legal	  Philosophy	  in	  
the	  Twentieth	  Century:	  The	  Common	  Law	  World,	  Volume	  11	  of	  A	  Treatise	  of	  Legal	  
Philosophy	  and	  General	  Jurisprudence	  (Dordrecht,	  NL:	  Springer,	  2011),	  533.	  Postema	  is	  particularly	  concerned	  with	  defending	  a	  conventionalist	  account	  of	  law.	  It	  may	  well	  be	  that	  the	  picture	  of	  convention	  I	  am	  adopting	  is	  incompatible	  with	  such	  a	  theory	  –	  though	  this	  point	  is	  too	  removed	  from	  the	  main	  aims	  of	  this	  study	  for	  full	  consideration	  here.	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My own view is that conventions are not intrinsically normative – that is, do not, 
by themselves, create obligations, although they do often provide instrumental reasons 
for action. The absence of intrinsic normativity suggests that, although conventions 
operate concurrently with norms and normative systems in everyday life, they are not 
themselves norms. To be sure, conventions can and frequently do evolve into social 
norms – as properly normative attitudes arise within the particular populations that share 
those conventions.20 But in the case of the trench conventions I have described, it seems 
we cannot say that it would be wrong, though it might well be less efficient, for officers 
to distribute rum rations to their troops at a different time of day from sunrise or sunset, 
or for soldiers to transition between duties (or between duties and rest) at a time other 
than stand-to.  
It will be understood from the structure of this section that I believe social norms 
differ significantly from conventions across two important dimensions of norms and 
normative systems– i.e. with respect to their connection with social meanings and 
identities, and with respect to their intrinsically normative character. I will begin to set 
out my basic account of social norms shortly. First, however, I want to discuss another 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  My	  account	  thus	  differs	  from	  that	  defended	  by	  Gerald	  Postema,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  convention	  does	  entail	  genuinely	  normative	  features,	  such	  as	  the	  power	  to	  bind	  or	  obligate	  parties	  to	  the	  convention.	  Postema	  helpfully	  distinguishes	  mere	  empirical	  reliance	  on	  or	  expectation	  of	  behavioral	  regularities	  from	  the	  kinds	  or	  types	  of	  expectations	  capable	  of	  founding	  legitimate	  obligations;	  however,	  on	  the	  view	  I	  am	  presenting,	  which	  aligns	  more	  closely	  with	  the	  views	  of	  Geoffrey	  Brennan	  et	  al,	  genuinely	  normative	  expectations	  or	  attitudes	  about	  the	  expected	  or	  observed	  conduct	  of	  others	  push	  the	  principles	  in	  question	  into	  the	  category	  of	  social	  norms.	  See	  Gerald	  Postema,	  “Coordination	  and	  Convention	  at	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Law,”	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Studies	  XI	  (January	  1982),	  172-­‐182;	  Geoffrey	  Brennan,	  Lina	  Eriksson,	  Robert	  Goodin,	  and	  Nicholas	  Southwood,	  Explaining	  Norms	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  15-­‐19;	  101-­‐104.	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contrasting case within the category of informal principles of social order. This is the 
case of traditions.  
 
3.1.2 Traditions 
In The Concept of Law H.L.A. Hart draws an analogy between traditions and 
moral rules: neither of these two kinds of practical principles, Hart suggests, can be 
“legislated,” or willfully and immediately created or called into being.21 Attempts to 
legislate such principles, in the manner of legal rules, are not just sociologically hopeless. 
Rather, they reflect a conceptual mistake.   
One can of course hold that the concepts of both traditions and moral rules bar 
creation by direct legislation, but for different reasons – as Hart himself observes.22 It is, 
Hart urges, “repugnant to the whole notion of morality” to suppose there could be “a 
moral legislature with competence to make and change morals, as legal enactments make 
and change laws.”23 If this is correct, then it seems that those who actively try to legislate 
morality are not merely conceptually mistaken, but may also err morally.24 
In the case of tradition, the error involved in attempts at direct legislation is purely 
conceptual. One cannot willfully and immediately “legislate” traditions. Here the 
difficulty resides in the “immediately,” rather than in the “willfully.” Not all traditions 
are products of will, but all traditions are products of time. It is this latter quality that 
cannot be achieved through legislation. This is significant, since it is the “time-honored” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Hart	  1961,	  172;	  225.	  	  22	  ibid,	  225.	  	  23	  ibid.,	  173.	  24	  Hart	  later	  elaborated	  on	  the	  difficulties	  involved	  in	  attempts	  to	  legislate	  morality	  in	  his	  response	  to	  Patrick	  Devlin’s	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals.	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quality of traditions that explains their distinctive mode of guiding action – i.e. by 
supplying exclusionary reasons. 
Exclusionary reasons are reasons that, once recognized, cut off consideration of 
certain other, potentially competing reasons, without actually outweighing or defeating 
them. Some philosophers (notably Joseph Raz) have argued that all norms (including 
legal norms institute by a legitimate authority) serve as second-order, exclusionary 
reasons in practical reasoning.25 I do not accept this general claim about the action-
guiding function of norms, but I do think traditions, as a specific sub-class of norms, 
operate in this way.26  
One point that tells in favor of this view of the action-guiding power of traditions, 
or of their role in the deliberations of individual agents about action, concerns the close 
connection between traditions and social meanings and identities. Unlike conventions, 
traditions generally do create and sustain social meanings and identities, including 
meanings that attach to communities at large, and roles or offices that specific individuals 
within those communities occupy.   
Consider Robert Graves’ description of a dress tradition associated with his own 
adopted army unit, the Royal Welch Fusiliers: 
  The most immediate piece of regimental history that I met as a recruit- 
 officer was the flash. The flash is a fan-like bunch of five black ribbons, each  
 ribbon two inches wide and seven and a half inches long; the angle at which the 
 fan is spread is exactly regulated by regimental convention. It is stitched to the   
 back of the tunic collar. Only the Royal Welch are privileged to wear it. The story  
 is that the Royal Welch were abroad on foreign service for several years in the  
 1830’s, and by some chance never received the army order abolishing the queue.  
 When the regiment returned and paraded at Plymouth the inspecting general rated the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  See	  Joseph	  Raz,	  Practical	  Reason	  and	  Norms	  (London:	  Hutchinson	  &	  Co.,	  1975),	  35-­‐48.	  	  26	  Accordingly,	  I	  see	  the	  difference	  between	  traditions	  and	  conventions	  as	  rather	  more	  substantive	  than,	  say,	  Gilbert.	  Cf.	  Gilbert	  1992,	  404-­‐405.	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 commanding officer because his men were still wearing their hair in the old  
 fashion. The commanding officer, angry with the slight, immediately rode 
 up to London and won from King William IV, through the intercession of  
 some Court official, the regimental privilege of continuing to wear the    
 bunch of ribbons in which the end of the queue was tied – the flash.27 
 
The existence and endurance of such “regimental peculiarities” cannot be 
explained in terms of providing stable solutions to coordination problems, as conventions 
can. Instead, this and other kinds of traditional rules and requirements persist precisely 
because of the social meanings and identities that they help to sustain.28 Indeed, the 
practical influence of traditions – their function as exclusionary reasons – is often 
dependent on agents’ commitments to the social roles or identities they help to support. 
The tradition of wearing the flash on one’s uniform, for example, does not simply fail to 
prevail amongst officers of other regiments; rather, it fails to count as a practical 
consideration at all.  
This integral connection with social meanings and identities, combined with the 
practical status of traditions as exclusionary reasons amongst those who accept them, 
often results in clashes between traditions and other concurrently operating normative 
systems. The sartorial traditions Graves describes are innocuous, but other cases of 
traditions coming apart from accepted legal or moral norms are quite serious. The 
tradition of circumcision within Jewish communities, for example, has recently run up 
against laws designed to protect the bodily integrity of children in Germany; more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Graves	  1930,	  108-­‐9.	  	  28	  It	  need	  not	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  specific	  meanings	  and	  identitiessupported	  by	  traditions	  remain	  unchanged,	  in	  order	  for	  those	  traditions	  to	  hold	  up	  over	  time.	  As	  Brennan	  et	  al	  point	  out,	  any	  given	  norm	  is	  only	  partially	  constitutive	  of	  a	  particular	  social	  meaning	  or	  identity,	  and	  this	  means	  that	  particular	  norms	  –	  here,	  traditions	  –	  can	  change,	  even	  as	  the	  social	  meanings	  or	  identities	  they	  help	  support	  remain	  the	  same.	  See	  Brennan	  et	  al	  2013,	  173.	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distantly, the tradition of dueling in Europe and United States for a long time operated in 
direct conflict with laws against killing or fighting. Philosophers such as Kwame 
Anthony Appiah have eloquently described how these traditional rules can lose their 
ability to operate as exclusionary reasons over time,29 but the fact remains that traditions 
often exclude other kinds of normative principles from the practical reasoning of 
individuals strongly committed to the particular social meanings and identities which 
those particular traditions support.30  
 
3.1.3 Social Norms 
If conventions lack a necessary connection with social meanings and identities or 
with intrinsically normative attitudes, and traditions resist direct or immediate creation or 
emergence, as well as functioning chiefly as sources of exclusionary reasons, then we can 
gain a preliminary understanding of social norms by seeing how they differ from 
conventions and traditions on each of these grounds.  
In the first place, social norms are intrinsically connected with normative 
attitudes. That is to say, social norms create obligations, rather than just giving 
incentives, for members of the groups and collectives in which they circulate; and they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Kwame	  Anthony	  Appiah,	  The	  Honor	  Code:	  How	  Moral	  Revolutions	  Happen	  (New	  York:	  W.W.	  Norton	  and	  Company,	  2011).	  	  30	  Traditions seem particularly well suited to pass the two-part test Raz sets for 
exclusionary reasons: we are susceptible to  experiencing “a peculiar feeling of unease” 
both when “we wish to censure a person who acted on the balance of reasons” for 
ignoring a tradition, and when “we have to justify someone’s acting on [that tradition] 
against claims that the persons should have acted on the balance of reasons.” See Raz 
1975, 41. 	  
	   	  64	  
are sustained by corresponding normative attitudes amongst those members.31 Whether or 
not it makes sense to define conventions in terms of stable solutions to coordination 
problems, it does not make sense to define social norms in this way – for social norms are 
not confined to the function of coordinating action, and their stability (such as it is) does 
not depend on performing such a coordinating role.32  
In the second place, social norms are capable of far more direct or immediate 
creation than traditions. To be sure, many social norms – such as norms governing the 
loudness of one’s voice in public places, or the distance one maintains between one’s 
body and that of one’s interlocutors in conversation – are products of quite gradual and 
undirected development. Nevertheless, it is characteristic of social norms that they can 
emerge and propagate quite rapidly, sometimes as a result of charismatic leadership by 
norm entrepreneurs; sometimes in consequence of bullying and ‘tendentious’ criticism; 
sometimes simply as a result of systematic misperceptions of the beliefs and intentions of 
other members of particular groups, organizations, or collectivities. The feasibility of 
these different pathways for norm emergence depends in part on the size of the groups or 
collectivities in question, but there seem to be no minimums or maximums on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Different	  theorists	  specific	  the	  nature	  of	  those	  normative	  attitudes	  differently.	  Cristina	  Bicchieri	  speaks	  of	  “normative	  expectations”	  as	  necessary	  (but	  not	  sufficient)	  for	  the	  persistence	  of	  social	  norms;	  Geoffrey	  Brennan	  et	  al	  associate	  social	  norms	  with	  “clusters	  of	  normative	  attitudes,”	  which	  they	  spell	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  dispositions	  to	  criticize,	  evaluate,	  sanction,	  and	  so	  forth	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  social	  norms.	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  normative	  attitudes	  that	  help	  to	  sustain	  social	  norms	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Section	  3.2	  below.	  	  32	  Thus	  I	  reject	  Cristina	  Bicchieri’s	  claim,	  in	  her	  2006	  book	  The	  Grammar	  of	  Society,	  that,	  as	  a	  general	  matter,	  social	  norms	  transform	  what	  are	  originally	  mixed-­‐motive	  games	  –	  or	  practical	  dilemmas	  in	  which	  differently	  positioned	  actors	  do	  not	  share	  central	  interests	  –	  into	  coordination	  problems.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  Bicchieri	  maintains	  this	  claim	  in	  her	  more	  recent	  work	  on	  social	  norms.	  Cf.	  Cristina	  Bicchieri,	  
The	  Grammar	  of	  Society	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  38.	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populations required to produce, and sustain over time, social norms – just as there is no 
clear temporal minimum or maximum period for the emergence of such norms and the 
normative attitudes that correspond to them.  
Unlike traditions, social norms do not normally supply exclusionary reasons; their 
role in practical reasoning is, instead, frequently to guide action in areas that are not 
obviously covered by either legal or moral norms. Nevertheless, it is possible for social 
norms to either overlap, or conflict with, both legal and moral norms in practical 
reasoning. This equivocal status of social norms vis-à-vis legal and moral norms lies at 
the basis of much of the current theoretical and practical interest in social norms. 
Properly understanding the concurrent functioning of these different kinds of norms and 
normative systems is crucial to the larger goals of this study. In order to reach that 
understanding, I want to turn now to a more detailed account of basic features of social 
norms.  
 
3.2 Social Norms: A Four-Feature Account 
In the last section, I provided a preliminary characterization of social norms, one 
that worked chiefly by contrasting social norms with conventions and traditions on the 
basis of three features of norms and normative systems identified in Chapter 2. In this 
section and the next I want to provide a more perspicuous account of social norms, by 
outlining my basic, four-feature account of social norms. The four features I will consider 
are (1) particularity (2) practice-groundedness (3) group-intentionality and (4) the 
creation of accountability. As I explain, I believe these features are at least jointly 
sufficient to distinguish social norms from legal and moral norms. 
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First, some preliminary points. My account of social norms is individualist, rather 
than holist. That is, I take it that social norms are grounded in, and can be explained by 
reference to, facts about the attitudes and actions of individuals, rather than facts about 
collectives. I do not rely on anything like the irreducibly group intentions discussed by 
Philip Pettit and Christian List – which may be a feature of group social life, but which 
are not, on my view, integral to the explanation of social norms.33  
Amongst individualist approaches to social norms and social rules, some theorists 
(such as Margaret Gilbert) posit a special category of intentions, called “we-intentions,” 
which are held at the individual level, but which are accepted at level of, and refer to the 
actions of, a group. Other theorists, such as Geoffrey Brennan, Bob Goodin, Lina 
Eriksson, and Nicholas Southwood, resist the idea that any special class or category of 
intentions is necessary to explain the existence or influence of social norms. My account 
follows this latter view, as will become clear in my discussion of the group-intentional 
feature of social norms.  
Finally, my four-feature account of social norms can be distinguished from other 
accounts insofar as I consider it important to understand how social norms operate from 
within the practical point of view, i.e. the point of view of individual agents deliberating 
about action. Some theorists of social norms, most notably Cristina Bicchieri, 
characterize social norms as serving to guide action chiefly in ways that bypass conscious 
deliberation or reflection on the part of agents. This perspective reflects the fact that the 
concurrent functioning of social norms consists partially in governing and guiding 
behavior not covered by legal or moral norms. Nevertheless, particularly in order to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Philip	  Pettit	  and	  Christian	  List,	  Group	  Agency	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013).	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understand and reconstruct conflicts amongst social norms and other kinds of norms, I 
believe we need to take up the practical point of view. My discussion will therefore focus 
on explaining how we can understand the action-guiding function of social norms from 
this perspective.  
 
3.2.1 Four Features of Social Norms 
In the first place, social norms are particular. That is, they apply within specific 
groups, organizations, and collectivities, rather than claiming universal applicability. In 
so doing, social norms often serve as markers of identity for members of particular 
groups, organizations, and collectivities – though this need not be so. What does 
generally follow from the particularity of social norms is that individuals can sometimes 
escape the obligations such norms impose simply by establishing that they do not belong 
to the particular groups or collectivities in which those norms apply.  
The particularity of social norms may help to distinguish social norms from 
properly moral norms, which are often taken to be universal in scope. Whether real or 
presumed universality is in fact a necessary feature of moral norms is a question that will 
divide philosophers based on their favored meta-ethical theories; however, those who do 
accept this feature as essential to moral norms should take it as one feature that 
distinguishes social norms from moral norms.  
In the second place, social norms are practice-grounded. This means simply that 
the normativity of social norms – i.e. their ability to create genuine obligations and 
inspire genuinely normative attitudes – depends partially on the existence or perception 
of corresponding social practices. This second feature of social norms also plausibly 
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serves to distinguish social norms from moral norms, which we generally do not take to 
derive their normativity from real or perceived social practices, but instead consider to at 
least claim to create obligations even in the absence of corresponding practices.34  
In the third place, social norms are group-intentional. This means that social 
norms depend for their existence on certain profiles of beliefs and intentions across the 
members of the particular groups or collectivities in which they apply. Different 
philosophers describe the nature of the cognitive and conative states that sustain social 
norms differently. Likewise, different philosophers adopt different methodologies for 
testing exactly which profiles of beliefs and intentions are capable of sustaining social 
norms over time. For my purposes, this third feature of social norms is interesting chiefly 
insofar as it helps explain the peculiar dynamics of emergence and transformation of 
social norms – the fact that changes in social norms track changes in the beliefs and 
intentions of group members, and so are susceptible to quite as rapid, and as radical, 
transformations as those beliefs and intentions are.  
Finally, social norms serve to create accountability. That is to say, social norms 
do not only create obligations for members of the groups in which they apply, and thus 
lay a partial claim to guide the actions of those members; but they also serve as shared 
standards for criticizing and sanctioning the actions of group members. In some cases, as 
with professional codes, there are fairly well-developed procedural rules for holding 
members accountable; in other cases, of the kind I will consider below, it is precisely the 
lack of such procedural rules, and the wide distribution of standing to criticize and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Nicholas	  Southwood	  considers	  practice-­‐groundedness	  to	  be	  the	  key	  feature	  that	  distinguishes	  social	  norms	  from	  moral	  norms.	  See	  Nicholas	  Southwood,	  “The	  Moral/Conventional	  Distinction,”	  Mind	  120,	  no.	  479	  (2011),	  761-­‐802;	  also	  Brennan	  et	  al	  2013,	  57-­‐89.	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punish, that characterizes the accountability-creating feature of social norms. The absence 
of such procedural rules, or of anything equivalent to rule of law requirements, in the 
case of social norms indicates one way of distinguishing social and legal norms.  
 
3.2.2 Example: Grim Sweepstakes 
In order to illustrate my four-feature account of social norms, I will use a 
hypothetical example based on a (possibly apocryphal) platoon practice described by 
Robert Graves in Goodbye to All That: 
 [A fellow soldier] had been telling me how had won about five pounds 
 in the sweepstake after the Rue du Bois show. It was a sweepstake of the sort that  
 leaves no bitterness behind it. Before a show [i.e. battle] the platoon pools all its 
  available cash and the winners, who are the survivors, divide it up afterwards. Those 
 who are killed can’t complain, the wounded would have given far more than that to 
 escape as they have, and the unwounded regard the money as a consolation prize 
 for still being here.35 
  
Suppose there is a social norm corresponding to this trench practice, which we 
might call Grim Sweepstakes. Consider how the four features of social norms outlined 
above help to explain the content of such a hypothetical norm. 
First, the hypothetical norm of Grim Sweepstakes will be particular – just as the 
practice Graves describes is particular, limited to a specific army platoon. Individuals 
belonging to other platoons may have their own rules governing the disposition of the 
affects of killed or injured comrades; these rules may approximate those of Graves’s 
platoon, or they may be quite different (e.g. requiring that money, like personal items, be 
sent home to the relatives of fallen soldiers). In any case soldiers who do not belong to 
this platoon will not be bound by Grim Sweepstakes, and will not be accountable to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Graves	  1930,	  145.	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members of Graves’s platoon for acting according to (or contrary to) this hypothetical 
social norm.  
Second, the hypothetical norm of Grim Sweepstakes will be practice-grounded. 
This point follows trivially from the fact that the norm we are imagining is based directly 
on a reported social practice. Nevertheless it is helpful to reflect on just what this feature 
entails for our hypothetical social norm. Is it possible, for instance, that the norm of Grim 
Sweepstakes could be based on a perceived, rather than a real, social practice? Although 
the answer depends partially on how we understand the relationship between the 
existence and the actual operation of a norm, it seems there are several ways this could be 
so. First, if “shows” (i.e. battles) are infrequent, then it seems like members of Graves’s 
platoon could have all the normative attitudes and dispositions associated with this social 
norm, without ever encountering a corresponding practice; and even possible that their 
beliefs in the existence of such a norm could collapse, once a battle does come, by the 
failure of that practice to materialize. Second, given the high turnover of members of 
platoons, it seems possible that the norm could exist prior to the practice, in the following 
sense: if a particularly convincing (or bullying) long-term member of the platoon 
manages to convince new arrivals that a norm of Grim Sweepstakes exists, then this 
might be enough to produce a new practice where previously there was none.36 Of course, 
it is by no means necessary that a norm like Grim Sweepstakes be grounded (initially) in 
a perceived, rather than a real, social practice. The same norm could develop out of an 
ongoing social practice that was not initially associated with any typically normative 
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qualities, such as the creation of obligations or corresponding normative attitudes 
amongst group members.  
The first two features of social norms I have identified do little to distinguish our 
imagined social norm of Grim Sweepstakes from the social practice Graves describes. It 
is only when we turn to the final two features of social norms that we can really 
distinguish this hypothetical norm from the actual (or perceived) practice.  
As noted above, the group-intentional feature of social norms holds that social 
norms are supported by particular profiles of beliefs and intentions, including specifically 
normative beliefs, and intentions arising from specifically normative attitudes. What 
might such beliefs and attitudes look like in the case of Grim Sweepstakes? In the first 
place, we must imagine that the members of Graves’s platoon do not merely put their 
money into the pool before battles for the purely instrumental reasons Graves (satirically) 
describes – i.e. that if one dies one needs no money, if one is wounded one has received a 
surplus, and if one survives unscathed one deserves compensation. Instead, we should 
imagine that soldiers in the platoon hold normative beliefs and normative attitudes 
towards this practice – that they consider themselves obligated, though not morally or 
legally obligated, to participate in the pool, and that they are disposed to hold a range of 
other normative attitudes towards themselves and their comrades with regard to the pool, 
such as approving those who participate, and criticizing or sanctioning those who do not. 
In the absence of such features, I have suggested, we cannot speak of a norm here at all, 
but only a certain practice, which individuals are free to abstain from without abrogating 
any obligation or setting themselves against the normative beliefs and attitudes of others. 
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The accountability creating capacity of our imagined norm, Grim Sweepstakes, 
completes the conceptual distinction between this norm and the mere practice described 
by Graves. For such a norm to arise and persist, there must be at least a shared belief that 
failures to participate in the money pool, if not excused or exempted, will result in some 
form of sanction from other members of the platoon. These sanctions may be tangible or 
intangible; they need not be governed by any well-developed procedural rules – though 
we can certainly imagine a group of soldiers with time on their hands developing quite 
elaborate rules of this kind, and even holding mock-tribunals for norm violators. In order 
for accountability to be effective there must be some way of monitoring compliance with 
the norm, and this may be one factor that makes Grim Sweepstakes more likely to persist 
within a fairly small unit, such as a platoon, than in a company or brigade, where 
opportunities for cheating (e.g. by withholding one’s own money from the pool) are 
greater.  
To conclude discussion of this example, we should imagine that Grim 
Sweepstakes contravenes a rule of military law, e.g. a norm against gambling (broadly 
interpreted to include this case), or a norm against denying resources to next of kin. With 
such a contrary legal rule in mind we are in a position to imagine individual soldiers 
weighing these legal and social norms against each other, and making a decision about 
which to follow – perhaps determined in part by the relative significance of the sanctions 
imposed for violations of each kind of norm, or by the perceived likelihood of being 
caught violating the one or the other. Over time, we may imagine, conformity with Grim 
Sweepstakes might become so entwined with the identities of members of a particular 
unit that they take this norm not merely to outweigh, but in fact to exclude as irrelevant 
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any contrary norm of military law. In that case, as I have suggested, we should be 
inclined to judge that Grim Sweepstakes has ceased to be a mere social norm, and has 
become a tradition, with whatever other differences in status and action-guiding power 
this entails. 
 
3.3 Explaining Social Norms and Explaining With Social Norms 
The value of the four-feature account of social norms offered above lies chiefly in 
its ability to help us make sense of actual, rather than hypothetical, norm-governed 
behavioral regularities. My own interest in this study is to show how closer attention to 
social norms can help us to explain individual and group participation in mass atrocities, 
to secure legal and moral accountability in the wake of such large-scale crimes, and to 
devise effective safeguards against future occurrences of acts that “shock the conscience 
of mankind.”  
In order to finish laying the groundwork for this specific inquiry, I want in this 
section to address three general methodological questions concerning explanations of, 
and explanations by, social norms. The first question concerns how can we reliably 
identify social norms within specific historical contexts. The second question concerns 
how can we reliably explain the decisions and actions of particular individuals by 
reference to such social norms. The third question concerns how we can explain the 
origins of, or transformations in, social norms. I will discuss each of these questions in 
turn.  
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3.3.1 Identifying Social Norms in Historical Contexts 
As Cristina Bicchieri has pointed out, a risk of circular reasoning generally 
accompanies our efforts to identify social norms in contemporary and historical 
contexts.37 The circle revolves as follows. First, in order to account (at a theoretical level) 
for the existence or endurance of a particular behavioral regularity, we infer the existence 
of a corresponding social norm. Then, we take the continuation of that behavioral 
regularity as confirmation of the existence of such a social norm. 38  
Bicchieri takes her own experimental research program to counterbalance this risk 
of circularity. By exploiting the conditions of behavioral experiments, in which both the 
practical problems subjects face and the information subjects are privy to can be 
controlled, we can independently confirm, and even measure the degree of, the influence 
of social norms within particular populations. The same experimental methods can help 
to answer questions of the kind broached in the discussion of the group-intentional 
feature of social norms above, i.e. questions concerning the range of profiles of beliefs 
and intentions across group members capable of sustaining, or prompting the emergence 
of, social norms.39  
Bicchieri’s experimental approach does little to help us overcome the problem of 
circularity when considering social norms in historical contexts. Historical reconstruction 
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is not and cannot be historical reenactment. To this practical impossibility is added a 
moral impermissibility when the historical contexts in question are of the kind at issue in 
this study, i.e. contexts of mass atrocity. The most influential behavioral experiments 
within the literature on large-scale crimes – i.e. the Milgram experiments and the 
Zimbardo prison experiment – are compelling just insofar as they identify dispositions 
that are not practice-grounded, as social norms are, but are rather enduring features of 
human psychology that predictably emerge in the face of situational pressures. Rather 
than suggesting that we can use experimental methods to reconstruct historical social 
norms, then, these experiments offer evidence that such a program cannot succeed. 
In this study, I rely on a different strategy for identifying social norms in 
historical contexts. This strategy consists in looking at the testimony of historical 
individuals themselves, conveyed in a variety of fora – from diaries and memoirs to 
interviews and courtroom statements. The use of First World War writings in this chapter 
helps to illustrate the promise of this approach; it also helps to illustrate some objections 
to this approach, as I shall explain.  
First, particular kinds of testimonial materials – such as memoirs – may not be 
written with a strict (or even a loose) view towards accuracy. Particular trends or 
incidents may be blown up to greater significance than they in fact had; sensational 
stories or rumors may be repeated unchecked.40 Other sorts of testimonial materials are 
equally subject to objections of this kind, which we might call objections of subjective 
non-veracity.  
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Second, every first-personal identification of a particular social norm – whether 
offered in the present, or recovered from the past – is subject to objections of objective 
veracity. Objections of this kind do not impugn the sincerity, or good faith, of the 
individual offering testimony about the norm in question, but rather point to the fact that 
individuals frequently misidentify social norms: mistaking mere social regularities as 
signs of social norms, for example, or assuming that certain actions on the part of others 
imply normative attitudes, when none are in fact present.  
Both of these objections pick out genuine concerns about the veracity of 
testimonial evidence concerning social norms. At the same time, these objections help to 
demonstrate the importance of testimonial accounts. Concerns about subjective and 
objective non-veracity are not limited to our theoretical dealings with social norms. 
Instead, such concerns pervade our practical experience of social norms. In everyday life, 
when we are told or when it is intimated to us that a social norm applies to some behavior 
or practice that we aspire to engage in, we always have an opportunity to question the 
sincerity or the accuracy of such claims. We do not always engage in such questioning, 
but when we do we typically employ strategies of confirmation that apply equally at the 
theoretical level: i.e. looking for further evidence from the testimony of others, 
comparing what we are told about a practice to what we actually see, and so on. I 
consider it a virtue, rather than a vice, of the focus on testimonial materials that it 
preserves these features of the first-personal practical perspective on social norms. 
The comparison with our everyday experience of social norms also provides some 
clues as to what kinds of social norms are likely to be included, and what kinds excluded, 
in testimonial accounts. In daily life, we are more likely to take notice of a social norm 
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when it is new, when it is changed (either in the scope of actions it applies to, the set of 
individuals it applies to, or in some other way), when it is violated, or when it appears to 
conflict with a norm of another kind (e.g. a legal or moral norm). To take an example, 
while many theorists identify norms determining the distance that individuals maintain 
between each other’s bodies during conversation, we generally don’t take notice of such 
norms unless we either experience an individual violating it (in which case we may 
sanction that person) or we are introduced into a new group or population (as when 
traveling abroad) where different norms apply.  
As we shall see in later chapters, similar patterns seem to apply to testimonial 
accounts of social norms in the context of mass atrocity. What this means is that a study 
employing this methodology is likely to focus chiefly on social norms that are new, 
changed, violated, or in conflict with other norms. If this were a mere exercise of natural 
history, that might be a problem; but given the specific aims of this study, it seems to me 
that the focus on social norms falling into one or more of these classes is exactly right. It 
allows us to see how newly introduced social norms might contribute to individual 
participation in atrocities; it allows us to consider cases of conflict between social and 
moral norms; and it offers us insight into the sanctioning activities involved in enforcing 
social norms even in times of social turmoil and conflict.  
 
3.3.2  Explaining Individuals’ Actions Via Social Norms 
Simply identifying or demonstrating the existence of a social norm is not always 
sufficient to establish that a particular individual’s action can be explained, wholly or 
partially, by reference to that social norm. The same can be said of other informal 
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principles, such as conventions and traditions; nevertheless there are a number of 
complicating factors in the case of social norms, as I shall explain.   
One complicating factor occurs in cases where there are social norms, but no 
actual social practices corresponding to them. Such cases are allowed by the fact that 
social norms are sometimes grounded in perceived, rather than actual, social practices. In 
such circumstances, it will necessarily be the case that most individuals who accept the 
norm do not actually perform the actions which would seem most readily explainable on 
the basis of that norm – for otherwise the practice would be actual, rather than simply 
perceived. However, in such cases there will also frequently be a range of other actions 
that are at least partially explained by the social norm. Some of these actions will consist 
in concealing the fact that one is not actually engaging in the practices prescribed by the 
norm; other actions will consist in holding accountable individuals who do not 
(successfully) conceal their own failure to engage in such practices.41 
It would be a mistake, however, to limit our view to individuals who attempt to 
hide their evasion of social norms corresponding to perceived, but not actual, social 
practices. Just as in cases of actual social practices corresponding to actual social norms 
within particular populations, there will likely be some individuals who do not accept a 
particular social norm for which they are nevertheless likely to be held to account, and 
who intentionally defy that norm. When individuals intentionally defy legal norms while 
nevertheless considering themselves accountable under them, we tend to speak of civil 
disobedience; it is not clear whether this term applies to intentional defiance of social 
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norms, but the two cases are analogous insofar as the defiant action taken is itself 
explained (at least partially) by the social norm.42  
In fact, there are a broad range of actions individuals can take that are ‘norm-
responsive’ but not ‘norm-satisfying.’43 Acting opposite to a norm; defiantly failing to act 
in accordance with a norm; and failing to act in accordance with a norm while concealing 
or disguising this fact in order to avoid sanctions are all cases of norm-responsive, but not 
norm-satisfying, ways of acting. To be sure, it is not always clear whether an individual 
acting opposite to, or failing to act in accordance with, a social norm is doing so out of 
ignorance, or doing so with knowledge but without intention, or doing so with both 
knowledge and intention. Here again, my basic methodological approach for 
distinguishing between these cases will be to use testimonial materials to indicate clear 
cases of acting with intention and knowledge in a way that fails to satisfy a social norm. 
As we shall see, such distinctions will be particularly important when it comes to 
explaining the actions of resisters to mass atrocities.  
A second complicating factor occurs in cases where there is in fact no social norm 
at a given point in time governing some practice or piece of conduct, but where the 
(mistaken) beliefs held by individuals concerning the existence of such a norm form part 
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of the explanation for their acting in a given way. As I have suggested above, systematic 
mistakes of this kind are one way that scholars have used to explain the emergence of 
social norms and corresponding social practices. I will not spend much time considering 
cases of this sort in this study, but it is worth pointing out that this is another significant 
complicating factor in explaining individual’s actions by way of social norms. 
 
3.3.3 Explaining Changes in Social Norms 
So far we have been considering social norms as more or less fixed entities – as 
practical prescriptions, prohibitions, or permissions that help to explain behavioral 
regularities over time. In order to complete our picture of social norms, however, we 
must finally consider how social norms themselves emerge, change, and break down. We 
must consider, that is, how to make sense of the dynamics of social norms.  
This is a large topic, and I can do no more than review a few of the most 
significant conceptual and methodological issues here. I will first distinguish types of 
changes in norms, then turn to consider strategies for explaining each of these types of 
changes.  
In the first place, consider different pathways for the emergence of social norms. 
Social norms may develop and guide action in situations that have long been 
encountered, but have previously lacked norms, or they may develop and guide actions in 
situations that are newly made possible by changes in technology, institutions, or other 
aspects of social life. Existing social norms governing one area of interaction may 
provide the model for social norms in another area of interaction, or they may serve as a 
negative model or point of caution. Social norms may emerge due to the conscious efforts 
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of individuals and groups (such as ‘norm promoters’ and ‘norm entrepreneurs’) or they 
may be the result of chance patterns of events and systematic mistakes in the beliefs and 
intentions of members of particular groups or populations.  
In the second place, consider different kinds of changes in social norms. Social 
norms may undergo changes related to each of the four features of social norms discussed 
above. The groups or populations to which they are particular may change – both 
internally (as when existing groups or populations grow or shrink) and externally (as 
when a social norm spreads from one group or population to another). The type of 
practices in which social norms are grounded may change – e.g. going from merely 
“perceived” to “actual.” The profile of beliefs and intentions supporting a social norm 
may change – with consequences for the stability and strength of sanctions of such 
norms. And, as this implies, the extent or strength or type of accountability associated 
with particular social norms may change.  
All of the above changes can affect particular social norms without actually 
destroying the continuity of those norms themselves. But there are other changes which 
do result in the loss or absorption of particular social norms. In some cases, social norms 
may undergo a change in status: the most obvious example is when social norms 
transform into legal norms governing the same kinds of actions, though arguably social 
norms may also sometimes take on the status of moral norms.44 In other cases, a different 
kind of transformation occurs, which can generically be called norm breakdown. In this 
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case, a social norm comprising a particular practical prescription, prohibition, or 
permission simply ceases to exist – because of a change in perceptions about social 
practices, because of a change in normative attitudes and dispositions, or both. Social 
norms may also go out of existence if the particular groups in which they circulate are 
dissolved. 
An interesting subclass of cases of norm breakdown consists of cases of norm 
inversion. Norm inversions occur when behaviors or actions previously prescribed by 
social norms come to be prohibited by social norms, or vice-versa. As I shall argue in 
later chapters, understanding the dynamics of norm inversion is particularly important for 
research on mass atrocity, since it is bound up with the theoretical problem of explaining 
how “ordinary” individuals can commit “extraordinary” crimes.  
Turning from the question of what kinds of changes norms may undergo to the 
question of how to explain those changes, it is evident that we have already covered some 
of the relevant points in previous sections. So, for example, much current political 
science work on norm emergence focuses on the role of individuals actively engaging in 
norm promotion as part of the explanation for the emergence of social norms.45 A second, 
more critical line of analysis comes from Margaret Gilbert, who notes the “tendentious” 
manner in which many social norms originate – i.e. through claims about what is right 
and wrong that precede, sometimes by a long time, group acceptance of those claims.46 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  See	  for	  example	  Martha	  Finnemore	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  “International	  Norm	  Dynamics	  and	  Political	  Change,”	  International	  Organization	  52	  (Autumn	  1998);	  Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  The	  Justice	  Cascade:	  How	  Human	  Rights	  Prosecutions	  Are	  Changing	  
World	  Politics	  (New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  Norton	  &	  Co.,	  2011).	  46	  Margaret	  Gilbert,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Political	  Obligation,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford,	  2008),	  199.	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In many cases, of course, it is impossible to establish what individuals or groups – 
if any – actively worked to promote the acceptance or proliferation of particular social 
norms. In such cases, as Brennan et al point out, we may attempt to provide functional 
explanations for the existence of those norms – i.e. explanations that work through 
showing what coordination- or cooperation-enhancing purpose social norms currently 
serve. These authors rightly urge caution with regard to functional explanations, and 
consider the best-case scenario to occur when we can roughly identify when the norms in 
question came about, and amongst which particular groups or populations.47  
One particular sub-category of explanations for the emergence of social norms, 
about which I have written elsewhere, concerns the manipulative introduction of social 
norms.48 Explanations by manipulative introduction are purposive explanations, with the 
added stipulation that locating the agent(s) responsible for introducing the norms is 
necessary, not merely desirable (since on my account manipulation is an intentional 
action, which must be undertaken by some particular actor(s). Although I take 
manipulation to be morally less savory than many kinds of non-obfuscatory norm 
promotion, I am less certain that it is more morally problematic than the kinds of bullying 
or pugnacious activities commonly involved in the tendentious introduction of social 
norms, and under certain circumstances of exigency it may be that the moral value of 
manipulatively instituting social norms dissuading actors from particular actions may 
outweigh the moral concerns we have for electing to institute social norms in this way. In 
sum, I believe there are a large number of increasingly specific ways of instituting or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Brennan	  et	  al	  2013,	  138-­‐148.	  48	  Paul	  Morrow,	  “Mass	  Atrocity	  and	  Manipulation	  of	  Social	  Norms,”	  Social	  Theory	  
and	  Practice	  40,	  n.	  2	  (April	  2014),	  255-­‐280.	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maintaining social norms that deserve closer attention, and in the remaining chapters of 
this study I will indicate particular dynamics or processes of norm emergence or 
transformation that merit further study.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented my basic account of social norms. I first 
distinguished social norms from other informal principles of social order – specifically 
conventions and traditions – on the basis of the three features of norms and normative 
systems highlighted in the last chapter. I then laid out my basic, four-feature account of 
social norms, and illustrated that account using examples rooted in testimonial materials 
stemming from the First World War. Finally, I addressed several methodological 
questions concerning the suitability of this account for resolving the meta-normative and 
meta-descriptive questions that are my major concern in this study. 
Although my discussion has touched on a variety of disputed questions in 
contemporary philosophical work on normativity, I have left other meta-normative issues 
largely unaddressed. I did not discuss, for example, what the implications of current work 
on the evolution of morality might be for the plausibility of the distinctions between 
social and moral norms that I advanced. Nor did I consider the distinction between 
explaining, and assigning responsibility for, the institution or enforcement of social 
norms. These questions, and especially the second one, will be of considerable 
importance in subsequent chapters of this study, and I will give them greater attention 
there.  
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Throughout this chapter, examples drawn from the First World War have helped 
to show that informal principles of order of many different kinds, including social norms, 
perform an important action-guiding function even in combat zones. The First World 
War was hardly a “conventional” conflict in the eyes of its combatants. Nevertheless, it 
was a more traditional sort of contest between belligerents than many of the intra-state or 
inter-ethnic conflicts that have followed, and which have proved particularly insidious as 
sources of mass atrocity. In the next two chapters of this study, I will show that social 
norms play an equally important role in guiding actions amongst elites and ordinary 
individuals during such large-scale crimes. 
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Chapter 4. Social Norms and Professional Participation in Mass Atrocities 
 
How can we explain widespread participation by morally competent individuals 
in crimes that “shock the conscience of mankind”? Theoretical responses to this question 
have grown increasingly sophisticated over the half-century since Raphael Lemkin 
posited “demoralization” as a common feature of historical perpetrators of genocide.1 
Some key contemporary explanatory theses for large-scale participation in mass atrocities 
include: wartime brutalization;2 deindividuation, or the submergence of individual 
personality traits in group contexts;3 obedience to authority;4 ideological influence;5 and 
sheer “thoughtlessness” on the part of individuals whose actions, if evil, are also ‘banal.’6 
My focus in this dissertation falls on a more recently evolved explanatory thesis 
within the interdisciplinary literature on large-scale crimes. I call this the Thesis of Norm 
Transformation. In Chapter 3, I defined norms as “practical prescriptions, prohibitions, or 
permissions accepted by members of particular groups or populations, and capable of 
guiding the actions of those members.” Using this definition, we can state the Thesis of 
Norm Transformation as follows:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  the	  various	  case	  studies	  compiled	  in	  Steve	  Jacobs	  (ed.),	  Lemkin	  on	  Genocide	  (Lanham,	  MD:	  Lexington	  Books,	  2012).	  	  	  2	  Benjamin	  Valentino,	  Final	  Solutions	  (Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  55.	  	  3	  Craig	  Haney,	  Curtis	  Banks,	  and	  Philip	  Zimbardo,	  “Interpersonal	  Dynamics	  in	  a	  Simulated	  Prison,”	  in	  Adam	  Jones	  (ed.),	  Genocide,	  Vol.	  III	  (Washington,	  D.C:	  Sage,	  2008),	  88-­‐105;	  James	  Waller,	  Becoming	  Evil	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  216-­‐218.	  4	  Stanley	  Milgram,	  Obedience	  to	  Authority:	  An	  Experimental	  View	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  and	  Row,	  1975).	  	  5	  Daniel	  Goldhagen,	  Hitler’s	  Willing	  Executioners	  (New	  York:	  Vintage,	  1997).	  	  6	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Eichmann	  in	  Jerusalem:	  A	  Report	  on	  the	  Banality	  of	  Evil	  (New	  York:	  Penguin,	  2006).	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 THESIS: Participation by large numbers of morally competent individuals in 
 mass atrocities is at least partially explained by transformations in basic norms 
 that structure social and political life. 
 
This general thesis takes on a variety of specific forms within the literature on 
genocide and mass atrocity. These variations reflect the many different types of 
transformations in norms identified in the last chapter. Some scholars explain individual 
participation in mass atrocities in terms of a breakdown or collapse of norms, while 
others speak of an inversion of norms.7 Some describe a transformation in one particular 
type of norms (e.g. legal or moral norms), while others refer to crosscutting 
transformations across different categories of norms.8 Some detail transformations in 
norms governing the conduct of individuals belonging to particular groups, associations, 
or organizations, while others examine transformations in norms that circulate in society 
at large.9  
In this chapter and the next, I use the conceptual framework of social norms 
developed in the previous chapters of this study to clarify and extend the thesis of norm 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Benjamin	  Valentino	  describes	  a	  breakdown	  in	  norms	  against	  cruelty	  occurring	  amongst	  perpetrators	  of	  mass	  atrocity.	  Cf.	  Valentino	  2005,	  55.	  	  James	  Waller	  and	  Christopher	  Browning	  refer	  instead	  to	  an	  inversion	  of	  ordinary	  moral	  norms	  amongst	  perpetrators.	  See	  Waller	  2001,	  203;	  Christopher	  Browning,	  Ordinary	  Men:	  
Reserve	  Police	  Battalion	  101	  and	  the	  Final	  Solution	  in	  Poland,	  New	  York:	  Harper	  Perennial,	  1993,	  150.	  	  8	  Browning	  and	  Waller	  both	  speak	  exclusively	  of	  transformations	  in	  moral	  norms	  in	  the	  works	  cited	  above.	  Mid-­‐century	  legal	  scholar	  Lon	  Fuller	  famously	  (and	  controversially)	  described	  a	  mutually	  reinforcing	  breakdown	  in	  legal	  and	  in	  moral	  norms	  in	  Germany	  under	  National	  Socialism.	  Cf.	  Lon	  Fuller,	  ‘Positivism	  and	  Fidelity	  to	  Law:	  A	  Reply	  to	  Hart,’	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  71,	  630-­‐672.	  Kristen	  Rundle	  has	  recently	  updated	  Fuller’s	  thesis	  in	  ‘The	  Impossibility	  of	  an	  Exterminatory	  Legality,’	  
University	  of	  Toronto	  Law	  Journal	  59	  (2009),	  65-­‐126.	  9	  Berel	  Lang	  discusses	  the	  breakdown	  of	  norms	  amongst	  professionals,	  particularly	  in	  ‘The	  Third	  Reich	  and	  the	  Breakdown	  of	  Professional	  Ethics,’	  The	  Future	  of	  the	  
Holocaust,	  Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1998,	  92-­‐104.	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transformation. My specific concern in this chapter is to examine the connection between 
norm transformation and professional participation in historical mass atrocities. By 
examining historical cases of professional complicity large-scale crimes, I contend, we 
can get a better grasp on the various forms and interpretations of the thesis of norm 
transformation. We can also see how the conceptual framework of social norms can be 
used to address key questions in the literature on mass atrocity.   
Two reasons particularly support starting our analysis of the thesis of norm 
transformation by looking at professionals and professional participation in atrocities. 
One reason is that professionals – doctors, lawyers, academics, and so on – frequently 
engage in conscious reflection on their activities and practices, and often leave highly 
articulate accounts of the beliefs and intentions, the aims and the attitudes associated with 
their actions.10 As we shall see, this is as true in circumstances of social upheaval and 
political violence as it is in periods of peace and stability. Much of the material 
underpinning my analysis of the thesis of norm transformation in this chapter comes from 
primary documents left behind by professionals implicated in, or known to have resisted, 
large-scale crimes.11  
A second reason for studying the thesis of norm transformation with special 
reference to professionals relates not to the availability of evidence, but rather to the 
degree of influence that professionals and professional groups exert within larger 
populations. Charges of complicity amongst professionals in mass atrocities sometimes 
concern actions that professionals themselves perform, but often they concern actions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  materials	  pertaining	  to	  professionals	  and	  their	  state	  of	  mind	  can	  be	  read	  uncritically,	  or	  can	  be	  exempted	  from	  suspicion	  of	  camouflage.	  	  11	  My	  use	  of	  such	  sources	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  methodological	  cautions	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  3	  above.	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performed by individuals considered especially susceptible to professionals’ influence.12 
Professionals, according to such claims, enjoy the power to promote, or prevent, norm 
transformations within non-professional populations. Hence it makes sense to study norm 
transformation amongst professionals as a prelude to studying norm transformations 
within non-professional populations implicated in mass atrocities. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 4.1 I address some general questions 
about professions and professional codes—including definitional questions of 
professions, and questions about the normative status of the norms that make up 
professional codes. In Section 4.2 I discuss some distinctive features of professionals and 
professional activity in Germany in the tumultuous decades between 1900 and 1950. In 
Section 4.3 I review Berel Lang’s effort to explain German professional complicity in the 
Holocaust via a particular version of the thesis of norm transformation. In Section 4.4 I 
argue that the thesis of norm transformation should be expanded to include explicit 
attention to social norms, and I provide examples of particular social norms that 
contributed to German professional participation in the Holocaust. I also clarify my 
conception of complicity, and respond to the objection that changes in norms constitute, 
rather than cause, professional complicity in large-scale crimes. 
 
4.1. Professions, Professionals, and Professional Norms 
On September 11, 1940 Dr. Leonardo Conti of the Reich Interior Ministry 
addressed the following letter to his former teacher, Professor Gottfried Ewald: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12This	  is	  how	  Robert	  Ericksen	  defines	  complicity	  in	  Robert	  P.	  Ericksen,	  Complicity	  in	  
the	  Holocaust	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  21-­‐23.	  I	  consider	  the	  concept	  of	  complicity	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Section	  4.4	  below.	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 Dear Professor Ewald,  
  With the deepest gratitude I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of  
 21 August. I still remember with great pleasure your lectures in Erlangen. 
  Your analysis contains much that is right, I’m sure. Nevertheless, I take a 
 different view, although I cannot and will not set it down in writing at this time. I  
 would only like to say, that I am fully convinced that the opinions of the entire  
 German Volk concerning these things are undergoing a transformation, and I can very 
 easily imagine that things which in one period are considered objectionable [verwerflich] 
 can in the next period come to be regarded as the only right choice. This is something 
 we have experienced countless times in the course of history. As the most recent example 
 I would gently point to the sterilization law: here the process of a transformation in 
 thought [Umformung des Denkens] is today already quite far advanced.13  
 
The analysis to which Conti here refers consisted in Professor Ewald’s critical 
evaluation and rejection of the secret Nazi euthanasia program, Aktion T4. Under this 
program, physically and mentally disabled German children and adults were selected by 
physicians for killing in state-regulated hospitals and medical establishments.14 Professor 
Ewald is one of the few German physicians acquainted with this program who is known 
to have openly opposed it. His case is cited within Holocaust historiography as a notable 
exception to the widespread phenomenon of professional complicity in genocide.15 
Professor Ewald’s principled opposition to the secret euthanasia program is 
laudable. But it is Dr. Conti’s rejoinder to his former teacher that I find remarkable, for it 
seems to provide clear and direct support for the historiographical thesis of norm 
transformation. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  For	  the	  German	  text	  of	  this	  letter,	  cf.	  Thorsten	  Sueße	  and	  Heinrich	  Meyer,	  
Abtransport	  der	  “Lebensunwerten,”	  Hannover:	  Verlag	  Clemens	  Koechert,	  1988,	  103-­‐104.	  The	  above	  translation	  is	  my	  own.	  This	  same	  letter	  is	  cited	  in	  Ericksen	  2012,	  161-­‐163.	  14	  Cf.	  Dick	  de	  Mildt,	  In	  the	  Name	  of	  the	  People	  London:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  1996.	  15	  Robert	  Jay	  Lifton,	  The	  Nazi	  Doctors:	  Medical	  Killing	  and	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Genocide,	  New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1986,	  82-­‐87;	  Henry	  Friedlander,	  The	  Origins	  of	  Nazi	  
Genocide:	  From	  Euthanasia	  to	  the	  Final	  Solution,	  Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1995,	  78;	  Ericksen	  2012.	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‘Seems to provide,’ because in fact the transformation in public attitudes towards 
euthanasia predicted by Conti never occurred. When word of the secret program 
eventually got out, it became the subject of strenuous public condemnation by several 
different German bishops and clergy.16 As a result, the government officially called a halt 
to the euthanasia program, while clandestinely continuing it until the end of the war.  
Importantly, what Conti anticipates in his letter is not a mere collapse or 
breakdown in norms prohibiting killing the mentally or physically impaired. Rather, the 
letter predicts an inversion of norms: “things which in one period are considered 
objectionable can in the next period come to be regarded as the only right choice.” I 
believe we should read this letter as predicting inversions in norms belonging to three 
kinds or categories of normativity, namely, moral, legal, and social norms. 
In the first place, Conti predicts an inversion in moral norms – or norms against 
killing that are understood as universal in scope, and as grounded neither in positive law 
or established social practices, but on some other foundation. In the second place, Conti’s 
letter anticipates an inversion in legal norms – an inversion not yet fully accomplished by 
the secret order authorizing Aktion T4, but one ultimately expected and, indeed, relied on 
by the doctors and nurses who participated in the program. In the third place, Conti’s 
letter looks forward to, and indeed promotes, an inversion in social norms – specifically, 
in the particular, practice-grounded norms that guide the actions of members of the 
medical professions.  
Professional norms provide a good starting point for thinking about the specific 
contributions of social norms, and changes in social norms, to mass atrocities. Many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Ericksen	  2012.	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professions – from medicine and law to engineering and museum curatorship – 
promulgate codes of ethics; but on both substantive and procedural grounds there is 
reason to question whether all or any of the particular prescriptions, prohibitions, and 
permissions contained in such codes have the status of moral norms, or whether instead 
they are more like legal or social norms.  
In this section I argue that professional codes are primarily composed of social 
norms. I first consider Michael Davis’s definition of a profession, and use it to establish 
the relationship between professional ideals and professional codes. I then argue that the 
specific norms that make up professional codes should be understood as social, rather 
than legal or moral norms. I provide examples designed to show that professional norms 
display the features of practice-groundedness and group-intentionality characteristic of 
professional norms (while allowing that professional norms sometimes overlap with 
properly legal or moral norms). Finally, I distinguish between the ways in which codified 
and non-codified social norms help to guide the actions of professionals.  
 
4.1.1 Defining Professions and Professional Codes 
Philosopher Michael Davis has proposed the following definition of a profession: 
 A profession is a number of individuals in the same occupation voluntarily 
 organized to earn a living by openly serving a certain moral ideal in a morally 
 permissible way beyond what law, market, and morality would otherwise require.17 
  
 
This definition provides a good starting point for discussing professions, 
professionals, and professional norms.18 It asserts the collective character of professions; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Michael	  Davis,	  What	  Can	  We	  Learn	  by	  Looking	  for	  the	  First	  Code	  of	  Professional	  Ethics?,	  Theoretical	  Medicine	  and	  Biothetics	  24	  (2003),	  442.	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links particular professions with particular moral ideals; and suggests special moral 
considerations constrain, but do not determine, the ways in which professionals pursue 
those ideals. I will briefly expand on each of these points before turning to critique 
Davis’s further claims concerning the normative status of professional norms. 
First, Davis’s definition highlights the collective, or group-based, character of 
professions.19 Some philosophers deny that this is a necessary feature of professions. 
They argue that it is in principle possible for there to be a ‘professions of one.’20 The 
arguments offered for this claim are unconvincing. At most they establish that some 
professions look back to single individuals as sources of their particular professional 
ideals. They do not show that those individuals, practicing alone, satisfied all the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a profession.21  
Second, Davis’s definition associates particular professions with particular moral 
ideals. Such ideals are most strikingly evident in the self-conceptions of the traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  To	  say	  that	  this	  starting	  point	  is	  reasonable	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  it	  is	  one	  which	  all	  will	  ultimately	  accept.	  Even	  amongst	  philosophers,	  some	  reject	  key	  features	  of	  Davis’s	  definition,	  as	  I	  point	  out	  below.	  Sociologists,	  who	  have	  their	  own	  well-­‐developed	  discourse	  on	  professions,	  will	  likely	  take	  issue	  with	  the	  normative	  assumptions	  contained	  in	  Davis’s	  definition,	  and	  may	  also	  protest	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  attention	  to	  the	  economic	  basis	  and	  effects	  of	  professionalization,	  such	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  monopolize	  the	  provision	  of	  services	  in	  particular	  areas.	  	  19	  Davis	  2003,	  442.	  20	  Cf.	  Daryl	  Koehn,	  The	  Grounds	  of	  Professional	  Ethics,	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1994,	  57,	  110-­‐111	  21	  The	  claim	  that	  professions	  have	  a	  collective	  character	  should	  not	  be	  mistaken	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  any	  particular	  professional	  organization,	  association,	  or	  group	  is	  coextensive	  with	  the	  profession	  at	  large.	  Not	  only	  are	  professional	  organizations	  often	  divided	  along	  local,	  state,	  or	  national	  lines,	  but	  there	  are	  often	  multiple	  professional	  organizations	  operating	  within	  a	  particular	  jurisdiction,	  with	  greater	  or	  lesser	  overlap	  amongst	  their	  memberships.	  What	  this	  shows	  is	  that	  professionals	  themselves	  often	  encounter	  difficulties	  in	  fixing	  the	  boundaries	  and	  internal	  hierarchies	  of	  their	  professions,	  despite	  the	  incentives—financial	  and	  otherwise—they	  have	  for	  doing	  so.	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‘liberal professions’, i.e. law, medicine, and ministry—devoted, respectively, to ideals of 
justice, health, and salvation or spiritual well-being.22 Practitioners of emergent or 
aspirant professions often find it difficult to demonstrate that they too serve distinctive 
moral ideals.23 It is a descriptive question, how exactly emergent professions go about 
associating themselves with a particular moral ideals. It is a normative question, whether 
service to distinctive moral ideals is in fact a core feature of professions, and of 
professional practice.24 
Closely connected with this second feature of Davis’s definition is a third feature, 
which goes to the ways in which professionals pursue their particular moral ideals. Davis 
writes that professionals pursue their ideals “openly,” in  “a morally permissible way,” 
and “beyond what law, market, and morality would otherwise require.” What these three 
criteria amount to, for Davis, is the claim that professionals pursue their distinctive ideal 
by following distinctive professional norms, which are publicly enumerated in 
professional codes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See	  Koehn	  1994.	  23	  The	  case	  of	  museum	  curators	  and	  other	  museum	  workers	  provides	  a	  fascinating	  illustration	  of	  this	  point.	  As	  Hugh	  Genoways	  has	  pointed	  out,	  the	  controversy	  over	  whether	  museum	  work	  qualifies	  for,	  or	  can	  at	  least	  aspire	  to,	  professional	  status	  dates	  back	  to	  at	  least	  the	  1930’s.	  It	  has	  been	  carried	  on	  more	  recently	  by	  such	  prominent	  figures	  as	  Stephen	  Weil,	  former	  secretary	  of	  the	  Smithsonian	  Institution.	  One	  key	  question	  in	  the	  debate	  seems	  to	  be	  precisely	  that	  raised	  by	  Davis,	  namely,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  distinct,	  and	  distinctly	  moral,	  ideal	  that	  museum	  workers	  serve.	  Cf.	  Hugh	  Genoways,	  “To	  Members	  of	  the	  Museum	  Profession,”	  in	  
Museum	  Philosophy	  for	  the	  21st	  Century,	  Hugh	  Genoways	  (ed.)	  Oxford,	  UK:	  AltaMira	  Press,	  2006,	  221-­‐222.	  	  24	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  often	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  normative	  and	  descriptive	  questions	  or	  claims	  when	  studying	  institutional	  facts	  in	  general,	  and	  professions	  in	  particular.	  Such	  a	  problem	  seems	  to	  be	  built	  in	  to	  Davis’s	  definition,	  which	  was	  arrived,	  as	  he	  says,	  through	  “public	  conversation”	  with	  professionals	  themselves,	  and	  which	  seems	  to	  tell	  us	  not	  just	  what	  professions	  are,	  but	  also	  what	  they	  should	  to	  be.	  Daryl	  Koehn	  discusses	  a	  similar	  problem	  in	  Koehn	  1994,	  4-­‐6.	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4.1.2 Professional Norms and Social Norms 
Davis’s clearest discussion of the normative status of professional norms comes in 
an earlier article entitled, “The Moral Authority of a Professional Code.”25 Here, Davis 
argues that professional codes comprise solutions to those collective action problems that 
are most likely to be encountered by professionals when pursuing their particular ideals. 
Thus, professional norms acquire whatever moral authority they have from the fact that 
those ideals which they assist professionals in serving are moral ideals.26 In order to 
possess genuine moral authority, these norms must also meet certain baseline 
requirements, such as the requirement (already mentioned above) of being morally 
permissible in their own right. This requirement, along with the stipulation that the ideal 
professionals serve must itself be a moral one, rules out certain paradoxical examples, 
such as blackmailers’ codes, or the ethics of poisoners. Ultimately, Davis suggests that 
we should conceive of professionals as constantly being guided by a single “auxiliary 
rule,” namely, “Follow Your Profession’s Code.”27  
Davis’s exposition of the normative status and action-guiding power of 
professional codes is illuminating. Nevertheless, it can be criticized on two fronts. First, it 
does not make clear whether all the particular rules or norms contained in morally 
authoritative professional codes must themselves be understood as moral rules or norms. 
Second, it says little about the way in which uncodified social norms guide professionals 
in pursuit of their particular moral ideals. I will consider each of these points in turn. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Michael	  Davis,	  “The	  Moral	  Authority	  of	  a	  Professional	  Code,”	  NOMOS	  XXIX:	  
Authority	  Revisited,	  James	  Pennock	  and	  John	  Chapman	  (eds.),	  New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  1987.	  	  26	  Davis	  1987,	  321.	  27	  ibid.,	  323.	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 A. Codified Professional Norms  
Davis’s account of the moral authority of professional codes seems to rest on the 
following two principles:  
 P1: where a given end Y is morally required, any action X that   
 is a necessary means to that end is likewise morally required.  
  
 P2: where a norm or accepted rule of conduct makes possible a morally 
 required action, that norm has moral authority (or, as I shall say, has the kind 
 of normativity characteristic of moral norms).  
 
The first of these two principles may be sound, but it is not clear how it applies to 
professions and professional codes, at least as Davis defines them. Davis’s definition of a 
profession stipulates that professionals pursue their moral ideal “beyond what law, 
market, and morality would otherwise require.” This suggests that the ends towards 
which the actions prescribed in professional codes are directed are not strictly morally 
required; and if this is the case, then P1 does not establish that actions necessary to secure 
those ends are morally required.   
The second of these two principles seems to me to be unsound. We can see this by 
examining more closely Davis’s description of the function of profession norms. Davis 
claims that the norms that make up professional codes are solutions to collective action 
problems that arise in the course of pursuing professional ideals. Davis does not claim 
that any given set of norms within any given professional code uniquely suffices to solve 
such problems – and indeed, I see no reason why this should be so. If other solutions – 
other norms – are feasible, then it is not clear why existing solutions should carry 
normative authority, unless that authority is at least partially grounded in established 
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practices. But practice-groundedness, as I argued in the last chapter, is a feature of social, 
rather than moral, norms.  
In light of these considerations, I believe the norms contained in professional 
codes should be regarded as a comparatively formal type of social norms. These 
professional norms sometimes overlap with moral norms, but they also sometimes 
conflict with moral norms, and in many cases they regulate behaviors for which there 
simply are not any corresponding moral norms. Codified professional norms also exhibit 
the feature of group-intentionality characteristic of social norms; and although the forms 
of accountability they create can be analogized to the accountability associated with legal 
norms, here again the distinction is shown by the fact that codified professional norms 
can conflict with legal norms.  
Consider an example. In the United States, as in other countries, lawyers were for 
a long time banned by the provisions of their professional codes from advertising their 
services in the manner of ordinary commercial enterprises. Justifications of this norm 
usually invoked the idea that legal representation was a public service, performed for the 
good of clients, and rewarded (rather than simply paid for) with a gratuity. So things 
stood until 1976 when, in Bates vs. State Bar of Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court struck 
down, on First Amendment grounds, this well-entrenched, widely accepted professional 
norm.28 
How should we understand what happened in this case? I think the norm against 
advertising clearly fits Davis’s description of professional norms as solutions to 
collective action problems. In this case, the problem is perhaps best described as a kind of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Cited	  in	  Koehn	  1994,	  2.	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social dilemma, in which, while it would be better for all lawyers if no lawyer advertised 
(since this would have the effect of decreasing competition over fees, and thus keep 
marginal profits high), each individual lawyer has an incentive to cheat and advertise in 
order to attract a disproportionate share of clients. The ban on advertising, built into Bar 
Association codes, and backed by the Associations’ enforcement powers, solves this 
social dilemma. But does it do so for the purpose of enabling professionals to better 
pursue their moral ideal? This is precisely the point in question, and many legal 
philosophers have argued that, in fact, the ban on advertising helped lawyers’ bottom 
lines, but if anything hindered the provision of services to, especially, the neediest 
clients.29 
It seems to me that this analysis is correct, and that, in this instance, there is no 
plausible argument according to which the ban on advertising is best understood as a 
moral norm. Nor was it a legal norm – though it was eventually struck down on the basis 
of a legal principle. Rather, the ban on advertising was a comparatively formal, codified 
social norm. It exhibits each of the four features of social norms that I have described in 
previous chapters of this dissertation. First, the norm was specific to lawyers—thus 
exhibiting the particularity feature of social norms. Second, the norm was at least 
partially grounded in existing or perceived practices within the legal profession—such 
that we can reasonably assume, counterfactually, that if no lawyers had ever observed 
this prohibition (or been perceived as observing this prohibition), then there would be no 
norm to speak of. Thus it exhibits the practice-groundedness feature of social norms. 
Third, the norm was supported by the shared beliefs and intentions of members of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  David	  Luban,	  Lawyers	  and	  Justice:	  An	  Ethical	  Study,	  Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1988,	  273.	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legal profession, and in particular, was capable of guiding the actions of individual 
lawyers in their pursuit of their legal practice. Thus it exhibits the group-intentional 
feature of social norms. Finally, the norm existed explicitly to create accountability 
amongst lawyers for a pursuing, or rather refraining from pursuing, a certain kind of 
“unprofessional” conduct. Thus it exhibited the accountability-creating feature of social 
norms. 
 
 B. Uncodified Professional Norms  
Professional codes are not the only source of social norms that guide, and 
structure, professional practice. Professionals are frequently influenced by social norms 
particular to their professions, which nevertheless do not find a place within their 
respective professional codes; and they are also commonly influenced by social norms 
that are not particular to their profession, but rather circulate within the various 
populations professionals serve.  
To illustrate the first point, we may consider the profession of museum 
curatorship. Recent research by historians such as Steven Conn amply demonstrates the 
changes that have occurred in the practice of museum curators in the U.S. over the past 
century—from a decrease in the research activities conducted by curators, to trend away 
from displaying mere objects and towards interactive or experiential environments.30 
While many of these changes may be described as trends, not all trends are grounded in, 
or driven by, changes in social norms. Curators who abstain from making their exhibits 
more interactive, for example, are unlikely to face any kind of accountability before their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Steven	  Conn,	  Do	  Museums	  Still	  Need	  Objects?	  (Philadelphia:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press,	  2010).	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peers, though they may face economic repercussions. One change that does appear to 
have a basis in changing social norms, however, relates to the educational attainments of 
curators. For many years, museum curators typically held advanced degrees in the 
particular field of inquiry to which the museums at which they worked were devoted: in 
art history, for example, or in biology, paleontology, and so on. During the 1970’s, 
however, the first undergraduate and advanced (masters’) degrees in museum studies 
began to be offered at universities in the US and the UK. With this development, there is 
a chance—though, so far as I know, it remains only a chance—that a social norm will 
develop according to which museum curators are expected to have a degree in this area, 
formal education replacing workplace experience as the “right” path to a career. To the 
extent that there is a code of conduct for the museum profession, it certainly does not 
contain any such norm regarding degree attainment, so it is appropriate to describe this as 
a (potential) social norm.  
Well-documented, by contrast, are efforts by professionals in other established 
and emerging professions to be responsive to (and in some cases, to exploit) social norms 
circulating within the wider, non-professional populations they serve. Physicians and 
scientists conducting research in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, have contemplated the 
ethics of exploiting local norms of hospitality, such as the norm against refusing requests 
made by guests in one’s own home, in order to obtain consent for collecting medical 
information. Undertakers and cemetery directors, by contrast, have had to be responsive 
to changing social norms regarding the proper intensity, duration, and direction of shows 
of mourning in American society over the past century, and have at times attempted to 
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channel such changes into increased prospects for their own professional recognition.31 
Some professionals may become indignant at claims that their actions are in part guided 
by non-codified social norms; but it can hardy be doubted that this is the case, given the 
kinds of groups that professions are: groups with fairly strictly defined and monitored 
boundaries, whose members typically undergo long periods of training and acculturation, 
and where interactions (commercial and otherwise) with non-members constitute the core 
of the groups’ shared practices. 
In this section I have analyzed the nature of professions and of the norms that 
characteristically guide the actions of professionals. I argued that the norms contained in 
professional codes should be understood as social norms, and I contended that uncodified 
social norms also serve as important influences on professional action. To be sure, other 
kinds of norms – including moral and legal norms – can and do guide the conduct of 
professionals, and it is a major argument of this chapter that, in cases of conflict between 
moral and social norms, professionals ought to favor action according to moral norms. 
Such conflicts become particularly pronounced in contexts of mass atrocity, as we shall 
see in the following sections. 
 
4.2 German Professionals and Professional Norms, 1900-1950 
Participation by German professionals in the crimes of the Holocaust is today the 
subject of an extensive research program. Attention first focused on this issue in the 
immediate postwar period, through the Nuremberg successor trials (e.g. the Doctors’ 
Trial and the Justice Case), as well as in scattered publications by émigré scholars (such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  David	  Sloane,	  The	  Last	  Great	  Necessity	  (Baltimore,	  MD:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1995).	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as Max Weinreich’s 1946 polemic, Hitler’s Professors).32 During the early decades of the 
Cold War the issue surfaced only occasionally, most notably in the 1960’s campaign by 
East German journalists to expose “Blood Judges” within the ranks of the West German 
judicial service.33 During the 1980’s, historians in Germany and elsewhere broke the 
subject wide open, and since then scholars have produced a slew of studies of the conduct 
– and misconduct – of many professional groups during the Hitler era.  
Two books published in the early 1990’s, Konrad Jarausch’s The Unfree 
Professions, and Charles McClelland’s The German Experience of Professionalization, 
offer a good overview of this material, and provide a good starting point for analyzing the 
thesis of norm transformation as applied to professionals. Both studies center on the 
experience of German lawyers, teachers, and engineers from 1900 to 1950.34 
Jarausch distinguishes three categories of professions in his study: “free” 
professions (corresponding roughly to the Anglo-American notion of liberal professions, 
including law and medicine); state-organized professions (such as philologists, or upper-
level high school teachers who traditionally engaged in original research); and emergent 
or aspirant professions (such as engineers). One aim of Jarausch’s study is to use the 
experiences of each of these types of professions in Germany in the period between 
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  See	  Max	  Weinreich,	  Hitler’s	  Professors	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1999	  [1946]).	  	  33	  For	  discussions	  of	  the	  “Blood	  Judges”	  episode,	  cf.	  Annette	  Weinke,	  “The	  German-­‐German	  Rivalry	  and	  the	  Prosecution	  of	  Nazi	  War	  Criminals	  During	  the	  Cold	  War,	  1958-­‐1965,”	  Nathaniel	  Stoltzfus	  and	  Henry	  Friedlander	  (eds.),	  Nazi	  Crimes	  and	  the	  
Law,	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008,	  159-­‐160;	  also	  Kenneth	  Ledford,	  “Judging	  German	  Judges	  in	  the	  Third	  Reich,”	  in	  Alan	  Steinweis	  and	  Robert	  Rachlin	  (eds.),	  The	  Law	  in	  Nazi	  Germany,	  New	  York:	  Berghahn	  Books,	  2013,	  173-­‐174.	  34	  Konrad	  Jarausch,	  The	  Unfree	  Professions,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1990;	  Charles	  McClelland,	  The	  German	  Experience	  of	  Professionalization,	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1991.	  
	   	  103	  
national unification in 1871 and the end of the Hitler era to comment on claims and 
hypotheses about professions offered by scholars familiar primarily with the Anglo-
American context. Here I suspect Jarausch would cast doubt on that part of Michael 
Davis’s definition that refers to professions as “voluntarily organized” groups—since 
reflection on the German experience requires “recognition of the role of the state as the 
source of licensing or social policies,” and since traits commonly associated with 
professions in the Anglo-American context, such as “the market, associational self-
control, and autonomy,” are, according to Jarausch, “likely to be less important in 
Germany.”35 While I do not think that the German context of professionalism described 
by Jarausch differs sufficiently to be incompatible with the account of professions and 
professional norms offered above, I will attend to such differences in the analysis that 
follows. 
The trajectory Jarausch traces for German professions, professionals, and 
professional norms in the period from 1871 to 1945 is too complex to summarize here. 
My aim will simply be to pick up on some points that are especially applicable to the 
present study. To begin with, Jarausch demonstrates throughout his study that changes in 
the institutional context in which professionals carry out their practice can have a 
significant impact on professionals’ ability to be guided by norms that they accept. His 
discussion of the changing institutional environment in which philologists, or 
academically trained upper-level school teachers, conducted their dual pedagogical and 
research activities amply illustrates this point.  
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  Jarausch	  1990,	  6-­‐7.	  Charles	  McClelland	  likewise	  emphasizes	  the	  stronger	  tradition	  of	  state	  supervision	  of	  professions	  in	  Germany	  (and	  elsewhere	  in	  Central	  Europe)	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  context.	  Cf.	  McClelland	  1991,	  35-­‐37.	  
	   	  104	  
Following unification in 1871, upper-level teachers took an active part in pushing 
for national standardization of the qualifications for, and chief activities of, their 
profession, closely guarding in particular the requirement that teachers at this level 
engage in significant independent research.36 The outbreak of World War I negatively 
affected the practice, if not the status or self-conception, of these upper-level teachers: 
school graduation requirements were in many places lowered, and in some cases the final 
year of secondary schooling cancelled entirely, as a result of mobilization.37 Immediately 
following the war, male philologists attempted, with mixed success, to block the entry of 
women into their profession—for example, by barring membership to women in their 
largest professional organization, the Philologenverband.38 Concerns with closing, and 
preserving, the masculine ranks of the profession were exacerbated during the inflation 
crisis of the early 1920’s, as government education ministries attempted to deal with 
immense deficits by cutting the number of teachers in schools and raising the number of 
students per class and hours of teaching expected of those who remained.39 Once again, 
upper-level teachers complained that these added duties encroached on the distinguishing 
feature of their profession, i.e. the expectation of independent research. 
While the outlook for philologists improved somewhat in the second half of the 
1920’s, an oversupply of trained teachers in the early 1930’s contributed to the appeal of 
National Socialist promises of reform and full employment. After the Nazi party’s rise to 
power in 1933, however, upper-level teachers saw their distinct position above primary-
school teachers (who did not undertake academic research) eroded, as distinctive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  ibid.,	  15-­‐16.	  37	  ibid.,	  27.	  38	  ibid.,	  36.	  	  39	  ibid.,	  58-­‐60.	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professional organizations such as the Philologenverband were discouraged and 
ultimately banned.40 The purge of Jewish teachers and affiliates with other politically 
suspect groups during the mid-30’s created openings for some opportunistic teachers to 
enter the profession, but other features of National Socialist ideology, such as a suspicion 
of specialization in scholarship, lowered the status of philologists, and decreased support 
for their academic research. With the outbreak of aggressive war in 1939, upper-level 
high school studies were again cut short due to mobilization, and the pursuit of 
scholarship further infringed by both changes to curricula (with an increased emphasis on 
indoctrination) and sheer physical distress (such as disruption of the teaching day by 
power outages, nighttime bombing raids, and so on).41 Reflecting on this long series of 
institutional developments and disruptions, Jarausch concludes, “instead of affecting just 
some dimensions like the Weimar crisis, the Nazi system impaired professionalism 
categorically: training standards declined, certification produced a manpower shortage, 
economic remuneration fell short of increased work, academic status lines were blurred, 
practice was hindered, ethics were warped, and free association destroyed.”42 
I have reprised this historical discussion at some length because I believe it 
provides a clear, but largely benign, example of a transformation in social norms amongst 
a particular group of German professionals during the first half of the twentieth century. 
The pursuit of significant independent scholarly research was clearly the object of 
normative attitudes amongst German upper-school teachers at the beginning of this 
period, and many professionals retained those attitudes, even as the institutional 
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  ibid.,	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  41	  ibid.,	  190,	  193.	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conditions necessary for such scholarly pursuits deteriorated.  Put differently, there was a 
clear professional norm regarding such research. I will set aside for the moment the 
question of whether this norm operated as a tradition in the context of practical reasoning 
and consider first whether this norm satisfied the four features of social norms outlined in 
the previous chapter of this study. 
The rule requiring philologists to undertake independent research seems clearly to 
satisfy each of the four features of social norms included in my account. It is particular to 
philologists (and indeed, those Jarausch describes took it as a point of pride that they, as 
opposed to lower-school teachers, engaged in such research). It is grounded in an existing 
practice—in this case one which predates by many years German unification in 1871. It 
is group-intentional, in this case not only guiding individual philologists to undertake 
research and share it in conferences, learned journals, and the like, but also, according to 
their self-conception, supposed to decisively influence and guide their teaching of pupils 
as well. And, finally, it is accountability-creating: this is pointed out not by Jarausch, but 
by Charles McClelland, who notes that during the Weimar era philologists rejected the 
idea that music and drawing teachers instructing upper-level students should be granted 
the same privileges as themselves, since they were not trained to engage in research.43  
There is a further question as to whether this norm operated in the manner of a 
tradition, i.e. by excluding other kinds of formal and informal principles from 
consideration. I believe the historical materials I have marshaled suggest that this 
probably was the case in the early part of the 20th century, but that eventually this 
particular mode of operation broke down, as laws and institutional arrangements bearing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  McClelland	  1991,	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on the profession changed. If this is correct, then it would be worth considering whether 
what had been a tradition became (for a shorter or longer time) a social norm, before 
ceasing to be able to guide action entirely). While my meta-normative account of social 
norms explains how such a transformation is possible, it is an empirical question, and one 
I am not in a position to resolve, whether such a transformation in fact occurred.44  
The case of the German philologists as recounted by Jarausch is only one out of 
many possible examples of the way in which professional social norms were altered or 
eroded by the social and political upheavals of the first half of the twentieth century. It is 
also a designedly benign example. Though there is evidence of complicity by upper-level 
teachers in the rise of National Socialism and the induction of young men into its 
imperial and genocidal projects, there is no reason to think that the philological norm 
requiring original scholarship contributed, directly or indirectly, to this complicity. If 
anything, the opposite seems to have occurred: the rise of complicit practices of 
indoctrination and manipulation of curricula seem to have degraded, even practically 
destroyed, the norm regarding scholarship. In the next two sections I will consider less 
benign examples of transformations in social norms, and consider the import of such 
cases for the general thesis of norm transformation.  
 
4.3 Norm Breakdown and Professional Participation in Atrocities 
Having considered the nature of professions generally, and the experience of 
German professions and professionals particularly, we are in a position to take up the 
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  difference	  between	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  evolutionary	  theory,	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  Machery	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  “Evolution	  of	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  in	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  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	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thesis of norm transformation. The most conceptually sophisticated discussion of this 
thesis appears in an article by philosopher and Holocaust scholar Berel Lang. In this 
article, entitled “The Third Reich and the Breakdown of Professional Ethics,” Lang (1) 
clarifies the sense in which the thesis of norm transformation is an explanatory 
hypothesis, (2) explains how the specific thesis of norm breakdown differs from a generic 
thesis of norm transformation, and (3) offers evidence for the occurrence of such a norm 
breakdown in a number of different professions implicated in the Holocaust. In this 
section I discuss each of these elements of Lang’s account, then address a general 
challenge to explanatory appeals to norms, and changes in norms, in studies of historical 
mass atrocities.  
Throughout this chapter, I have referred to the thesis of norm transformation as an 
explanatory thesis—a proposed way of making sense of participation by large numbers of 
ordinary, i.e. morally competent, individuals in mass atrocities. There are some who 
consider the very effort to supply explanations for genocide and mass atrocity misguided. 
This is especially true in the particular case of the Holocaust. Berel Lang sketches the 
broad outlines of this dispute at the beginning of his essay. He acknowledges that there 
are risks involved in taking the Holocaust (and, we may suppose, other mass atrocities) to 
be the result of “day-to-day processes which, in their individual causal patterns, hardly 
appear as extraordinary at all.”45 One such risk is that of underestimating the suffering 
inflicted on victims. Another is excusing, by explaining, the actions of perpetrators.  Lang 
contends that these risks are no worse than those incurred by taking the Holocaust as 
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  “The	  Third	  Reich	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  in	  The	  
Future	  of	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  University	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“incomprehensible or ineffable,” as “a conceptual or practical aberration.”46 He thus 
allies himself unreservedly with the pro-explanation camp and proffers his account of a 
breakdown in professional norms as a contribution to the “search for the origins of even 
the enormity of the Nazi genocide in the commonplace background from which it 
emerged.”47 
Since the previous section provided a broad overview of the structure and social 
position of the professions in Germany in the early 20th century, we may pass over 
Lang’s own sketch of this background, and consider his essay’s principle claim: that a 
systematic breakdown in professional norms contributed materially to professional 
complicity in the Holocaust. Clearly this is a version of the general thesis of norm 
transformation outlined at the outset of this chapter. Here our task is to understand its 
specific features, and particularly to understand why Lang speaks in terms of a 
breakdown of professional norms.  
Three features of Lang’s account stand out as salient. First, Lang is not concerned 
with the alteration or erosion of particular professional norms so much as he is with 
fundamental changes in structures and procedures through which professional norms are 
created and emended. He remarks that, during the Nazi period, such changes in norms 
occurred across a variety of professions “without open discussion inside or outside the 
profession;” without any effort “to reach a professional consensus,” and with the explicit 
intention of concealing such changes from non-professionals.48 Second, with respect to 
changes in particular norms, Lang points out that the departures from previous 
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professional practice tended to be radical, rather than incremental. Finally, Lang asserts 
that in most cases professionals themselves were fully conscious of these substantial 
alterations in the structure and procedures for the creation of professional norms, and in 
the contents of the norms themselves. 
All three of these features are on display in the case of the Nazi euthanasia 
program, Aktion T4, discussed earlier in this chapter. The initial order ‘authorizing’ this 
program was highly secret.49 Neither Professor Ewald’s critical analysis of this program 
nor Dr. Conti’s reply to his former teacher circulated publicly. Indeed, they did not 
circulate widely within the medical profession itself – in which there was no effort to 
achieve consensus on this radical change in norms for treating, or rather dealing with, 
severely disabled patients.50 Ultimately it was German clergy, not German physicians, 
who eventually exposed Aktion T4 to public attention and outcry.51 Although that public 
reaction belied Conti’s prediction of a “transformation of thought” amongst ordinary 
Germans towards euthanasia, both his letter and Ewald’s analysis testify to the fact that 
those physicians who were apprised of Aktion T4 were fully conscious of the radical 
break with previous professional norms embodied in this program. These included not 
only the famous prescription “first do no harm” but also professional norms against 
deceiving patients or their guardians and against basing diagnoses on insufficient 
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information. Thus, each of the three criteria for norm breakdown proposed by Lang are in 
evidence in this case.  
Lang’s list of conditions for a breakdown in professional ethics makes a good fit 
with some of the more egregious documented instances of professional complicity in the 
crimes of Holocaust. We may yet wonder whether, or two what extent, the radical 
transformation in professional norms Lang describes explains professional complicity in 
genocide. Above, I distinguished between the merely statistical concept of a norm and the 
properly normative concept of a norm, and I argued that one distinguishing feature of the 
normative concept of a norm is that norms thus understood are inherently (rather than 
contingently) action guiding. This is true across specific categories of norms, such as 
legal, moral, and social norms. Nevertheless, as explained in the last chapter of this study, 
there is a standing question, when we are confronted with some particular empirical 
pattern of behavior shared across time and across agents, whether that particular pattern 
should be explained, in part or in whole, by reference to the action-guiding power of a 
norm. In the specific case of the Euthanasia program, we might ask whether the fact of 
widespread participation by doctors, surgeons, and other medical professionals in mass 
murder can be partially or completely explained by the fact that these professionals were 
guided in their actions by a particular norm – whether a moral norm of the kind Conti 
describes, or a norm of any other kind.  
As I argued in the last chapter, I believe such questions can be answered using 
techniques of history and social science. Historians, and especially historians of the 
Holocaust, have long been accustomed to dealing with multiple, mutually incompatible 
thesis concerning the causes or contours of events in the distant past, and they have 
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developed sophisticated strategies of counterfactual reasoning, creative collation of 
source types, and critical readings of testimonial and documentary evidence in order to 
address such challenges. Within Holocaust historiography, some of the best-known 
difficulties have to do with the unreliability of testimonial evidence (particularly when 
obtained through legal proceedings) and the extensive use of misleading euphemisms, or 
“camouflage,” in Nazi-era documents.52 These strategies and these precautions seem to 
me perfectly adequate to deal with the circularity problem described above, and to secure 
the viability of explanations of individual and group participation in mass atrocities that 
reserve an action-guiding role for legal, moral, or social norms. If this is correct, then the 
thesis of norm transformation should also be viable, in the sense of being capable of 
being supported by historical evidence. My aim in the next, and last, section of this paper 
will be to show that changes in social norms, specifically, can help make sense of 
professional complicity in mass atrocity. 
 
4.4 Professional Complicity and the Transformation of Social Norms 
So far in this chapter I have relied on a definition of complicity drawn from the 
historiographical literature on genocide and mass atrocity, and specifically from Robert 
Ericksen’s recent book, Complicity in the Holocaust.53 On this view, complicity is a term 
of normative assessment reserved for actors who are not (or not usually) direct 
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  to	  refer	  to	  atrocities	  should	  themselves	  be	  understood	  as	  examples	  of	  social	  norms.	  See	  Paul	  Morrow,	  “Mass	  Atrocity	  and	  Manipulation	  of	  Social	  Norms,”	  Social	  Theory	  and	  
Practice	  40,	  n.	  2	  (April	  2014),	  255-­‐280.	  53	  Ericksen	  2012,	  21-­‐23.	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perpetrators of atrocities, but who, because of certain facts about their position within 
society at large or within specific institutions and organizations, may reasonably be 
supposed to have exerted some influence upon the practical reasoning of those 
individuals who did directly perpetrate atrocities. Ericksen’s two focal points, German 
ministers and German university faculty, can easily be accommodated by such a 
definition, since the ideals historically associated with their professions are, respectively, 
to exert moral and intellectual influence.  
The specific aim of this last substantive section of my paper is demonstrate the 
contribution of social norms, and changes in social norms, to professional complicity in 
the Holocaust. In order to achieve this goal, it will be useful to introduce a slightly more 
refined definition of complicity. The definition I will use is drawn from Christopher 
Kutz’s work on this concept. Kutz’s excellent work bridges ethical and legal perspectives 
on complicity; for my purposes, I want to focus solely on complicity as a moral concept. I 
shall therefore understand complicity as the moral status or condition of an agent who 
has contributed to some act or pattern of wrongdoing, insofar as that contribution is 
irreducibly mediated by the contributions of other agents.54  
Let me point out a few features of this definition. First, it is clearly broader than 
the definition employed by Ericksen and other Holocaust and Genocide scholars, but it 
clearly accommodates that definition, since intellectually or moral influencing 
perpetrators of wrongdoings can count as a contribution to those wrongdoings.55 Second, 
the definition acknowledges that agents often bear more than one (blameworthy) moral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  For	  the	  language	  in	  Kutz’s	  text	  that	  inspired,	  but	  does	  not	  directly	  overlap	  with,	  this	  definition	  see	  Christopher	  Kutz,	  Complicity:	  Ethics	  and	  Law	  for	  a	  Collective	  Age,	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2000,	  2.	  	  55	  In	  case	  some	  doubt	  this,	  I	  describe	  specific	  examples	  below.	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status or condition at a time. This is why it refers to contributions to wrongdoing insofar 
as those contributions are irreducibly mediated by others. Often, agents can be charged 
with both mediated and unmediated contributions to large-scale wrongs like genocide and 
mass atrocity; those agents are complicit in some wrongs, and directly culpable for 
others.56 Finally, the definition is neutral with regard to individual and group agents. As 
we have seen, historians and other scholars of mass atrocity commonly speak of groups 
(and not only professions) as being complicit. It is generally unclear whether this moral 
assessment of complicity is (1) being charged against the group as a group; (2) being 
charged against all or some of the individuals who compose the group, or (3) both. My 
definition is neutral between these options in the following sense: it allows for cases in 
which one group or collective agent contributes to wrongdoings in a way that is 
irreducibly mediated by other group agents. In what follows, I shall discuss both the 
complicity of individual agents who belong to professional groups, and the complicity of 
those professional groups themselves.  
Social norms are eminently suited to giving rise to complicity, as I have defined 
it, for the following reason: individual agents whose actions are guided in part, or in 
whole, by social norms are usually (though not always) acting in ways that are 
irreducibly mediated by other agents.57 Consider an example from a well-known primary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  It	  may	  also	  be	  possible	  for	  agents	  to	  be	  both	  complicit	  in,	  and	  directly	  culpable	  for,	  “the	  same”	  wrongdoings.	  The	  chief	  difficulty	  here	  consists	  in	  individuating	  wrongdoings	  (understood	  as	  a	  specific	  sub-­‐class	  of	  actions).	  For	  a	  classic	  statement	  of	  the	  problem,	  see	  Joel	  Feinberg,	  “Action	  and	  Responsibility,”	  in	  Doing	  and	  
Deserving	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1970).	  	  57	  The	  qualification	  “usually”	  accounts	  for	  cases	  in	  which	  social	  norms	  are	  grounded	  in	  perceived	  (but	  not	  actually	  existing)	  social	  practices.	  Generally	  such	  cases	  are	  unstable	  –	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  practice	  at	  t1	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  norm	  commonly	  continues	  by	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  practice	  itself	  at	  t2,	  so	  that	  at	  t2	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  an	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source: Jewish professor Victor Klemperer’s diaries of the Nazi era. Klemperer, who 
himself was married to a non-Jew, but had not children, describes in an entry for August 
11th, 1940 an emergent social norm affecting children of comparably “mixed” marriages: 
 Children of mixed race were also no longer being admitted to secondary  
 schools. Officially it was still allowed; but a rector who permitted a mixed  
 race child among his pupils would earn a complaint to the Party from Hitler  
 Youth and parents: Thus one rector had been dismissed for being ‘pro-Jewish,’ 
  as a result of which no headmaster accepted a mixed-race child anymore.58 
 
Klemperer later refers to the denial of secondary schooling to ‘mixed race’ 
children as a “dreadful disgrace.”59 We may certainly call it a wrongdoing, and it is 
appropriate to charge individual school rectors who complied with this norm with 
complicity in this wrongdoing, insofar as their denials of admission were in fact guided 
by this social norm. Additionally, since this social norm, as described, was enforced not 
only by other rectors, but also by members of other formal groups (such as the Hitler 
Youth) and informal collectives (parents of non-mixed, ‘Aryan’ children), it is 
appropriate to speak of complicity of schoolmasters as a group, since their part in this 
wrongdoing was (apparently) irreducibly mediated by other groups.60 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  actually	  existing	  social	  practice.	  In	  a	  small	  minority	  of	  cases,	  however,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  social	  norms	  can	  exist	  within	  groups,	  organizations,	  or	  societies,	  and	  influence	  the	  behavior	  of	  individual	  members	  in	  certain	  ways,	  without	  the	  corresponding	  practices	  ever	  emerging.	  In	  some	  cases	  I	  am	  unsure	  whether	  the	  action	  of	  an	  individual	  agent	  that	  is	  guided	  by	  such	  a	  social	  norm	  should	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  mediated	  by	  others.	  	  58	  Victor	  Klemperer,	  I	  Will	  Bear	  Witness:	  A	  Diary	  of	  the	  Nazi	  Years,	  1933-­‐1941,	  trans.	  Martin	  Chalmers,	  New	  York:	  Modern	  Library,	  1999,	  352.	  	  59	  Victor	  Klemperer,	  I	  Will	  Bear	  Witness:	  A	  Diary	  of	  the	  Nazi	  Years,	  1942-­‐1945,	  New	  York:	  Modern	  Library,	  2001,	  240.	  	  60	  The	  reverse	  is	  also	  true,	  i.e.	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Hitler	  Youth	  and	  parents	  should	  also	  be	  charged	  with	  complicity,	  along	  with,	  perhaps,	  more	  direct	  forms	  of	  culpability	  in	  this	  case.	  Some	  may	  also	  wish	  to	  speak	  of	  differing	  levels,	  or	  degrees,	  of	  complicity;	  I	  cannot	  give	  adequate	  attention	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  such	  levels	  here.	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The above example is meant to indicate how a change in norms, and particularly 
the emergence of a new social norm amongst a certain group of German professionals, 
gave rise to complicity in one of the many wrongdoings associated with the Holocaust. I 
have not described this change in norms as an inversion, or breakdown, because I am not 
aware that corresponding norm of free admittance, or free admittance based on merit, 
existed amongst headmasters prior to the rise of the Nazi movement. By contrast, a case 
drawn from the experience of the German legal profession during this period illustrates 
the phenomenon of norm inversion. As Jarausch points out in his study of German 
professions, and as Kenneth Ledford has more recently highlighted, prior to the 1930’s 
there was a strong norm of freedom of representation within the legal profession in 
Germany – according to which lawyers were free to defend clients no matter what their 
political affiliations. This norm survived the clashes between extreme leftist and rightist 
groups immediately following the First World War, and subsequently during the Weimar 
period. It seems to have persisted for a time during the mid-1930’s. But it was decisively 
eradicated, or rather inverted, after 1939, when lawyers were forbidden, as a matter of 
official justice ministry policy, from unreservedly defending individuals accused of 
political crimes. 
The clearest expression of this transformation in professional norms comes in a 
Richterbriefe, or ‘Letter to Lawyers,’ issued by Reich Justice Minister Otto Thierack on 
October 1, 1944. After discussing in a general manner changes in the administration of 
justice in Germany that had occurred during the war, Thierack turns to the changed role 
of defense attorneys within the justice system, writing: 
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[Today] the lawyer as defense attorney has been brought closer to  
 the state and the community. He has been integrated into the community of 
  the Rechtwahrer [defender of law], and has lost his earlier position as one- 
 sided advocate for the accused. Whoever cannot clearly and unconditionally  
 admit to this internally, and who is not constantly ready and willing to act 
 accordingly, should not put on the robe of a German lawyer, or enter the   
 defense attorney’s bench.61  
 
Thierack’s comment is clearly meant to confirm – and reinforce – a fairly recently 
developed professional norm applicable to lawyers acting as defense attorneys.62 What’s 
more, like Dr. Conti, Thierack acknowledges that this new norm – under which defense 
attorneys are to act as defenders of the law, rather than defenders of clients – marks a 
serious shift from previous practice. Possibly Thierack himself would not accept the 
notion that this shift represents a complete inversion in norms, in the way that Conti does 
when speaking of sterilization and euthanasia, but the historical evidence suggests that in 
fact such a description is justified, with a majority of defense attorneys who remained in 
practice63 advancing the interests of the state against accused individuals, rather than 
advancing the interests of the accused against the state. For this reason it is reasonable to 
speak of complicity amongst individual German lawyers resulting from an inversion in 
professional norms.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61Otto	  Thierack,	  Letter	  of	  1	  October	  1944,	  excerpted	  in	  Martin	  Hirsch,	  Diemut	  Majer,	  and	  Jürgen	  Meinck	  (eds.),	  Recht,	  Verwaltung	  und	  Justiz	  im	  Nationalsozialismus:	  
ausgewählte	  Schriften,	  Gesetze	  und	  Gerichtsentscheidungen	  von	  1933	  bis	  1945:	  mit	  
ausführlichen	  Erläuterungen	  und	  Kommentierungen,	  Baden-­‐Baden:	  Nomos	  Verlagsgesellschaft,	  1997,	  545.	  	  62	  Traditionally,	  and	  also	  during	  the	  Nazi	  period,	  lawyers	  acting	  as	  defense	  attorneys	  were	  certified	  by	  the	  state,	  via	  examinations,	  but	  were	  not	  directly	  employed	  by	  the	  state,	  or	  counted	  as	  civil	  servants	  –	  in	  contrast	  to	  judges	  and	  prosecuting	  attorneys.	  Cf.	  Jarausch	  1990.	  	  63	  In	  light	  of	  this	  and	  other	  fairly	  radical	  change	  in	  expectations	  as	  to	  how	  they	  were	  to	  comport	  themselves	  in	  the	  courtroom,	  some	  defense	  attorneys	  opted	  to	  remove	  themselves	  from	  criminal	  trials	  altogether,	  taking	  only	  civil	  cases.	  Thierack	  himself	  acknowledges	  (and	  reproves)	  this	  tendency	  in	  his	  letter.	  See	  Hirsch	  et	  al	  1997,	  546.	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Having examined a case of social norm inversion and a case of social norm 
emergence, I want to consider an objection. This objection is a species of the circularity 
objection discussed in Chapter 3 above, and runs as follows: I have generally referred to 
transformations in social norms contributing to professional complicity in large-scale 
wrongs, which suggests a causal connection in which the change in norms comes first, 
and the complicity follows; but I have also spoken at times as if the mere fact that a 
change in norms occurred itself constituted the complicity of professionals in such 
wrongs. The worry then is that it can’t be the case that complicity is entailed in both of 
these ways by norm transformation; and perhaps this worry is compounded by the worry 
that the purported causal connection between a change in norms and professional 
complicity is itself dubious.64 
My response to this objection is to argue that both the causal and the constitutive 
accounts of how a shift in professional norms drives professional complicity are true, and 
that they are not in fact incompatible. On this view, we may distinguish, if we choose, 
between a causal and a constitutive version of the thesis of norm transformation stated at 
the beginning of this chapter – but in fact, in the case of professionals, at least, both of 
these theses are likely to be true at once in particular cases of mass atrocity. Let me 
explain. On the one hand, the constitutive version of the thesis, according to which the 
fact of norm transformation (of a certain kind) within a given group itself constitutes that 
group’s complicity, fits well with Berel Lang’s account of the breakdown of professional 
ethics, in which he understood that breakdown to be marked in large part by the changes 
in the procedures by which professional norms were created, revised, or dispensed with. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  This	  second	  worry	  especially	  mirrors	  the	  general	  concern	  about	  circularity	  discussed	  above.	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On this view, the complicity of German professionals, such as lawyers and headmasters, 
consisted in part in their loss of control of the procedures by which the norms governing 
their own activity were regulated. Such an account is especially apt when the individuals 
or groups that thereby gained influence over professional norms could not reasonably 
claim any authority to exert such influence – as in the cases of the headmasters.  
On the other hand, I believe the causal version of the thesis of norm 
transformation is itself viable, i.e. not contradictory, and in fact applicable to at least 
some of the cases discussed here. Proving that any particular professional was in fact 
influenced by a transformed norm to participate in some wrongdoing will of course 
always require a careful gathering of historical data, and the judicious exercise of 
analytical reasoning. Nevertheless, there is no in-principle objection to the idea that 
changes in norms can cause complicit behavior. In the first place, it is not a necessary 
condition for the emergence of any particular social norm for the practices on which that 
norm is grounded to already exist, but only necessary that those practices be perceived, 
by some agents, to exist. In the second place, it often happens that some practice in fact 
exists, but is not associated with any particular norm capable of guiding action, amongst a 
population. In some such cases, that practice subsequently comes to be associated with a 
social norm by members of that population – either through mistaken perceptions, or 
through the active efforts of norm entrepreneurs. In such cases, we would say that 
practice itself did not cause the emergence of the norm, but the norm, once established, 
may have caused the continuation (and expansion) of the practice. Possibly this is what 
happened in the case of the German defense attorneys whose change in practices 
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Thierack approves – though it would be rash to leap from a demonstration that such a 
causal pathway is possible, to the conclusion that it is plausible, or actual. 
With respect to such a modest theoretical finding it might be asked who could 
possibly object to the idea that social norms, and social norms, can contribute in this way 
to mass atrocities. In response to this worry, I would say that I see this chapter, and this 
study more generally, chiefly as filling in neglected theoretical terrain, rather than 
refuting existing claims about the significance (or insignificance) of social norms to 
making sense of mass atrocity. Nevertheless, there are some theoretical positions that my 
account does conflict with. On the one hand, the emphasis on norms, and especially 
social norms, rules out general explanations of mass atrocity that rely on widespread 
deficiencies in moral cognition amongst perpetrators or bystanders to atrocities.65 On the 
other hand, my account conflicts with descriptions of mass atrocity that interpret such 
large-scale crimes as products of sheer collapse or breakdown in many or all principles of 
social order.66  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The thesis of norm transformation is an intriguing explanation for professional 
complicity in genocide and mass atrocity. It is certainly only a partial explanation; it tells 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Although	  such	  explanations	  are	  now	  largely	  out	  of	  favor,	  they	  were	  once	  taken	  seriously	  by	  scholars	  seeking	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  particular	  mass	  atrocities.	  One	  example	  is	  psychologist	  G.M.	  Gilbert’s	  1960’s	  characterization	  of	  German	  SS	  members	  as	  “murderous	  robots.”	  See	  Waller	  2001,	  61-­‐62.	  66	  My	  research	  is	  thus	  complementary	  to	  the	  work	  done	  by	  Scott	  Straus	  and	  others	  on	  the	  structures	  and	  organizational	  patterns	  that	  underlie	  episodes	  of	  mass	  violence.	  See	  Scott	  Straus,	  The	  Order	  of	  Genocide	  (Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2008);	  also	  Stathis	  Kalyvas,	  Ian	  Shapiro,	  and	  Tarek	  Masoud	  (eds.),	  Order,	  
Conflict,	  and	  Violence	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008).	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us little, by itself, about the macro-level causes of the social and political transformations 
that led to transformations at the micro-level in particular norms and sets of norms, such 
as professional codes. In this chapter I have not tried to newly validate the thesis of norm 
transformation for any particular collection of actors charged with collaboration or 
complicity in large-scale crimes. Instead, I have tried to clarify the meta-normative 
underpinnings of this thesis, to demonstrate the variety of codified and uncodified social 
norms that commonly guide professionals in their practice, and to distinguish different 
ways in which transformations in such norms are connected, causally or constitutively, 
with professional complicity in atrocities.  
Not all cases of professional participation or complicity in mass atrocity can be 
explained by reference to transformations in professional norms. Some cases within 
Holocaust historiography, such as recent studies of academic anti-Semitic research, 
indicate that certain longstanding scholarly norms, such as norms requiring ‘objectivity,’ 
and norms requiring footnoting and peer review, could be evaded without being changed 
in order to advance genocidal projects and policies; in this case the thesis of norm 
transformation seems not to apply. Nevertheless this chapter has demonstrated how 
closely that thesis fits a wide variety of cases in the annals of professional complicity in 
the Holocaust. In the next chapter of this study I will expand my view to consider how 
social norms, and changes in social norms, can be used to make sense of collaboration, 
bystanding, and resistance by non-professionals in the face of genocide and mass atrocity.
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Chapter 5: Categories and Categorization in the Theory of Mass Atrocity 
Categories and processes of categorization are conspicuous in current scholarship 
on genocide and mass atrocity. State-centered theories of mass atrocity record and 
compare administrative categories deployed by political and military leaders in order to 
separate and set at odds members of different demographic groups during large-scale 
crimes. Agent-centered theories of mass atrocity adopt psychological models of cognitive 
categorization in order to explain the widespread collapse – as well as the occasional 
survival – of affective ties and normative commitments amongst friends, relatives, and 
neighbors in the context of mass atrocities. 
Additional categories appear in historical and legal investigations of large-scale 
crimes. Historians employ a broad array of categories – including ‘perpetrators’, 
‘bystanders’, ‘rescuers’,  ‘resisters,’ and ‘victims ‘or ‘targets’ of atrocities– in order to 
synthesize large quantities of historical data, and ground comparisons between the actions 
(or inactions) of temporally and geographically dispersed individuals. Lawyers and 
judges work within constraints imposed by existing juridical categories, while also 
seeking to expand or reshape those categories, in their efforts to secure legal 
accountability for large-scale crimes. 
In this chapter, I use the conceptual framework of social norms developed in this 
study to define and distinguish these four forms of categorization – administrative and 
cognitive, historical and juridical. Each of these four forms of categorization contributes 
to different ends in the context of mass atrocity and transitional justice. Each exhibits 
significant points of complementarity and conflict with the others.  Reflecting 
philosophically on the different ways in which social norms shape and sustain these 
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different forms of categorization before, during, and after mass atrocities will help us to 
better understand the connections between these different sets of categories. It may also 
help us to resolve some of the more serious conflicts.  
We saw in the last chapter how one particular actor category – that of 
‘professionals’ – serves the needs of state officials before and during mass atrocities, and 
receives scrutiny from historians and judges afterwards. The category of professionals 
generally applies only to elite participants in atrocities. The more general forms of 
categorization considered in this chapter are expansive enough to include those “ordinary 
men” (and women) whose direct and indirect participation in large-scale crimes is the 
subject of much recent research. One reason for examining categories and processes of 
categorization using the framework of social norms is that such norms commonly serve 
both to distinguish different segments or levels of political societies and to connect the 
decisions and actions of individuals across those different segments or levels. A second 
reason is that social norms, with their socio-empirical and normative aspects, may serve 
to bridge the boundary between the descriptive and normative features of the four kinds 
of categories under consideration here.  
As with my earlier discussion of professional norms and professional participation 
in mass atrocities, a variety of historical and social scientific sources ground my analysis 
in this chapter. Diaries, oral testimonies, and works of secondary scholarship supply the 
various historical examples of social norms and categories that I discuss. I have tried to 
incorporate exemplars from a range of mass atrocities, varying both geographically and 
chronologically through the 20th century. The restriction of the analysis to 20th century 
large-scale crimes reflects the fact that I am concerned chiefly with state-directed or 
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state-supported mass atrocities. The four forms of categorization I shall consider are, as 
we shall see, particularly applicable to crimes of this kind.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 5.1 I define and distinguish two 
prospective forms of categorization – state-level administrative categorization and 
individual-level cognitive categorization – and explain some of the extant questions about 
the interactions between these two forms of categorization in the context of real or 
impending large-scale crimes. In Section 5.2 I take up two retrospective forms of 
categorization – historical and juridical categorization – and consider some conflicts that 
arise between the descriptive and normative aspects of the particular categories deployed 
in each.  In Section 5.3 I use historical examples to illustrate how social norms influence 
each of these four forms of categorization, and how the perspective of social norms can 
help to resolve some apparent conflicts among them. Finally, in Section 5.4 I consider 
some objections to my account of categorization, and highlight key theoretical and 
practical consequences.  
 
5.1 Prospective Categorization 
Categories make manageable problems and phenomena that initially appear 
intractable. The four forms of categorization considered in this chapter each serve to 
resolve, in particular ways, for particular actors, problems of scale, scope, or complexity 
associated with the perpetration, reconstruction, or redress of large-scale crimes. 
Administrative and cognitive forms of categorization aid planners and perpetrators of 
mass atrocities, and they do so prospectively – i.e. before atrocities begin, or while they 
are ongoing. In this section, I define and distinguish these two forms of categorization, 
	   	  125	  
paying close attention to the role of social norms, and changes in social norms, in each. 
As we shall see, these two prospective forms of categorization help clarify the thesis of 
norm transformation discussed in the last chapter.  
 
5.1.1 Administrative Categorization 
Mass atrocities are large-scale undertakings, which require coordinated action 
across space and time, and demand the mobilization of large segments of local, regional, 
and national populations. Though commonly described in terms of social or political 
disarray, mass atrocities are ordered, if not orderly, events. One of the principal tools 
used by state governments and quasi-governmental organizations to give order to planned 
or ongoing mass atrocities is the form of categorization that I call administrative 
categorization. 
Administrative categorization consists in the division of national or regional 
populations according to ethnic, religious, racial, political, class, gender, or other 
demographic differences. Although just and peaceful political societies regularly engage 
in administrative categorization, this form of categorization is also integral to political 
societies riven by large-scale crimes.  
Genocide remains the paradigm example of mass atrocity in international law and 
politics, and it is no accident that Raphael Lemkin’s foundational essay on this crime 
stresses the “concentrated and coordinated” character of genocide.1 More recently, 
historian Eric Weitz has demonstrated the significance of administrative categories and 
processes of categorization before, during, and after genocide. In his 2003 study, A 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Raphael	  Lemkin,	  “Genocide,”	  in	  Axis	  Rule	  In	  Occupied	  Europe	  (Washington:	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace,	  1944),	  82.	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Century of Genocide, Weitz analyzes four central cases of 20th-century genocide: in the 
Soviet Union, Nazi-controlled Europe, Cambodia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.2 In each of 
these cases, the administrative categorization of citizens and inhabits along racial, ethnic, 
religious, national, and class-based lines marked a clear step in the progression towards 
genocide. Weitz argues that the process of categorization is an empirically necessary 
stage on the way to genocide, reflecting state leaders’ “determination to remake 
fundamentally the societies and states they had either conquered or inherited.”3  
Administrative categorization is not limited to genocide, but is also a key element 
in other kinds of large-scale crimes. In order to demonstrate the importance of 
categorization for forms of mass atrocity distinct from genocide, we may look to 
Christian Gerlach’s notion of “extremely violent societies.”4 Gerlach introduces this 
notion, along with the corollary concept of “mass violence,” precisely in order to counter 
what he takes to be shortcomings in current legal and political conceptions of genocide. 
He argues that the concept of genocide is politically convenient, insofar as it assumes that 
responsibility resides with a relatively small number of state leaders and planners, but 
that it is descriptively and analytically insufficient for dealing with many real world 
episodes of mass violence, which exhibit (1) plurality in the direction of violence; (2) 
plurality in the perpetrators of violence: (3) complex (rather than direct) links between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Eric	  Weitz,	  A	  Century	  of	  Genocide:	  Utopias	  of	  Race	  and	  Nation	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2003).	  3	  Weitz	  2003,	  237-­‐238.	  	  4	  Christian	  Gerlach,	  Extremely	  Violent	  Societies	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010).	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the planning and the carrying out of violence; and (4) considerable diversity of 
motivations for promoting or participating in acts of violence.5 
Gerlach’s case studies of historical examples of extremely violent societies – 
including Indonesia, former East Pakistan, and elsewhere – go a long way towards 
establishing his claims about the diversity of the targets and the perpetrators of large-
scale killings, rapes, and other crimes. His analysis of the “coalition[s] for violence” that 
characterize extremely violent societies helps fill out the picture of administrative 
categorization I have been developing. 6  It does so in two ways. First, Gerlach’s analysis 
shows that the institutional and administrative levels or sites at which categories are 
introduced or appropriated are multiple and, in many cases, competitive, rather than 
monolithic (so that militaries or police services may deploy categories independently 
from state political apparatuses). Second, the analysis shows that relationships of alliance 
or antagonism between members of differently-categorized populations are fluid, 
evolving over time, so that it is not possible to say of any particular group at the first 
moment of categorization that it is destined either to perpetrate atrocities or to suffer 
them.  
These findings enrich and extend Weitz’s claims concerning the importance of 
administrative categorization before and during genocide. Extremely violent societies, 
like societies engaged in genocide, exhibit important elements of order and stability, even 
in the midst of considerable normative and institutional change. Such societies contain 
multiple hierarchies, multiple centers of control, but they nonetheless retain sufficient 
degrees of structure and organization to impose or reinforce distinctions between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  ibid.,	  1-­‐9.	  6	  ibid.,	  17-­‐91.	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members of different demographic groups, and on this basis recruit perpetrators, thwart 
potential resisters, and isolate targets of persecution and violence.  
How do states and quasi-governmental organizations impose or reinforce such 
demographic distinctions? One important strategy is the exploitation and transformation 
of social norms. Because of their particularity and practice-groundedness, social norms 
are ready-made sources of distinctions between racial, ethnic, religious, gender, or other 
demographic groups within national or regional populations. Because of the shared 
normative attitudes that help support them, social norms are also relatively durable 
features of groups on which to base administrative distinctions; and they have the 
advantage the monitoring for compliance and enforcement commonly comes from within 
groups themselves, rather than requiring external monitoring and enforcement.  
Although these features of social norms make them useful tools for state 
institutions and quasi-government organizations engaged in administrative categorization, 
existing social norms must often be altered or modified in order to serve this purpose 
before or during atrocities. Sometimes these alterations affect the range of practices or 
activities to which the norms apply; sometimes they affect the scope of the populations in 
which these norms circulate. In many cases, too, the build up to large-scale crimes will be 
marked by efforts to transform social norms into legal norms – and in this way centralize 
control over the imposition of sanctions for violations. 
Administrative categories and processes of categorization profoundly affect the 
fates and fortunes of individuals and groups in modern political societies. Inclusion or 
exclusion from particular racial, ethnic, religious, geographic, or citizenship categories 
can make all the difference in determining what resources individuals command, what 
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rights they enjoy, and what responsibilities they owe. Even within highly egalitarian 
societies, administrative categories are necessary to allow public institutions to operate 
effectively in the face of naturally occurring differences of age and geography, health and 
heredity. Because of their great significance for the prospects of those subject to them, 
such categories often are central to struggles for justice; but they can also serve as 
instruments of profound injustice.  
In Section 5.3 I will review some historical examples of the exploitation of social 
norms, and changes in social norms, for purposes of administrative categorization before 
and during mass atrocities. I want now to consider a second form of categorization that 
plays an important prospective role in mass atrocities. This is cognitive categorization. 
 
5.1.2 Cognitive Categorization 
In order to understand how administrative categories help order and structure 
large-scale crimes, we need to understand how these macro-level categories reach down 
to the level of individuals and individuals’ actions. Current accounts of cognitive 
categorization in the context of mass atrocity provide this bridge between macro-level 
state policies and micro-level individual conduct. Cognitive categorization, as I 
understand it, refers to the basic ways in which individual actors perceive events and 
situations, including normative aspects of those events and situations, during mass 
atrocities. Social norms both contribute to processes of cognitive categorization and are 
subject to alteration by such processes, as I will show. 
Political scientist Kristen Renwick Monroe has provided the most sophisticated 
theory of the determinants of individual choice and action during large-scale crimes. 
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Monroe’s 2012 book, Ethics in an Age of Terror and Genocide, synthesizes half a 
century ‘s worth of empirical social scientific research and develops a novel theory of 
individual moral choice during mass atrocity.7 Like Weitz, Monroe takes categorization 
as one of the cornerstones of her account. Unlike Weitz, the particular form of 
categorization with which Monroe is concerned is not administrative but rather cognitive 
categorization – the form of categorization that takes place in the minds of individual 
actors facing specific practical problems during atrocities. 
Monroe’s account of the psychological mechanisms involved in cognitive 
categorization is similar to the account that Cristina Bicchieri and other experimentally-
oriented philosophers offer of norms generally, and social norms particularly – though, as 
I shall suggest, Monroe’s model seems to leave less room for reflective weighing of 
norms. The account construes cognitive categorization as operating in several distinct 
stages. First, out of the manifold data of experience, cognitive categorization settles the 
particular ways in which particular situations will be framed for particular actors. 
Particular modes of framing, in turn, lead to the activation, or suppression, of particular 
scripts for behavior. These scripts, finally, count as the proximate causes of observed 
conduct.8 
In developing her theoretical apparatus, Monroe largely refrains from discussing 
individual decisions and actions from within the practical point of view – i.e. the point of 
view of individual agents deliberating about action and weighing various practical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Kristen	  Renwick	  Monroe,	  Ethics	  in	  an	  Age	  of	  Terror	  and	  Genocide	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2011).	  	  8	  ibid.,	  255-­‐260.	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considerations.9 Her extensive experience interviewing individuals known to have been 
perpetrators, bystanders, or victims of atrocities leads her to affirm that “ethical acts 
emanate not so much from conscious choice but rather from deep-seated instincts, 
predispositions, and habitual patterns of behavior.”10 This methodological position is 
central to Monroe’s whole approach, as indicated by the fact that she introduces her 
inquiry by asking how it can be the case that perpetrators, resisters, and bystanders all 
experienced themselves as having had “no choice” concerning their very different 
conduct during atrocities.11  
I believe the perspective of practical reasoning is indispensable if we are to 
understand the action-guiding function of norms, including social norms, during mass 
atrocities, and make sense of the ways in which high-level administrative categories 
come to influence the decisions and actions of individual actors. For this reason, I believe 
an account like Monroe’s, which largely elides the perspective of practical reasoning, is 
necessarily incomplete –though not, for that reason, unhelpful. Indeed, I have benefited 
considerably from studying Monroe’s theory, and I hope the criticisms I offer in the 
remainder of this chapter may be seen as supplementing, rather than supplanting, that 
theory, by showing that considerations from within the larger literature on perpetrators, 
bystanders, and resisters of genocide give us reason to take up the perspective of practical 
reasoning, and the framework of social norms. Three such considerations stand out: the 
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  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  Monroe	  asks	  the	  individuals	  she	  interviews	  about	  their	  deliberations	  over	  what	  to	  do.	  Rather,	  what	  I	  mean	  to	  say	  is	  that,	  apparently	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  those	  interviews,	  Monroe	  discounts	  the	  possibility	  that	  serious	  episodes	  of	  weighing	  different	  norms	  and	  normative	  considerations	  against	  each	  other	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  a	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  part	  in	  the	  contexts	  of	  action	  about	  which	  these	  individuals	  were	  interviewed.	  10	  ibid.,	  256.	  11	  ibid.,	  3.	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first stemming from work on bystanders, the second from research on resisters, and the 
third from studies of perpetrators of atrocities.  
One reason to take up the perspective of practical reasoning when studying 
cognitive categorization is that this approach makes better sense of cases in which the 
breakdown of norms renders cognitive categories, and the frames and scripts connected 
to them, inoperable. Bystander inaction in the face of atrocities, when reflective of a 
collective action problem, illustrates this scenario. Many of the most provoking cases of 
bystanding involve neighbors – individuals and families living in close proximity to and 
in longstanding relationships with each other – failing to respond in the face of 
mistreatment or abuse of some subset of themselves. In many cases, as Monroe herself 
shows, bystanding seems to result from a specific kind of cognitive categorization, where 
ethnic, racial, national, religious, or other identities are stimulated so as to set neighbor 
against neighbor, or at least leave them indifferent to each others’ suffering.12 In at least 
some cases, however, a change in cognitive categorization seems to be not the cause, but 
rather the effect, of bystanding. Carlos Santiago Nino, discussing bystander behavior 
during the ‘Dirty War’ in Argentina, argues that neighbors of ‘disappeared’ persons in 
Buenos Aires and elsewhere faced a serious collective action problem, where no single 
individuals’ actions or protests could suffice to end government kidnappings, and where 
any first- mover to speak out or intervene faced serious risks of reprisal. In the face of 
their failure to overcome this collective action problem, Nino suggest, ordinary citizens 
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  For	  a	  particularly	  powerful	  historical	  case	  study	  of	  this	  phenomenon,	  see	  Jan	  Gross,	  Neighbors:	  The	  Destruction	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Community	  in	  Jedwabne,	  Poland	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2001).	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came to exhibit anomie.13 Anomie, in this context, means a general “disregard for social 
norms,” as well as a failure of the motivating power of affective ties.14 The cognitive 
category of neighbors, in other words, lost its normative significance, due in part to the 
breakdown of ordinary social norms of neighborly regard in the face of state-sponsored 
violence.  
It is not clear that Monroe’s model can accommodate cases in which failures of 
norms undermine or alter cognitive categories. In particular, it is not clear that her model 
can distinguish between cases in which bystanding is the result of the ordinary 
functioning of cognitive categories, and cases in which bystanding occurs in the face of 
categories, due to collective action problems and the failure of existing social norms to 
overcome them. I want to suggest that the perspective of practical reasoning be used to 
make sense of this distinction. This perspective is already reconstructive, designed to 
provide an idealized picture of processes of practical deliberation suggested by first-
personal reports; it is thus especially appropriate to bystander cases, in which a great deal 
seems to turn on whether an individual’s inaction stems from a failure of conditions 
necessary for successful action (due to collective action problems) or from a failure of an 
intention to act (due to cognitive categorization).    
A second reason for taking up the perspective of practical reasoning comes from 
work on resisters of atrocities, particularly the various individuals and groups who, at 
considerable risk to themselves, shelter persons picked out by administrative categories 
for persecution or killing. On Monroe’s analysis, rescuer behavior is driven by the same 
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  Carlos	  Santiago	  Nino,	  Radical	  Evil	  On	  Trial	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  47.	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non-deliberative mechanisms of cognitive categorization as bystander and perpetrator 
behavior; this is, again, an analysis that purports to explain the feeling of “having no 
choice.” A closer look at the range of rescuer behavior, however, suggests that normative 
weighing and deliberation are an important part of the theoretical reconstruction of this 
behavior. Nechama Tec, who studies particularly Christian rescuers in occupied Poland, 
marks an important distinction between short term and long term rescuers – between 
those individuals who provided Jews and other targeted persons with a bed for the night 
and those who set up long term shelters and hiding places. Tec notes that “on balance for 
rescuers long-lasting aid had to be more perilous. Simply put, more things could happen 
in a longer time.”15 Her interviews with rescuers lead her to conclude that long-term 
rescue required considerable moral patience, by dent of its being a necessarily open-
ended commitment.16 In some noteworthy cases, this commitment even managed to 
survive alongside avowed anti-Semitic beliefs and feelings, which, in so many other 
cases, placed victims of persecution outside the bounds of humane concern.17  
Action over the long term to resist mass atrocity in a given way is not easily 
analyzable in terms of sub-conscious, instinctual or automatic reactions.18 Rather, such 
temporally extended resistance demands instead the kind of analysis that the practical 
point of view provides.19 This perspective complements, rather than contradicts, the 
approach outlined by Monroe: it allows for a more nuanced reconstruction of the context 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Nechama	  Tec,	  When	  Light	  Pierced	  the	  Darkness:	  Christian	  Rescue	  of	  Jews	  in	  Nazi-­‐
Occupied	  Poland	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1987),	  82.	  	  16	  Nechama	  Tec,	  Resistance	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  20-­‐21.	  	  17	  Tec	  1987,	  99-­‐109.	  18	  This	  may	  not	  apply	  to	  those	  individuals	  who	  acted	  in	  many	  different	  ways,	  for	  short	  periods,	  to	  resist.	  	  19	  See	  Michael	  Bratman,	  “Agency,	  Time,	  and	  Sociality,”	  Proceedings	  and	  Addresses	  of	  
the	  American	  Philosophical	  Association	  84,	  n.	  2	  (2010),	  7-­‐26.	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and continuation of individual and group action, which in turn can serve as the basis for 
further empirical research. 
A third, and final, consideration in favor of taking up the perspective of practical 
reasoning comes from work on perpetrators of atrocities themselves. Early accounts of 
perpetrators of atrocities, particularly those stemming from the Holocaust, tended to play 
down or even deny the ability of perpetrators to engage in practical deliberations – 
casting perpetrators as “murderous robots,” or cogs in a killing machine.20 The widely 
publicized trial of Adolf Eichmann, and Hannah Arendt’s controversial assessment of 
Eichmann as guilty, ultimately, of a failure to think, seemed to leave little space for 
considering the practical deliberations of perpetrators. More recent scholarship on mass 
atrocities, however, frequently informed by juridical testimony or direct interviews with 
perpetrators, has led scholars to suggest that it is precisely the breakdown, inversion, or 
transformation of norms that helps to explain perpetrator behavior. 
In such dynamic situations, it is not enough simply to say that perpetrators were 
following established norms, based on familiar cognitive categorizations of persons and 
situations. Instead, we must look more closely at where there were points of continuity in 
norms, and where there were transformations. In the latter case, we must consider how 
those transformations came about. The contest between established and newly developing 
norms is, I believe, best described from within the perspective of practical reasoning; this 
perspective also provides important (though not exclusive) insights into the phenomenon 
of norm transformation itself, as I have argued throughout this study. Finally, in keeping 
with the general analytical framework of this dissertation, I believe it is important to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  James	  Waller,	  Becoming	  Evil	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  62.	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produce an account of mass atrocity that can make sense of conflicts among different 
kinds of norms, including legal, moral, and social norms. The perspective of practical 
reasoning assists in this. For this reason, and the two others I have discussed, 
consideration of the guiding function of norms, and changes in norms, within the 
practical deliberations of individual actors should be integrated into the theory of 
cognitive categorization that Monroe provides.  
 
5.2  Retrospective Categorization 
Prospective forms of categorization help make possible the perpetration of large-
scale crimes by connecting the decisions and actions of individual actors with the 
overarching patterns, plans, and processes of violence set out by state and quasi-
governmental organizations before and during mass atrocities. Retrospective forms of 
categorization, by contrasts, assist scholars and officials reconstructing those patterns of 
individual and group conduct, and subjecting them to empirical description and 
normative evaluation. In this section I define and distinguish two key forms of 
retrospective categorization – i.e. historical and juridical categorization – and discuss the 
significance of social norms, and changes in social norms, in each.  
 
5.2.1 Historical Categorization 
Historical studies of mass atrocities, and especially state-directed or state-
supported mass atrocities, are usually grounded in documents, declarations, and decrees 
issued by the organizers of such crimes.  As a result, historians, like lawyers and judges 
in international courts, must be aware of, and sometimes work with, administrative 
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categories employed prospectively by planners and perpetrators of atrocities. At the same 
time, however, historians of mass atrocity typically introduce their own categories in 
order to clarify the complex relationships between individuals and groups that they 
attempt to retrospectively reconstruct. The process of retrospectively deploying 
categories for such purposes is what I call historical categorization.  
Two ongoing debates attest to changes in traditional modes of historical 
categorization in the study of mass atrocity.  The first debate concerns the empirical 
validity of actor categories of the kind I introduced above: categories such as 
‘perpetrators,’ ‘bystanders,’ ‘victims’ or ‘targets,’ and ‘resisters.’ The second debate 
concerns the normative content or function of these categories. Closer attention to the 
influence of social norms, and changes in social norms, upon historical actors can, I 
suggest, help to move these debates forward.   
Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg exemplifies the traditional approach to historical 
categorization in the study of mass atrocity in his 1992 book, Perpetrators Victims 
Bystanders.21 Hilberg grants serious situational and dispositional differences amongst the 
different individuals and groups whose actions during the Holocaust place them in these 
categories. Amongst perpetrators, he differentiates between true believers and mere 
sadists amongst perpetrators. Amongst victims, he distinguishes between “advantaged” 
individuals and “strugglers” or “the unadjusted.” Hilberg does not consider such internal 
variations to undermine the integrity of the basic historical actor categories he employs, 
however. Rather, Hilberg claims, “these three groups were distinct from one another and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Hilberg	  includes	  resisters	  in	  his	  category	  of	  victims.	  Cf.	  Raul	  Hilberg,	  Perpetrators	  
Victims	  Bystanders	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  Perennial,	  1992).	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did not dissolve in their lifetime. Each saw what happened from its own, special 
perspective, and each harbored a separate set of attitudes and reactions.”22 
More recent historical and social scientific studies of perpetrators, bystanders, and 
rescuers in the context of genocide and mass atrocity challenge Hilberg’s views 
concerning the fixity and non-overlapping character of these historical categories. The 
trend towards comparative approaches in the study of mass atrocity has led scholars to 
tinker with the basic categories used to distinguish and compare historical actors and their 
conduct during large-scale crimes. New hybrid categories, such as “killer-rescuers” and 
“indirect perpetrators,” have been proposed.23 At the same time, more nuanced accounts 
of the practical positions occupied by individuals and groups included in these categories 
have become customary. 
One way that the conceptual framework of social norms supports current efforts 
to rethink traditional historical categorizations of actors during atrocities is by suggesting 
that particular individuals may act differently – i.e. act as perpetrators, engage in rescue, 
or simply not act in the manner of bystanders – according to whether they believe they 
are subject to monitoring by their peers, and hence at risk of being held accountable. In 
the next section, I will consider an example of a “killer-rescuer” from Rwanda that seems 
to support this view. 
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  ibid.,	  ix.	  23	  See	  Lee	  Ann	  Fujii,	  “Rescuers	  and	  Killer-­‐Rescuers	  during	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide:	  Rethinking	  Standard	  Categories	  of	  Analysis,”	  in	  Jacques	  Semelin,	  Claire	  Andrieu,	  and	  Sarah	  Gensburger	  (eds.),	  Resisting	  Genocide:	  The	  Multiple	  Forms	  of	  Rescue	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  145-­‐157;	  Andrew	  Szanajda,	  Indirect	  
Perpetrators:	  The	  Prosecution	  of	  Informers	  in	  Germany,	  1945-­‐1965	  (New	  York:	  Lexington	  Books,	  2010).	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Attention to social norms also promotes internal differentiation in the particular 
historical categories employed in research on mass atrocity. Elsewhere, I have argued that 
the intentional manipulation of social norms is one of the more indirect ways in which 
individuals and groups can seek to prolong atrocities.24 If this is correct, than the category 
of perpetrators ought to include those who engage in such manipulation, as well as the 
more proximate performers of violence.  
A second major debate related to the use of historical categories in studies of mass 
atrocity concerns the normative content or function of these historical categories 
themselves. With respect to the sorts of actor categories under discussion here, the debate 
concerns whether normative judgments, for example moral judgments of the kind 
“perpetrators of atrocities are morally blameworthy,” “unjust,” or “corrupt,” are to be 
aired, or whether, for the sake of objectivity, should be avoided. The practice in dispute is 
sometimes referred to pejoratively as the “tribunalization of history.” It has been 
discussed expressly in the context of Holocaust historiography, but is certainly relevant to 
the study of other genocides and mass atrocities as well.  
The conceptual framework of social norms can help resolve such debates by 
showing, first, that not all normative judgments made outside a legal forum must be 
moral judgments, and second, that it is possible to make first-order claims about the 
normative judgments reflected in the actions of historical individuals while either 
expressing or withholding second-order claims about the propriety of those judgments. 
Social norms offer historians a low-stakes way to begin incorporating claims about the 
norms accepted by particular groups into their historical reconstructions and analyses.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Paul	  Morrow,	  “Mass	  Atrocity	  and	  Manipulation	  of	  Social	  Norms,”	  Social	  Theory	  
and	  Practice	  40,	  n.	  2	  (April	  2014),	  255-­‐280.	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Some may worry that this proposal misses the main point in question, which 
concerns whether it is appropriate for historians to make (or even to undertake) all-
things-considered normative judgments, and particularly moral judgments, about the 
historical individuals and groups that they study. I agree that, ultimately, the cases we 
find most interesting are those in which individuals seem to follow social norms, but 
thereby violate moral norms; or, alternatively, where individuals flout social norms in 
order to fulfill moral obligations. A full treatment of this historiographical problem is 
more than I can offer here, but I believe there are signs that such judgments, which are 
already frequently made, can be rendered on a principled basis by incorporating some 
minimal necessary conditions for moral accountability. Ernesto Verdeja has done helpful 
work on the distinction between moral (i.e. morally accountable) and non-moral (i.e. not 
morally accountable) bystanders to atrocities; I have tried to extend this line of analysis to 
consider conditions for the praiseworthiness of resisters.25 Accurately reconstructing 
extant social norms is an important component of such analyses, since social norms affect 
both the kinds or sources of information available to differently positioned actors during 
atrocities, and the variety of practical considerations that help guide their actions – and 
since these two features of agents’ subject positions seem to bear on our assessments of 
the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of their actions or inaction.  
 
5.2.2 Juridical Categorization 
Juridical categorization is critical to the effort to retrospectively redress mass 
atrocities by means of the various civil and criminal penalties available under domestic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Ernesto	  Verdeja,	  “Moral	  Bystanders,”	  in	  Adam	  Jones	  (ed.),	  New	  Directions	  in	  
Genocide	  Research	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2012),	  153-­‐168.	  
	   	  141	  
and, increasingly, international law. Juridical categorization shares many features with 
historical categorization, but the two forms of categorization also differ in important 
ways. Perhaps the most contentious forms of juridical categorization concern the 
definition and identification in practice of particular kinds of large-scale crimes – such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and so forth. Here, a variety of 
problems arise. I will consider some of these problems in my discussion of transitional 
justice and transitional normative shift in the next chapter. For now, I want to focus on a 
few paradoxes that arise when legal actors attempt to categorize large-scale crimes and 
charge individuals and groups with directly or indirectly participating in them. 
Like historians of mass atrocity, lawyers and judges seeking to deliver legal 
redress for past large-scale crimes must be able to make sense of the administrative 
categories that set the stage for such crimes. This means that legal practitioners who 
would use law to prevent, or punish, genocide and other international crimes are 
sometimes put in the paradoxical position of having to affirm, at least provisionally, 
administrative categorizations of sub-populations that seem to lack reality outside the 
delusions of ideologues. In the case of genocide, for example, as philosopher Larry May 
has pointed out, members of the ‘groups’ targeted for destruction in alleged genocide 
cases may not perceive themselves to share meaningful identity characteristics with the 
other individuals they are thrown together with – or at least, do not perceive themselves 
to do so before policies of persecution based on those characteristics begin. May’s 
juridical rule of thumb for certifying the existence of groups in genocide cases is to look 
for markers or characteristics that reliably allow for recognition of purported group 
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members both by those within the group, and those without.26 While this “publicity 
condition” supports the ontological soundness of the four types of group included in the 
UN’s Convention on Genocide (i.e. national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups), May 
suggests that the same considerations support the inclusion of other types of groups, 
including political or professional groups, in the law on genocide.  
Successful prosecution of other kinds of atrocity crimes also depends upon 
juridical categorization. So, for example, in the case of crimes against humanity, though 
the intention perpetrators will not include the destruction or displacement of groups as 
groups, categorization of groups as targets of persecution is essential. This is because 
crimes against humanity, like other large-scale crimes, aim principally at populations, 
rather than individuals.27  Indeed, as David Luban has argued, it is because of the focus of 
such crimes on populations, and because of the inevitably of humans living in 
populations that can be carved up on the basis of a variety of distinguishing group 
characteristics, that we can speak of them as crimes against humanity, or the condition of 
being human, at all.28  
Because contemporary large-scale crimes are usually highly organized, 
indictments for such crimes commonly target not only the individuals and groups directly 
implicated in perpetrating murder, rape, torture, and other harms, but also the state 
leaders and officials whose actions occasioned or facilitated them. In distributing legal 
accountability across these various levels, lawyers and judges face problems of 
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  Larry	  May,	  Genocide:	  A	  Normative	  Account	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  40-­‐50.	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  David	  Luban,	  “A	  Theory	  of	  Crimes	  Against	  Humanity,”	  29	  Yale	  Journal	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International	  Law,	  2004,	  104.	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  ibid.,	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differentiation similar to those confronted by historians, but must resolve those problems 
in accordance with strict, and in many cases, restrictive procedural and substantive rules 
of law. An historical example of the curious juridical categorizations that can result from 
such restraints can be found in the Cold War era prosecutions of Nazi soldiers and prison 
camp guards in Germany, who, even when directly responsible for the deaths of 
prisoners, could be convicted only of being accessories to murder, rather than of murder, 
due to the requirement in the applicable section of the German legal code that guilt for 
murder must be accompanied by a “hateful mentality.”  
While recent developments in international criminal law have been responsive to 
such deficiencies in domestic legal codes for dealing with mass atrocities, international 
law, and international courts, are the products of contentious political processes. The 
standards and criteria that lawyers and judges use to assign defendants to particular 
juridical categories differ in important ways from those employed by historians, and the 
findings reached by these groups can differ drastically. Political scientist Richard Ashby 
Wilson accounts for such discrepancies by suggesting that law and history exhibit 
fundamentally different epistemologies.29 
How can greater attention to social norms help to resolve these paradoxes of 
juridical categorization? Again, I can only sketch some promising possibilities, the 
practicality of which must be worked out through further research. In the first place, 
insofar as social norms, particularly longstanding or codified social norms, help to 
structure groups and organizations, and expand their capacities for coordinated action, 
including illegal action, attention to social norms may provide reasons for distributing 	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  Richard	  Ashby	  Wilson,	  Writing	  History	  in	  International	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  Trials	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2011),	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responsibility relatively more heavily on those at the top of group hierarchies. This 
accords with claims by moral and political philosophers that different distributions of 
accountability at the individual and collective levels may be justified for relatively long-
lasting, highly structured groups, on the one hand, and for  collectivities that are more 
ephemeral or loosely structured, on the other.30 
A second point is related. Within hierarchical groups and organizations, social 
norms provide superiors with one among many different mechanisms or levers of control 
over their inferiors. As research on social norms expands, it is likely that leaders of 
organizations may undertake direct efforts to regulate, or alter, social norms. Mark Osiel 
provides a good example of this when he proposes that military officers be made to incur 
civil penalties when soldiers under their command, or fellow officers, commit war 
crimes.31 The idea is to break down certain affective and normative ties between soldiers 
seen as having potentially negative effects on society at large. This proposal is hardly 
limited to the problem of mass atrocities; it might, for example, be extended to include 
cases of sexual assault, or other cases where wrongdoing is severe enough to merit 
concentrated efforts to change social norms. 
In this section I have discussed two forms of retrospective categorization central 
to current theoretical and practical responses to mass atrocity. As we have seen, both 
historical and juridical forms of categorization must be attentive to the administrative 
forms of categorization employed prospectively by states and quasi-governmental 
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organizations to plan and perpetrate large-scale crimes. Likewise, both historians and 
justice-sector officials have a considerable interest in understanding the cognitive 
processes, including the processes of norm cognition, that help drive individual actors’ 
participation in, or resistance to, large-scale crimes. Nevertheless, the ways in which 
historians and justice-sector officials reconstruct individual and group patterns of conduct 
during large-scale crimes differ significantly on both descriptive and normative grounds. 
I have argued that we can gain a better perspective on these differences, and 
resolve some of the apparent conflicts between historical and juridical modes of 
categorization, by focusing on the action-guiding influence of social norms during mass 
atrocities. I have suggested that the particularity and practice-groundedness of social 
norms makes them helpful tools for understanding inter- and intra-group dynamics during 
mass atrocities. I have also suggested that closer attention to social norms may shift some 
of our judgments about the proper distribution of legal and moral accountability to 
individuals and groups in the wake of atrocities – though the effects here are likely to be 
small, given the large range of factors that tend to influence such judgments.  
In discussing the ways in which attention to social norms can alter our thinking 
about prospective and retrospective forms of categorization, I have mainly concentrated 
on abstract features of social norms and theoretical claims about the nature of 
categorization. In the next section, I will illustrate the value of these discussions and 
arguments by considering how social norms – as well as other kinds of informal 
principles of social order – have affected process of categorization in real world, 
historical cases of mass atrocity. The specific historical exempla I consider also help 
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clarify the general thesis of norm transformation as it appears in current theories of mass 
atrocity. 
 
5.3 Social Norms and the Order of Mass Atrocity: Historical Illustrations 
Social norms mediate between macro-level administrative categories and the 
micro-level cognitive categories, thus significantly influencing the deliberations and 
actions of “ordinary” individuals during atrocities.32 Studying the influence of social 
norms, and changes in social norms, upon ordinary men and women during atrocities 
complements the analysis of professional participation in mass atrocities offered in the 
last chapter. It does so by drawing attention to a wider range of social norms that 
contribute to atrocities, and to a broader array of dynamics that can be observed in the 
changes that social norms undergo in the context of large-scale crimes. This is true, as I 
shall argue, no matter whether the individuals under consideration act as perpetrators, 
resisters, bystanders, or targets of such crimes. 
 
5.3.1 Perpetrators  
Perpetrators are individuals who, by their actions, contribute more or less directly 
to mass killing, mass rape, and other mass atrocity crimes.33 As noted above, my interest 
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  By	  referring	  to	  “ordinary”	  individuals,	  I	  mean	  in	  the	  first	  place	  to	  draw	  a	  contrast	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  focus	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  that	  focuses	  on	  “ordinary	  men”	  (or,	  more	  rarely,	  women)	  and	  their	  experiences	  during	  mass	  atrocities.	  33	  This	  definition,	  like	  the	  ones	  that	  I	  will	  offer	  for	  the	  other	  three	  actor	  categories	  considered	  in	  this	  section,	  is	  only	  provisional.	  It	  will	  be	  significantly	  complicated	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  historical	  and	  legal	  categorization	  below	  –	  as	  will	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  stable,	  clearly	  demarcated	  actor	  categories	  as	  adequate	  solutions	  to	  the	  problems	  of	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in this chapter lies not in elite, but in “ordinary,” perpetrators of atrocities. Lee Ann Fujii, 
a scholar of the Rwandan genocide, has argued that it is necessary to study norms in 
order to understand how the mass mobilization of ethnic Hutus as perpetrators of the 
mass killing of Tutsis was possible. She writes: 
 Norms become more important when reality is confusing, contradictory, or 
 changing. The more ambiguous the situation, the more likely people are to  
 rely on norms as guides for behavior; and the clearer the prescription of a given  
 norm, the more likely people will follow that norm and not others.34  
 
The Rwandan genocide, like other historical episodes of mass atrocity, presents us 
with the case of a program of violence of enormous scale, but perpetrated in large part by 
intimates – neighbors, friends, and family members – within local communities. The 
genocide was far from a normal occurrence; it represented a major disruption in the 
ordinary rhythms and habits of agricultural life. Even so, many pre-existing norms, 
specifically social norms, persisted through and helped to structure the violence of the 
genocide, even as new norms developed to complete the ordering of mass killing. To take 
one clear example of an old social norm carried over into the new context of genocide, 
the gendered division of housework and fieldwork, familiar from the agricultural 
existence of Hutus in Rwandan society, persisted into the genocide, with men, and 
particularly young men, performing the bulk of the killing. Jean-Baptiste, one of the ten 
perpetrators whose testimony is recorded in Jean Hatzfeld’s book Machete Season, 
explains the gendered division of labor during the genocide as follows: “it is a country 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  scale	  that	  must	  be	  surmounted	  by	  those	  who	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  social	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  34	  Lee	  Ann	  Fujii,	  “Transforming	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  Genocidal	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  (March	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custom that women do not concern themselves with any bothersome task of cutting. The 
machete is for a man’s work. This was as true for the farming as for the killing.”35  
As Jean-Baptiste goes on to explain, female Hutu’s lives did not remain entirely 
unchanged during the genocide, and women did not escape complicity in the violence 
against their Tutsi neighbors. Many Hutu women took part in looting after their neighbors 
had been killed or fled, and some revealed the hiding places of Tutsi to male killers. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the persistence of this “country custom” contributed 
significantly to the structure and organization of genocide. 
Along with the persistence of old customs, we should pay attention to the 
emergence of new social norms corresponding to the novel social conditions and 
practices involved in large-scale crimes. The historical and social scientific literature on 
mass atrocities provides clear evidence of the influence of such emergent social norms. 
Here again, we may turn to the post-trial testimonies of perpetrators in Rwanda for an 
initial indication of the kinds of norms in question.36 So, for example, as Léopord, 
another of the perpetrators interviewed by Hatzfeld, explained concerning the balance 
between murder and looting amongst perpetrators:  
 We began the day by killing, we ended the day by looting. It was the   
 rule to kill going out and to loot coming back. […] Those who killed a lot had  
 less time to pillage, but since they were feared, they would catch up because 
 of their power. No one wound up ahead, no one wound up robbed.37 
 
It would be risky to extrapolate, based on the reports of individuals within the 
particular group of perpetrators whose testimony Hatzfeld solicited, the extension of this 	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  Jean	  Hatzfeld,	  Machete	  Season:	  The	  Killers	  in	  Rwanda	  Speak,	  Laura	  Coverdale	  trans.	  (New	  York:	  Picador,	  2003),	  109.	  36	  Keeping	  in	  mind	  that,	  with	  perpetrators	  particularly,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  apply	  tools	  of	  source	  criticism	  to	  confirm	  claims	  about	  the	  emergence	  and	  influence	  of	  specific	  social	  norms.	  	  37	  Hatzfeld	  2003,	  86.	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particular rule governing slaughter to the larger commune or national level. Following the 
terminology I have used throughout this dissertation to discuss social norms, this report 
leaves unclear the extent of the group or collectivity to which this purported social norm 
was particular. Rather than challenging the conceptual framework defended here, 
however, this example helps to make the case for more careful, systematic study of social 
norms by historians and social scientists researching mass atrocity.  
 
5.3.2 Bystanders  
If we look beyond Rwanda, and beyond perpetrators, we can find other examples 
of novel social norms and other kinds of informal principles of social order arising in the 
course of mass atrocities. Victor Klemperer, the Dresden professor whose wartime diary 
provided evidence of professional norm transformations in Chapter 4 above, reports a 
notable emergent convention amongst bystanders to nascent anti-Jewish persecution in 
1930’s Germany. In his diary entry for June 13, 1934, Klemperer shares an anecdote 
concerning the consequences of boycotts of Jewish-owned business in three neighboring 
towns outside Dresden: 
 In Falkenstein one is not allowed to buy from the “Jew.” And so the  
 people in Falkenstein travel to the Jew in Auerbach. And the Auerbachers in  
 turn buy from the Falkenstein Jew. However, on bigger shopping expeditions 
 the people from the one-horse towns travel to Plauen, where there’s a larger  
 Jewish department store. If you run into someone from the same town, no one 
 has seen anyone. Tacit convention.38 
 
This comic anecdote illustrates the way in which informal principles of social 
order can arise and operate in ways that are complementary to administrative categories 
and legal norms before and during large-scale crimes. Boycotts of Jewish-owned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Klemperer	  1998,	  67-­‐68.	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businesses in small towns, as well as in urban centers, depended on administrative 
processes of categorization concluding in criteria for determining definitively which 
businessmen, and businesses, counted as Jewish, and which not. The reported response of 
non-Jewish residents of the small towns mentioned – i.e. their observance of the boycott 
against Jewish-owned businesses within their own towns, but not in other towns, recalls 
Monroe’s account of cognitive categorization: here, a shared belief about the bounds of 
the group within which a particular principle applies gives rise to a definite pattern of 
behavior that would be difficult to make sense of except by reference to that principle. 
Intuitively, it seems appropriate to categorize the individuals Klemperer describes 
as following this “tacit convention” as bystanders to persecution. The convention 
furnishes a standing means of circumventing an established rule (apparently legal) 
without being held accountable for breaking it. Klemperer’s diary description is, of 
course, defeasible as testimony to the existence of this social norm; it only picks out 
individuals with respect to this particular ban on frequenting Jewish-owned businesses – 
and so does not tell us anything about actions or behaviors these individuals might have 
engaged in on other occasions, which could lead us to consider them also as perpetrators, 
or as resisters. A more in depth discussion of bystanding – of the temporal scope of 
bystanding, and of the distinction between blameworthy and non-blameworthy 
bystanding – is beyond the scope of this section; but I believe this is one of many points 
on which philosophy can contribute substantially to the theorization of mass atrocity. 
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5.3.3 Targets (or Victims) 
Traditional historical and social scientific accounts of mass atrocity typically 
designate those individuals or groups picked out for abuse as victims. More recently this 
designation has become controversial, due to its connotations of passivity and sacrifice. 
Here I will use the less historically-burdened term ‘targets’ to discuss individuals and 
groups picked out for, and in many cases actually subjected to, abuse during atrocities. 
Gender-based social norms have affected the experience of targets, as well as 
perpetrators, of large-scale crimes. Recently, in Darfur, the gendered norm requiring 
women, and particularly young girls, to fetch water, firewood, and other domestic 
provisions for their families continued into the displaced persons’ camps to which many 
Darfuri’s fled, and there left women especially exposed to attacks by militia when they 
left the camp to gather firewood.39 In a different historical context, Victor Klemperer 
records at one point his relief in finally having privacy to cook for himself and his wife 
Eva again without being subject to criticism from fellow residents of his “Jews’ House” 
for taking on such a feminine task.40 It should be noted, of course, that gender-based 
social norms do not persist everywhere and in all cases of genocide and mass atrocity; 
Tony, the Dutch resister whose testimony provides one of the key foundations of 
Monroe’s grounded theory of moral choice, takes peculiar pleasure in noting how fully 
norms governing relations between men and women broke down within the resistance 
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  Prunier,	  Darfur:	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  21st	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  Edition	  (Ithaca,	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  University	  Press,	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  York:	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  150.	  	  
	   	  152	  
cells in which he was active – anticipating, as he sees it, postwar women’s liberation 
movements.41 
Not every difference in group practices granted new significance in the context of 
mass atrocity is structured by social norms. Nechama Tec, reporting on her interviews 
with Jews hidden by Polish Christians during World War Two, highlights the difficulties 
some Jews had blending in with local populations, and the changes in comportment they 
made in order to fit in: “When as it often happened, passing Jews lived among lower 
class Poles they had to make a conscious effort to use rough language. Those who spoke 
softly and politely stood out within this kind of an environment.”42 Without further 
evidence, it would be wrong to interpret this case as one where a norm supported the 
culture of cursing; instead, the passage shows that individuals’ efforts to assimilate to (or 
escape from) social practices, whether during mass atrocities or not, must extend beyond 
assimilation to or escape from social norms.  
 
5.3.4 Resisters 
The most extensive extant body of social scientific research on the connection 
between social norms and individuals’ decisions and actions during atrocities focuses on 
those who resist atrocities. Exactly what counts as resistance is not always stated in this 
literature; elsewhere, I have argued that the constitutive features of a working definition 
of resistance should leave open questions about praiseworthiness.43 Here I will focus on 
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  2011,	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examples of the kind most commonly cited in the literature: i.e. examples of individuals 
who, through their actions, help to rescue or preserve targets of atrocities.  
Both philosophical and social-scientific studies of rescuers often cite a tendency 
toward flouting, or living in exception to, social norms as correlated with rescue, and 
particularly altruistic rescue.44 Kristen Renwick Monroe seems to accept this traditional 
claim (though, as noted above, her account of rescuer behavior seems to suggest that 
conscious weighing, and rejection, of social norms is not at work here). Lawrence Blum, 
in his essay “Altruism and the Moral Value of Rescue,” offers a more philosophically 
nuanced account of this general claim by discussing some of the social norms that 
rescuers seem to reject which we may be less inclined to judge generally invalid – such as 
norms suggesting that one’s family deserves to be privileged in one’s deliberations about 
what to do, and that children, particularly, should not be exposed to unnecessary risk. 
Blum suggests that rescuers exhibit a mixture of response to principle, and empathetic 
response to particular needs, that causes them to flout such social norms – but without 
becoming subject to negative reflective moral judgments for this reason.  
Nechama Tec’s account of Polish rescuers challenges Blum’s discussion on this 
last point, at least as far as first-order moral judgments are concerned. Her description of 
Polish Christian’s fear of revealing that they were rescuers even after WWII ended, and 
of the reception they received from their neighbors when they did reveal this, shows that 
rescuers could continue to be held accountable to social norms even after the act of 
rescuing was over; and seems to confirm that rescue is importantly bound up with the 
refusal to follow social norms. This refusal may sometimes be non-deliberative, in the 	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way Monroe suggests; but in other cases it seems to have been quite carefully considered, 
and the framework of social norms indispensable for reconstructing how it occurs.  
One interesting final case to consider, appropriately drawn from Lee Ann Fujii’s 
work, is that of the mixed category of “killer-rescuer.” While interviewing a confessed 
Rwandan genocidaire named Olivier, Fujii asks her interlocutor whether he ever rescued 
anyone during the several months of killing. Olivier replies that he once encountered a 
Tutsi boy fleeing the interahamwe [local bands of killers], and instructed the boy to take 
one path, rather than another, in order to avoid them. The boy survived. Clearly Fujii (and 
indeed, Olivier himself) takes this to have been the morally right action; but the fact that 
(apparently) it did not give rise to any further acts of the same kind, or measurably reduce 
Olivier’s subsequent participation in killing, prompts us to ask why this should have been 
a one-off occurrence.45 
One possible explanation, in terms of social norms, is that although Olivier was 
generally subject to a social norm requiring that he take part in killing, and although that 
social norm generally carried with it strong forms of accountability, in this one instance 
Olivier was outside the range of monitoring of any of the other young men to whom this 
social norm applied, and so the practical cost of the morally right action was radically 
diminished. This is, of course, only one of several possible explanations for this 
noteworthy case of rescue, but it illustrates well, I think, a possible way in which actions 
prescribed by particular moral norms are sometimes arrived at by individuals who more 
typically allow certain social norms to outweigh or exclude those moral norms.  
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The specific examples of social norms I have considered in this section (and in 
other work on this topic) are fallible; they are open to counterexample and contrary 
evidence, as good historiographical methodology requires them to be. My aim has been 
to offer further evidence of the relevance of the framework of social norms to the study of 
mass atrocity. The examples I have provided are all designed to show how social norms – 
particular, practice-grounded, group intentional, and accountability creating – help to 
mediate between the collective-level administrative categorization states typically deploy 
during the build up to mass atrocity, and the individual-level cognitive categorization 
which, it is supposed, constrains the choices available to specific individuals in the 
context of mass atrocity.  
 
5.4 Objections  
In this chapter I have examined the connections between four forms of 
categorization central to current scholarship on genocide and mass atrocity. I have used 
the framework of social norms to explain how each of these forms of categorization 
represents a response to certain problems of scale encountered by elite and ordinary 
actors before, during, and after mass atrocities. Before and during mass atrocities, I have 
argued, social norms help to mediate between macro-level administrative categorization 
and micro-level cognitive categorization. After mass atrocities, I have suggested, 
attention to social norms can help resolve challenges raised by both historical and 
juridical modes of categorization. In this final section, I want to consider three objections 
to the account I have offered. A first objection comes from the general literature on 
genocide and mass atrocity, and concerns the state-centered approach to mass atrocity 
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that I have adopted. A second objection is more classically philosophical, and concerns 
the normative-descriptive, or is/ought distinction. A third, and final, objection is 
historiographical, and concerns the validity of the particular historical examples of social 
norms I have provided.  
A first objection holds that, in my general approach to the structure of genocide 
and mass atrocity, and in my particular focus on administrative categorization, I am 
fixating on only a partial, and perhaps even an exceptional, sub-class of large-scale 
episodes of violence. On this view, it is a quirk of the last century that many episodes of 
mass atrocity were in fact apparently centrally organized; and it might also be true even 
in those cases that the focus on central authorities or architects of destruction is more a 
convenient way of limiting retribution than an accurate way of representing the social 
conditions productive of mass violence. The objection has its roots in the 
“intentionalism” or “functionalism” debate in Holocaust studies;46 it extends the 
functionalist side of that debate to mass violence more generally through notions such as 
“structural violence” and “genocidal social practices.”47 
In response to this objection I would say that the framework of categories and of 
social norms developed here is flexible enough to accommodate more and less 
centralized, or centrally organized, episodes of mass violence. At the limits, to be sure, 
the value of these analytical tools runs out – e.g. in the case of one-off attacks. To be 
clear, however, the balance of current scholarship seems to suggest that most mass 
atrocities, like most traditional armed conflicts, are not like this. They may be carried out 	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by “coalitions of violence,” of the sort Gerlach describes, but in that case categories and 
social norms are likely to become more, not less, important analytically, as they are used 
to explain differences between the targets and the methods of participant groups.  
A second objection is philosophical in character. It holds that the prospective and 
retrospective uses of the framework of social norms for the study of mass atrocity that I 
have advocated violate the is/ought distinction by confounding descriptive and normative 
claims. The objection is not the same as the historiographical worry, noted above, that 
engagement in normative judgments may render historical accounts less objective, and 
thus less epistemically valuable. Instead, the objection here is conceptual, holding that I 
have treated social norms as both empirical facts or states of the world, and as normative 
entities or claims about “ought”-ness.  
The correct response to this objection is to say that it is no objection at all, but 
rather an appropriate description of the two-fold aspect of social norms. As explained in 
Chapter 3 above, I accept the view recently put forward by Geoffrey Brennan and others, 
according to which social norms combine “normative” and “socio-empirical elements.”48 
At the core, when we imagine or identify social norms, we are taking to be a matter of 
descriptive fact that some practical prescription, permission, or prohibition exists within a 
particular community – where existence is (as I have argued in previous chapters) a 
matter of a certain profile of beliefs and intentions amongst group members, or, more 
simply, a matter of acceptance by a sufficient proportion of group members.49 
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A third objection is both philosophical and historiographical, and concerns my 
method for discovery and verification of social norms in historical contexts. The basic 
worry is that it is circular to take patterns or structures of events as evidence of social 
norms, and then to use the claim of social norms to explain those patterns of events. As I 
noted in Chapter 3 of this study, scholars like Cristina Bicchieri have tried to counter this 
objection in their study of present-day social norms by turning to experimental, 
laboratory methods; but this alternative approach is clearly not available for the study of 
historical events, such as historical mass atrocities.  
My response to this concern is to cede the point that circularity is a risk in 
reconstructing the role of social norms in historical contexts of mass atrocity. It need not, 
however, be taken as fatal to the project of integrating social norms into theories of mass 
atrocity. Historians have numerous tools for confirming or disconfirming the 
explanations of behavior that they offer: from corroboration of motivational claims by 
multiple sources to counterfactual thinking about how and whether individuals’ decisions 
and actions might have differed had circumstances changed. I cannot claim to have 
demonstrated these tools in all their sophistication in my own discussion of social norms 
in this chapter. The particular cases I have cited should be considered as exempla: 
illustrative, but nevertheless criticizable on a variety of grounds. Scholars working 
directly in history and the social sciences will, I expect, be able to craft responses to some 
of these criticisms, and will be able to move the study of categories and social norms in 
the context of mass atrocity beyond the point to which I have taken it here. My goal in 
this chapter, as in this study, has been to make the conceptual and theoretical case for 
integrating the framework of social norms into discussions of categories and 
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categorization before, during, and after large-scale crimes. It is my hope that other 
scholars may find this framework useful, and employ it in ways and for purposes that I 
have neither considered nor conceived. 
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Chapter 6. Social Norms and the Distinctiveness of Transitional Justice 
In the previous chapters of this study, I have outlined the conceptual framework 
of social norms and explained how this framework can help scholars and practitioners 
make sense of individual and group participation in mass atrocities. In this final chapter, I 
will consider how this framework can be applied to some characteristic problems of 
justice that arise in the wake of atrocities, as local and international actors pursue legal 
accountability for past crimes while simultaneously striving to secure social and political 
stability going forward. I consider, that is, how the framework of social norms can be 
used to identify, and resolve, typical problems of transitional justice.  
Current scholarship on transitional justice is marked by vigorous debates about 
the contents of core principles of transitional justice and about the contexts in which 
those principles apply. Theorists debate the roles that individual and institutional actors 
play during political transitions,1 scrutinize the significance of particular historical 
precedents,2 and set out competing accounts of the main obstacles to achieving justice in 
transition.3 Current scholarship on transitional justice is also characterized by various 
meta-debates about the origins, the aims, and the limits of the theory of transitional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Stephen Humphreys, Theatre of the Rule of Law: Transnational Legal Intervention in 
Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Kathryn Sikkink, 
The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics, 
New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2011. 
2 Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 
(2003), 69-94; Jon Elster, Closing the Books, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004, 3-78. 
3 Cf. Martha Minnow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After 
Genocide and Mass Violence, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1999; Debra Satz, “Countering 
the Wrongs of the Past: The Role of Compensation,” in NOMOS LI: Transitional Justice, 
Melissa S. Williams, Rosemary Nagy, and Jon Elster, eds., New York: New York 
University Press, 2012, 129-150; Gary Bass, “Reparations as  a Noble Lie, ibid., 166-179. 
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justice itself.4 Some theorists dispute where the center of the theory of transitional justice 
lies. Others question whether distinctively transitional principles of justice, capable of 
grounding a distinct theory of transitional justice, exist at all.5  
In this chapter I address the distinctiveness of transitional justice – examining in 
detail differences between those principles of justice that apply during ordinary times in 
the life of political societies and the principles of justice that apply specifically during 
transitional periods. I argue that transitional transformations in social norms, and the 
various institutions that promote them, stand in need of governance by distinct principles 
of transitional justice.  
Previous disputes over the distinctiveness of transitional justice have tended to 
regard political transitions as scenes of transformation in legal norms. Theorists on both 
sides of such disputes have mined the Hart-Fuller debate – discussed in the first chapter 
of this study – for support for their respective claims about the uniqueness, or 
routineness, of the rule of law challenges that arise during transitions. These theorists 
have not given comparable attention to the sorts of informal principles of social order – 
such as conventions, traditions, and social norms – that also figured prominently amongst 
Hart and Fuller’s concerns. Here I shall argue that theorists who frame the problems of 
transitional justice exclusively in terms of conflicts between laws and rule of law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For general overviews of the sources and subjects of such ‘meta-debates’ within this 
expanding field see Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State 
of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 
(2009), 5-27; also Alexander Hinton, “Introduction” in Transitional Justice: Global 
Mechanisms and Local Realities after Genocide and Mass Violence, New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 2010, 1-22. 
5 Cf. Elster 2004, 77-78; Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, “Transitional Justice as 
Ordinary Justice,” Harvard University Law Review 117, no. 3 (2004), 761-825; Stephen 
Humphreys, “Laboratories of Statehood: Legal Intervention in Colonial Africa and 
Today,” The Modern Law Review 75, no. 4 (July 2012), 475-510. 
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principles mistake the importance of transformations in social norms during liberalizing 
political transitions, and overlook the distinct problems of justice that such 
transformations raise. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 6.1 I examine Ruti Teitel’s influential 
theory of transitional justice, with particular emphasis on her account of transitional 
normative shift. I show that this notion of transitional normative shift is central to Teitel’s 
general argument for the distinctiveness of transitional justice, and I reconstruct one 
particular principle of transitional justice, the principle of transitional prioritization, 
which her account supports. In Section 6.2 I engage with two prominent critics of Teitel’s 
theory of transitional justice, David Dyzenhaus and Dirk Venema. I argue that, while 
both of these critics make good arguments against Teitel’s explanation of the 
distinctiveness of transitional justice, neither gives sufficient consideration to her notion 
of transitional normative shift, or the ways in which that notion might be expanded to 
encompass transformations in social, as well as legal, norms during transitions. In Section 
6.3 I distinguish between different types of intentional transformations in social norms 
commonly undertaken during liberalizing political transitions, and briefly identify 
different strategies for pursuing such transformations. I then establish the importance of 
international organizations – including multi-national organizations like the European 
Union and the United Nations, as well as NGOs – in promoting and pursuing transitional 
transformations in social norms, and I identify two principles of justice – the principle of 
local collaboration and the principle of selective norm conservation – which I believe 
apply distinctly to the activities of such international organizations during liberalizing 
political transitions. Finally, in Section 6.4, I present a case study of the United Nations’ 
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efforts to transform both legal and social norms in transitional East Timor in the late 
1990’s and early 2000’s. This case study provides support for my claim that building 
stability and the rule of law in transitional contexts requires promoting transformations in 
social as well as legal norms in accordance with principles of justice.  
 
6.1 Teitel on Transitional Normative Shift 
In her 2000 book Transitional Justice, legal scholar Ruti Teitel claims that the 
“quintessential and defining feature” of political transitions is “the grounding within 
society of a normative shift in the principles underlying and legitimating the exercise of 
state power.”6 Such shifts constitute what Teitel terms the basic “phenomenology of 
transition.”7 In her book, and in subsequent essays, Teitel employs historical examples to 
illustrate her notion of transitional normative shift. These examples highlight the context-
dependent nature of the challenges encountered by legal and political actors during 
particular political transitions; they also form the basis of Teitel’s general account of the 
emergence of the idea of transitional justice over the last half-century.8  
In this section, I will sketch Teitel’s account of transitional normative shift, and 
identify one particular principle of justice that she suggests applies distinctively to such 
transitional changes in norms. Before I do so, I want to note two clear limits of Teitel’s 
account of transitional justice. First, Teitel is concerned exclusively with “liberal” (or, as 
I shall say, liberalizing) political transitions. Such transitions aim at establishing (or 
restoring) democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. The last of these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 213. 
7 ibid., 5.  
8 Teitel 2003. 
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three objectives is crucial for Teitel’s argument for the distinctiveness of the pursuit of 
justice during transitions.  
The second clear limit of Teitel’s account of transitional justice is that Teitel is 
concerned exclusively with legal aspects of liberalizing transitions. She is concerned, that 
is, with changes in the laws that constrain and ground government action and social 
interaction in transitional societies. Accordingly, Teitel’s account of transitional 
normative shift focuses entirely on shifts in legal norms. Even those legal norms, such as 
the norms established by international humanitarian and human rights law, that appear to 
be strongly supported by, and perhaps even grounded in, properly moral norms, are 
considered solely from a legal perspective.9  
I will consider later whether these limitations are compatible with the project 
Teitel takes on, i.e. the project of explaining how societies in transition achieve 
fundamental shifts in the norms that structure and constrain government policy and social 
interaction. I want for now to reconstruct Teitel’s account of the phenomenon of (legal) 
normative shift as it occurs during liberalizing political transitions.  
Teitel begins by insisting that any truly just transition must satisfy two different, 
and often competing, goals. The first is the retrospective goal of seeking justice for 
wrongdoers who enjoyed impunity under predecessor regimes. The second is the 
prospective goal of securing peace and stability going forward. During liberalizing 
political transitions, these two goals are pursued principally in and through law. Attempts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Thus it is a major question for Teitel how judges or advocates manage to integrate 
international human rights law with pre-existing domestic law during transitions; but she 
does not extend to her inquiry to the question of how the various moral norms bound up 
with respect for human rights come to play a part in the practical deliberations of officials 
and citizens in countries where abuses of those rights were previously routine. 
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to reconcile the retrospective and prospective goals of transitional justice by means of the 
law commonly give rise to what Teitel considers the core problem of liberal political 
transitions: the “transitional rule of law dilemma.”  
Teitel explicates her notion of transitional rule of law dilemma in several different 
ways. She makes the general observation that, while law traditionally facilitates the 
“transmission of authoritative norms across time,” during liberal political transitions law 
is redirected towards the aim of “radically transform[ing]” such norms.10 She refers back 
to the Hart-Fuller debate, and uses the eight principles of the rule of law identified by 
Fuller to explain, in abstract terms, the possibility of conflicts among rule of law 
requirements during transitions.11 Finally, she discusses an array of concrete, historical 
examples of transitional rule of law dilemmas.  
Early in her book, Teitel contrasts the quite different choices made by the 
Hungarian and German courts in the wake of the fall of communism. In such “successor 
cases,” Teitel writes, “judicial rhetoric conceptualizes the problem in terms of multiple 
competing rule of law values in seemingly intractable conflict: one value deemed 
relative, and the other essential.”12 In Hungary, she claims, the Constitutional Court 
understood itself as confronting a dilemma between the rule of law value of 
“predictability” and the substantive justice principle of accountability for past 
wrongdoings when it was forced to rule on a law abrogating statutes of limitations for 
1950’s political persecutions. Ultimately the court ruled the law unconstitutional, and in 
so doing, Teitel suggests, it gave priority to a previously suppressed principle of justice: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Teitel 2000, 219. 
11 Teitel 2000, 12-15. 
12 Teitel 2000, 17.  
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“if the totalitarian legal system abolished or ignored the line between the individual and 
the state, the line drawn by Hungary’s Constitutional Court posited a new constraint on 
the state: an individual right of security.”13 The results of prioritization were different in 
Germany. Here, Teitel cites the well-known case of the (former) East German border 
guards, who were put on trial during the unification process for shootings of civilians 
attempting to cross the Berlin Wall. Although good legal arguments existed for the claim 
that the guards had acted in accordance with East German law, and so could not be 
prosecuted under the post-unification legal settlement, the guards were in fact convicted. 
Their conviction, Teitel writes, should be regarded as a case of legal discontinuity, in one 
sense, and continuity, in another. The judgment of the court broke with the law that 
existed at the time in East Germany, and so could be considered discontinuous (and 
indeed, retroactive), but it reaffirmed judgments made in the post-WWII period, where 
the courts had found that “evil legislation lacked the status of law.”14    
The contrasting historical cases described here illustrate Teitel’s notion of the 
transitional rule of law dilemma. They also go some way towards explaining how 
“normative shifts” can justly settle such dilemmas. Neither here, nor anywhere else in her 
work, however, does Teitel explicitly identify particular principles of justice fit for 
governing such shifts. She offers instead some general descriptions of the considerations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Teitel 2000, 16.  
14 ibid. German legal scholar Robert Alexy, writing on this same case, has suggested that 
the post-unificiation German courts invoked a substantive conception of the rule of law, 
while relaxing certain procedural rule of law principles, such as non-retroactivity and 
(arguably) predictability. I believe this reading is consistent with the “prioritization” 
reading Teitel presents. Cf. Robert Alexy, “A Defence of Radbruch’s Formula,” in 
Recrafting the Rule of Law, ed. David Dyzenhaus (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 1999), 
15-39. See also the discussion of retroactivity as a violation of the rule of law in Ch. 2 
above.  
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that contribute to transitional normative shift, writing for example, “which rule of law 
values ultimately take precedence in transition is a function of the particular historical 
and political legacies—that is, of the primary understanding of the sources of fear, 
insecurity, and injustice that gains authoritative normative force in the society.”15 Teitel 
terms this highly contextual approach to determining which rule of law values should be 
relaxed, and which upheld, in particular cases “transitional constructivism.”16 
I have said that Teitel does not explicitly identify specific principles of 
transitional justice in her account. Some critics go further, and claim that it is not possible 
to reconstruct such principles from a close reading of her work.17 I do not think this is 
accurate. Although Teitel does not explicitly identify the principle(s) of justice that she 
believes should guide transitional shifts in legal norms actors, at least one such principle 
can easily be extracted from the historical examples described above. This is the principle 
of transitional prioritization.  
According to the principle of transitional prioritization, judges, administrators, 
and other legal actors should resolve rule of law dilemmas in particular cases by 
prioritizing one of two or more conflicting rule of law values. Actors should determine 
which rule of law value to prioritize in each instance by considering which of these 
values has suffered more serious abuse under prior regimes, and also by reflecting on the 
comparative advantages and disadvantages of upholding one or more values at the 
expense of the others. Prioritizing previously neglected values, such as equality before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Teitel 2000, 215.  
16 Teitel 2000, 219-223; Teitel 2005, 285-287. 
17 Pablo De Greiff, “Theorizing Transitional Justice,” in NOMOS LI: Transitional 
Justice, Melissa S. Williams, Rosemary Nagy, and Jon Elster, eds., New York: New York 
University Press, 2012; 61. 
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the law, or rights, such as property rights, will in some instances require discounting or 
selectively neglecting other values that did not suffer similar abuses. But it is the 
assumption of those who accept the principle of transitional prioritization that the legal 
and political gains achieved through considered choices outweigh whatever losses are 
incurred. 
Does this principle of transitional prioritization provide the basis for a distinct 
theory of transitional justice – i.e. a theory whose core principles differ substantially from 
those which apply during ‘ordinary’ circumstances? In my view, it does not. In the first 
place, rule of law dilemmas do not arise only during transitions between political 
regimes, and so it is difficult to see why this specific strategy Teitel recommends for 
resolving such dilemmas should be limited to transitional contexts. In the second place, 
whether or not rule of law dilemmas are distinctive of transitional societies, they hardly 
exhaust the “phenomenology” of liberalizing transitions.18 A complete descriptive 
account of liberalizing political transitions must attend to more than the paradoxes 
involved in seeking to transform legal norms while preserving the rule of law. On my 
view, it is impossible to gain a clear picture of how either the retrospective, justice 
seeking or the prospective, stability securing aims of transitional justice can be achieved 
without attending to shifts in social and moral, as well as legal, norms achieved or 
attempted during transitions. In the final two sections of this chapter, I will show that 
transformations in social norms belong centrally to the phenomenology of liberalizing 
political transitions. First, I want to look more closely at some objections that have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Teitel 2000, 5.  
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raised against Teitel’s account of transitional justice, and to consider in more detail her 
notion of transitional normative shift. 
 
6.2 Two Critics of Teitel’s Account of Transitional Justice 
Critics of Teitel’s account of transitional justice divide into two camps. First, 
there are critics who share Teitel’s rule of law-based approach to transitional justice, but 
who reject either her description of transitional rule of law dilemmas, or her claim that 
such dilemmas should be solved by principles of transitional justice that are distinct from 
the principles applicable during ‘ordinary’ periods in the life of liberal political societies. 
Second, there are critics who believe that a theory of transitional justice should not be 
confined to liberal, rule of law-based transitions, but should extend to non-liberal, or even 
anti-liberal, transitions and anti-liberal conceptions of justice. In this section, I will argue 
that Teitel’s notion of transitional normative shift remains central to the study of 
transitional justice even if one or the other of these lines of criticism succeeds. At the 
same time, I will suggest, that these criticisms give us reason to expand Teitel’s notion of 
transitional normative shift to included attention to transitional transformations in social, 
as well as legal, norms. 
 
6.2.1 Rule of Law-based Criticisms 
I will begin by considering those critics of Teitel who generally endorse a rule of 
law approach to transitional justice, but who object to Teitel’s specific version of that 
approach. Perhaps the most controversial claim in Teitel’s account concerns the 
“distinctiveness” of the rule of law dilemmas encountered during liberalizing political 
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transitions. This claim has provoked criticism from various scholars.19 Here, I will focus 
on the objections raised by David Dyzenhaus.  
Dyzenhaus, whose work on the Hart-Fuller debate I discussed briefly in Chapter 
2, has written extensively on the theory of transitional justice.20 He has pointed to 
limitations in notions that enjoy wide currency within the literature on transitional justice, 
denying for example that the conceptual framework of “restorative justice” can be 
applied to societies, such as South Africa, in which no prior period of equality and 
respect for liberty existed that could be restored.21 Dyzenhaus has argued against Teitel, 
specifically, that rule of law dilemmas are features of ‘ordinary’ periods in the life of 
liberal political societies, as are efforts amongst officials to prioritize particular rule of 
law values. For this reason, neither these dilemmas nor the principle of transitional 
prioritization can ground a distinctive theory of transitional justice.  
Dyzenhaus’s argument runs as follows. He begins with the Fullerian claim that 
the satisfaction of certain formal features of the rule of law, such as the eight “internal” 
principles outlined in The Morality of Law, is a necessary condition for the achievement 
of certain substantive desiderata, such as real freedom and equality for citizens.22 Second, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See for example Posner and Vermeule 2004.  
20 David Dyzenhaus, “Justifying the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” Journal of 
Political Philosophy 8, no. 4 (2000), 470-496; David Dyzenhaus, “Transitional Justice,” 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 1, no. 1 (2003), 163-175 [hereafter cited as 
Dyzenhaus 2003a]; David Dyzenhaus, “Judicial Independence, Transitional Justice and 
the Rule of Law,” Otago Law Review 10, no. 3 (2003), 345-369 [hereafter cited as 
Dyzenhaus 2003b]; David Dyzenhaus, “ as a Theory of Transitional Justice,” in NOMOS 
LI: Transitional Justice, Melissa S. Williams, Rosemary Nagy, and Jon Elster, eds., New 
York: New York University Press, 2012, 180-217. 
21 Dyzenhaus 2000, 485. 
22 Eric Posner has recently criticized Dyzenhaus for adopting this view in Eric A. Posner, 
“Transitional Prudence: A Comment on David Dyzenhaus, ‘Leviathan As a Theory of 
Transitional Justice,’” in NOMOS LI: Transitional Justice, Melissa S. Williams, 
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he endorses the further Fullerian position – central to Teitel’s account – that the various 
formal features of the rule of law cannot always be satisfied simultaneously, or at least 
not in the same degree. But this problem, Dyzenhaus point outs, is not restricted to 
transitional contexts. Rather, it is a general feature of the pursuit of the rule of law in 
liberal political societies. The ‘transitional rule of law dilemmas’ Teitel describes are not 
qualitatively different from the rule of law dilemmas encountered during ‘ordinary’ 
times, and so cannot ground a distinction between ‘ordinary’ and transitional justice.  
Teitel might respond to this argument by asserting that it is not the form of the 
dilemma, but rather the preferred solution to the dilemma, which differs during 
transitional – as opposed to ‘ordinary’ – periods. Hence it is worth considering 
Dyzenhaus’s account of the way in which the rule of law dilemmas encountered during 
ordinary periods are to be resolved, in order to see whether this differs substantially from 
the procedure of ‘prioritization’ which Teitel recommends for resolving transitional rule 
of law dilemmas. Dyzenhaus recommends that a strategy of “principled compromise” be 
applied in both transitional and ‘ordinary’ rule of law dilemmas.23 A principled 
compromise is a compromise that relaxes or reduces the requirements of one or more 
formal features of the rule of law in order to ensure compliance with one or more other 
features. What a principled compromise does not allow is for any single formal feature of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Rosemary Nagy, and Jon Elster (eds.) (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 
228-229. 
23 David Dyzenhaus, “Justifying the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” Journal of 
Political Philosophy 8, n. 4 (2000), 483-485. Dyzenhaus takes the notion of a principled 
compromise from Jonathon Allen, “Balancing Justice and Social Unity: Political Theory 
and the Idea of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” University of Toronto Law 
Journal 49 (1999), 315-353. 
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the rule of law to be sacrificed entirely in order to ensure satisfaction of the other features 
(or, for that matter, any other politically-desirable result).24  
It remains to consider how far apart Teitel and Dyzenhaus’s views concerning the 
resolution of (transitional) rule of law dilemmas really are. If Teitel’s principle of 
‘prioritization’25 is in fact equivalent to Dyzenhaus’s strategy of ‘principled 
compromise,’ and if Dyzenhaus is also correct in saying that rule of law dilemmas 
requiring such compromises are a normal feature of liberal political societies, then we 
seem to have reason to accept Dyzenhaus’s conclusion that  transitional justice really is 
just ordinary rule of law justice – unless some other grounds can be found for the 
distinction. We should consider whether Teitel can offer any argument in favor of 
instances of transitional prioritization which do not stop at “principled” compromise, but 
go all the way to sacrifice one or more rule of law principles whole cloth, within the 
limited context of transitional jurisprudence.  
Here the defect in Teitel’s preferred strategy for explicating her notion of 
transitional rule of law dilemmas, and the attendant normative shifts, becomes evident. 
As noted above, Teitel explicates these notions chiefly by means of historical examples, 
and it is far from clear that any of the examples she describes furnish an instance of 
existential compromise, of wholesale, self-conscious repudiation of one or more rule of 
law values. None of her examples, that is, fully substantiate her claim that we must 
“distinguish understandings of the rule of law in ordinary and transitional times.”26 This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 ibid.  
25 A principle which, it should be recalled, I have reconstructed on the basis of my 
reading of Teitel’s work, rather than one which Teitel expressly names and explicitly 
describes as such.  
26 Teitel 2000, 12.  
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is not to say that no successful argument can be made for this conclusion; indeed, I will 
attempt to mount a different argument later in this chapter. But it does mean that such an 
argument cannot be drawn directly from Teitel’s text.27 
 
6.2.2 Non-Rule of Law-Based Critiques 
So far I have considered objections to Teitel that come from within rule of law-
based approaches to transitional justice. I want now to consider objections that fault 
Teitel precisely for centering her account of transitional justice on liberal, rule of law-
based political transitions. Such an objection is lodged by Derk Venema in his article, 
“Transitions as States of Exceptions: Towards a More General Theory of Transitional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Dyzenhaus is not the only scholar who accepts Teitel’s claim that efforts to advance 
the rule of law are integral to liberal political transitions, but who differs in his 
assessment of the implications of this claim for how transitional justice ought generally to 
be theorized. In his article “Theorizing Transitional Justice,” Pablo De Greiff has recently 
argued that the rule of law is in fact only one of four ideals that form the normative core 
of liberal political transitions (the others are (1) mutual recognition of citizens as equal 
bearers of rights, (2) civic trust, and (3) reconciliation). An adequate theory of transitional 
justice, De Greiff argues, must explain how these ideals can be pursued in a “holistic” 
fashion, through a diverse slate of transitional justice mechanisms.27 De Greiff’s main 
objection to Teitel is that she fails to recognize these other integral goals of liberal 
political transitions, and so ultimately provides merely a descriptive, rather than a 
properly normative, account of transitional justice. This charge seems to me to be unfair, 
if it means simply that Teitel provides no normative principles that might guide legal and 
political actors during transitions. For, as I have argued above, Teitel does supply one 
such principle: the principle of transitional prioritization of those rule of law principles 
that are most endangered. However, it seems that De Greiff is more concerned to argue 
that the particular set of problems to which Teitel devotes most of her attention, i.e. the 
problems of legal normative shift exemplified by the notion of transitional rule of law 
dilemmas, offers only a partial, rather than a holistic, view of the problems that must be 
confronted during transitions, and gives insufficient direction to actors as to how those 
problems can be solved. If this is right, then it seems to me that De Greiff could lodge 
precisely the same complaint against Dyzenhaus. See De Greiff 2012. 
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Justice.”28 While acknowledging the value of Teitel’s account of liberal political 
transitions, Venema advocates “expanding the theory of transitional justice to include all 
fundamental political transformations.”29 He advertises his own general theory as a 
purely descriptive exercise, belonging to the tradition of “factual or analytic research” in 
the social sciences.30 At the same time, Venema is particularly interested in showing that 
the sorts of transformations in legal norms highlighted by Teitel are features not only of 
liberal, but also of non-liberal, and even anti-liberal, political transitions.31  
Venema connects Teitel’s notion of legal normative shift to an array of legal and 
political thinkers, from Immanuel Kant to Hans Kelsen to H.L.A. Hart. He argues that, 
while the notion of normative shift does provide an important resource for theorizing 
transitions, it is not necessary (nor does it often happen) that all or even most members of 
a political society on the brink of a transition undergo a fundamental change in attitudes 
towards the validity of the law and its grounds. At most, Venema argues, “members of 
the legal community” and “people that take an interest in law and politics” must undergo 
such a change in their “factual normative attitude” in order to create a “sufficient social 
basis for the new regime.”32 What Venema describes here is a clear example of norm 
leadership, in which particular legal actors, by dent of their special positions within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Derk Venema, “Transitions as States of Exception: Towards a More General Theory of 
Transitional Justice,” in Critical Perspectives on Transitional Justice, Nicola Palmer, 
Phil Clark, and Danielle Granville (eds.) (Portland: Intersentia, 2012), 73-89.  
29 Ibid, 73. 
30 ibid., 73-74.  
31 By taking a descriptive perspective on transformations in legal norms, Venema restricts 
himself to what Brennan et al call the socio-empirical aspect of norms. Cf. Brennan et al 
2013, 3.  
32 Ibid 76. This claim clearly parallels Hart’s contention that, at the limit, only legal 
officials must internalize primary and secondary rules in order for a society to have law.  
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society, instigate (or at least facilitate) a transformation in norms in the hopes of having 
those new norms eventually trickle down to the level of ordinary citizens. 
Having amended Teitel’s notion of legal normative shift, Venema proceeds to 
show that such shifts occur not only during liberal, but also during non-liberal and even 
anti-liberal, political transitions. To illustrate this point, he uses the twin examples of the 
(anti-liberal) transition to National Socialist government in the Netherlands following the 
German occupation of that country in 1940, and the (liberal) transition back to liberal, 
democratic government following the liberation of the Netherlands in 1945. In both 
cases, Venema argues, local legal and political actors associated with the predecessor 
regime came to accept (and to apply) laws sharply at odds with previously enacted laws.  
Although Venema’s discussion of these particular historical events aims chiefly at 
showing that the notion of normative shift can be used to make sense of both liberal and 
anti-liberal political transitions, he concludes his article by reflecting on the implications 
for “the fundamental legal philosophical question around the nature of law.”33 The fact 
that ostensibly indispensable legal principles have been repeatedly violated in both liberal 
and anti-liberal political transitions, by the very actors who take upon themselves 
responsibility for creating and interpreting the law, suggests, that the “fundamental 
characteristics” of law are not to be found in such principles at all, but rather in 
“something much more pragmatic like the ordering power of law or the expression of a 
political identity.”34  
Venema’s reflections on the relationship between problems of transitional justice 
and questions of general jurisprudence are intriguing. It is not obvious, however, that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Venema 2012, 88.  
34 Ibid, 88-89.  
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facts of the particular cases of liberal and non-liberal transitions under discussion justify 
such sweeping claims about the nature of law. Particular legal and political actors 
frequently have reason to reassess their particular legal obligations. Such reassessments 
need not stem from fundamental transformations in basic normative commitments. They 
may, rather, be driven by observations of changes in the conduct or commitments of 
other, differently positioned legal actors. Ultimately, changes in attitudes amongst legal 
actors towards the contents and grounds of the law of the kind that occur during political 
transitions tell us less about the nature of law itself than they do about the ways in which 
beliefs about the law, and about legal obligations, circulate and find expression in the 
beliefs and actions of legal actors. It is my view, set out in previous chapters of this study, 
that at least some of those beliefs and attitudes reflect social norms prevailing amongst 
particularly-positioned individuals and groups, including professional groups, within 
particular political societies. Hence, I believe that an adequate general theory of 
transitional justice and transitional norm transformation must attend to changes in social, 
as well as legal, norms within societies undergoing both liberal and non-liberal political 
transitions. In the next section of this chapter, I will expand the discussion to consider 
various kinds of transformations in social norms that commonly occur during liberalizing 
political transitions, specifically, and I will consider whether such transitional shifts in 
social norms might be governed by distinctive principles of justice.  
 
6.3 Norm Transformation and The Distinctiveness of Transitional Justice  
Transformations in social norms make up an important part of liberalizing 
political transitions. Liberalizing political transitions open up institutional space for 
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international actors to promote transformations in social norms related to public health, 
gender equality, economic interactions, and other favored policy goals within transitional 
societies. While the opportunities are considerable, unchecked efforts by international 
actors to transform social norms during liberalizing political transitions may conflict with 
concurrent rule of law reforms, or raise other questions of justice. Accordingly, it is 
important to understand what different forms these transitional transformations in social 
norms take; what duties their backers owe to members of local populations; and what 
moral principles, or principles of justice, ground such duties.   
In this section, I respond to each of these questions. My analysis is in three parts. 
First, I will show that transformations in social norms are often central aims of local and 
international actors during liberalizing political transitions. Second, I will show that these 
local and international actors are institutional in such a way as to be liable to 
considerations of justice. Finally, I will identify two distinct principles of transitional 
justice which I believe ought to govern the efforts of international actors to effect 
transformations in social norms during liberalizing transitions.  
 
6.3.1 Types and Modes of Transitional Transformations in Social Norms 
In considering the importance of transformations in social norms as part of the 
process of liberalizing political transitions, we can focus either on the different types of 
transformations undertaken, or on the different strategies by which those transformations 
are pursued.35 Here I will consider each of these points in turn.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 There are, of course, any number of unintended transformations in social norms that 
occur during political transitions. Here my attention is confined to intentionally pursued 
transformations in social norms. I understand ‘intentional’ to cover both cases where the 
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A first type of change in social norms commonly pursued during liberalizing 
political transitions consists in the inversion of social norms. As I explained in Ch. 2 
above, inversions in norms occur when actions or policies previously prohibited within a 
particular population come to be prescribed, or vice-versa.36 Some of the most dramatic 
inversions of norms that occur during political transitions are really reversions, as in 
cases where moral prohibitions against killing have been inverted during ongoing 
atrocities, only to be restored at the close of violence. The inversions in social norms that 
occur during political transitions are frequently less dramatic, involving instead such 
things as the gendered division of labor within a society, or the educational attainments 
expected of members of different racial or ethnic groups, or the prescribed language of 
business or politics. Nevertheless, though not bound up with the immediate survival of 
members of particular groups or populations, such social norms exert a powerful 
influence on the long-term well being of individuals, and the project of inverting them 
often takes up just as much energy as rule of law reforms amongst domestic and 
international actors involved in transitions.  
A second type of transitional transformation in social norms concerns the 
introduction of genuinely new social norms to govern unprecedented interactions or 
relationships. This type of transformation in social norms mirrors the transitional 
introduction of entirely new legal institutions and regimes, such as international criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
change in social norms is itself the proximate goal of some actor(s), and cases where the 
change in social norms is a foreseen step towards or by product of some other proximate 
goal.  See Michael Bratman, “Two Faces of Intention,” in Intentions, Plans, and 
Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).   
36 I will focus here only on cases where the two norms that stand in a relationship of 
inversion are both social norms – though clearly inversions in norms sometimes involve a 
change in status from, say, a social prescription to a legal prohibition. 
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courts and proceedings, which have garnered great attention within theories of 
transitional justice. Transitional introductions of new social norms may be related to the 
legal sector, but they also frequently occur within the commercial sector, as international 
aid and development organizations provide funding for markets and infrastructure 
previously unseen within particular societies. Establishing norms against cheating and in 
favor of trust amongst participants in large-scale development projects, for example, may 
be a major aim of liberalizing political transitions in some cases. 
A third type of transitional transformation in social norms is more or less the 
opposite of the second. It consists in the transitional destruction or disruption of social 
norms. These social norms may or may not be closely related to the causal pathways that 
have given rise to past large-scale crimes. On the one hand, transitional efforts to break 
down social norms related to ethnic or religious identification may be directly related to 
perceived importance of ethnic or religious identification in past atrocities. On the other 
hand, transitional efforts to break down norms prescribing the bribing of officials, or 
prohibiting reporting of infractions of workplace regulations, may not be directly related 
to large-scale crimes at all, but may instead be the result of an inflow of money and 
attention from international actors, combined with the relative paucity of opportunities 
for political participation by local actors.  
These three types of transitional transformations in social norms can be pursued 
through a variety of different strategies. Local governments or international organizations 
may sponsor media campaigns over radio or television in an effort to establish practices, 
and instill normative attitudes. Celebrities from sports or entertainment may use their 
personal recognizability to promote particular changes in social norms (which may be 
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more palatable from a public relations standpoint than promoting changes in legal 
norms). Local communities, confronting altered distributions of wealth, resources, and 
population groups, may engage in deliberations about how to solve novel social 
problems, or how to compensate for the breakdown of customs or traditions. Finally, in 
some cases, local or international actors may engage in more clandestine, or even 
manipulative, strategies for introducing new social norms within transitional societies.37 
I have offered only a brief sketch of the different ways in which local and 
international actors undertake to transform social norms during liberalizing political 
transitions. A great deal more could be said on this important policy issue from the 
standpoint of implementation. I want to turn now to consider such transitional 
transformations in social norms from the standpoint of justice. I will first show that such 
intentional efforts to transform social norms in transitional societies are legitimate objects 
of assessments of justice. I will then turn to consider two particular principles of justice 
which I believe apply distinctively to such transitional transformations in social norms. 
 
6.3.2 International Actors as Subjects of Justice During Transitions 
 
The duties grounded in principles of transitional justice are standardly assumed to 
apply chiefly to states and their agents. This assumption appears in the work of both those 
who, like Teitel, think that these principles are ‘distinctive’ or ‘extraordinary,’ and in the 
work of those who, like Dyzenhaus, think these principles are ‘ordinary’ or not 
distinctive to transitions. It is perhaps because these authors focus their attention chiefly 
on changes in legal norms occurring during liberalizing political transitions that they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 For the difference between the manipulative introduction and the manipulative 
activation of social norms, see Morrow 2014.  
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concentrate on states and state institutions as bearers of duties of justice. Transitional 
transformations in social norms are by no means uniformly directed or approved by states 
and state institutions, however. We should consider, then, whether the other actors 
involved in promoting transitional transformations of social norms can be bearers of 
obligations grounded in principles of justice.  
The set of international actors involved in transitional transformations in social 
norms is as large and as diverse as the set of international actors involved in international 
development, international security, and international affairs more generally. It includes 
inter-governmental organizations, such as the European Union or the African Union; 
humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross and UNICEF; religious and ethnic-
based non-profits; university-based public health experts; economic institutions such as 
the IMF and the World Bank; and even private corporations. Each of these organizations 
actively and intentionally undertakes to change social norms and social practices within 
transitional societies, with substantial expected effects on the lives and livelihoods of 
large numbers of individuals. Such efforts are clearly morally assessable; but are they 
assessable from the standpoint of justice? And what does it mean if they are? 
Political theorist Jennifer Rubenstein has recently distinguished two different 
ways of thinking about the activities of humanitarian non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), which bear important implications for the ability of these actors to be subjects of 
claims of justice.38 I believe her account can help us to understand how international 
actors involved in transitional norm transformation can be subject to claims of justice. On 
the one hand, Rubenstein suggests, we can think of humanitarian NGOs like the Red 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Jennifer Rubenstein, “Humanitarian NGOs’ Duties of Justice,” Journal of Social 
Philosophy 40, n. 4 (Winter 2009), 524-541. 
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Cross or Doctors Without Borders as engaging in an indefinite series of interactions with 
local populations in various countries – providing vaccines or medicines; distributing 
food and drinking water; and generally offering individuals and populations a “bed for 
the night.”39 In many ways, as Rubenstein points out, humanitarian NGOs intentionally 
cultivate and defend this image, in order (at least in part) to avoid being drawn into 
political debates that might hinder effective provision of life saving aid.40  
On the interactional account, Rubenstein argues, humanitarian NGOs bear a 
variety of moral obligations to those they serve (as well as those from whom they solicit 
funding), but they do not bear duties of justice. This is because, as Rawls most famously 
pointed out, duties of justice arise principally in the context of institutions and 
institutionalized relationships between individuals, rather than in the context of 
occasional (or even one-off) interactions between individuals or groups.41   
Against this interactional account of humanitarian NGOs, Rubenstein offers an 
institutional account, according to which humanitarian NGOs do in fact compose a 
durable institutional structure of humanitarian aid, and can therefore be understood as 
bearing duties of justice to the various parties (including donors and recipients of aid) 
whom they serve. Three features of humanitarian NGOs which Rubenstein cites as 
evidence of this institutional status are: the significant effects humanitarian NGOs have 
on the well being of clients and patrons; the pervasiveness of such NGOs on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 ibid., 527-528. See also Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2011), 37-39. 
40 ibid.  
41 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Original Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 7-11; Rubenstein 2009, 526. 
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international scene; and the way in which their work “constrains people’s options in a 
serious way.”42 
I believe the many non-state actors that participate in political transitions and help 
to promote transitional norm transformations together meet the criteria Rubenstein 
proposes for a social institution capable of standing in relationships characterized by 
duties of justice towards other institutions and the individuals who compose them. 
Support for this position comes, in part, from critics of the transitional justice “industry”, 
such as Stephen Humphreys.43 Humphreys complains that the same international NGOs, 
staffed by elite lawyers, economists, and other transitional justice “experts,” can be seen 
jetting in to advise on political transitions around the globe, writing model constitutions 
and engaging in rule of law building activities organized around sets of best practices and 
lessons learned. Insofar as these criticisms accurately pick out a distinct set of 
international transitional justice specialists, they seem to support the view that such 
agents operate as established, institutional actors whenever they temporarily enter into 
specific transitional contexts. In the case study that closes this chapter, we will see the 
United Nations entering into just such a relationship with newly recreated institutions in 
transitional East Timor, and struggling to address the problems of justice arising from this 
relationship. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 ibid., 532. Technically Rubenstein ascribes these features to the “institution of 
international humanitarian aid at large,” rather than to any particular NGO engaging in 
humanitarian activities in any particular context. For reasons I state below, I believe that 
during political transitions significant opportunities, and significant pressures, arise for 
particular international actors to enter into institutional, rather than merely ‘interactional,’ 
relationships with local populations. 
43 Humphreys 2010. 
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There is another reason for considering many international actors to stand in 
institutional, justice-assessable relationships with local populations during liberalizing 
political transitions. In transitional contexts, international organizations like the UN or 
humanitarian and development oriented NGOs will commonly have a longer track record, 
and a more continuous leadership structure, than the nascent state institutions which it is 
the goal of liberalizing transitions to cultivate. Put another way, whereas in many 
contexts in which they operate international organizations are not able to act on their own 
authority, but require the consent of domestic institutions, in transitional contexts 
international organizations may be the most powerful actors and effective actors on the 
domestic scene when it comes to the economy, security, or public health. In light of this, I 
believe there is often good reason to take the institutional, rather than the interactional, 
perspective on the many groups and organizations engaged in transitional justice 
activities, and thus to consider those activities susceptible to assessments of justice.  
While I cannot give an exhaustive list of necessary conditions for international 
actors involved in liberalizing transitions to be subject to duties of justice, I think the 
following conditions are at least jointly sufficient. Where international actors have an 
established presence on the international scene prior to the onset of a particular political 
transition; where they come to be regarded as the point of first, rather than last, resort for 
supporting critical health, economic, or security needs by members of local populations; 
and where these actors exercise dynamic decision-making powers on the basis of 
changing facts on the ground, rather than abiding strictly to static mission guidelines or 
organizational rules, then these international actors owe duties of justice to members of 
local populations, and also (perhaps) to other international actors.  
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6.3.3  Two Principles of Transitional Justice 
 
I have argued that at least some international actors involved in the various 
activities of liberalizing political transitions stand in relationships of justice to members 
of local populations within transitional societies. In this section, I want to consider what 
principles of justice ground the duties that these international actors owe to local 
populations, and to ask whether those principles are in any way distinct from principles 
of justice that apply in ordinary periods. We saw in the first part of this chapter that 
transformations in legal norms are among the major tasks undertaken or assisted by 
international actors during liberalizing political transitions; but it was questionable 
whether the principles of justice that govern such transformations are really distinctive, or 
merely ordinary. Furthermore, the discussions by Teitel and Dyzenhaus focused chiefly 
on how local governments ought to go about effecting such transformations. Here I want 
to consider instead the transformations in social norms undertaken by international actors 
during transitions. I will suggest that two principles of justice apply to such 
transformations, which are themselves distinctive to transitional contexts. These are the 
principle of local collaboration and the principle of selective social norm conservation.  
The principle of local collaboration holds that international actors ought to seek 
genuine local collaboration in their efforts to transform particular social norms. Such 
collaboration might include local deliberations in public meetings or gatherings; 
partnerships with citizens of transitional societies for the purposes of norm promotion and 
norm entrepreneurship; and soliciting local appraisals of the success of particular norm-
transformation campaigns.  
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The principle of local collaboration may seem so obvious and uncontroversial as 
to be no real normative principle at all. Nevertheless, there are real pressures that 
international actors face to avoid or bypass genuine local collaborations. In the first place, 
the window of opportunity for such actors to effect changes in social norms is often brief, 
at most one or two years before local institutions gain the strength to take over key 
decision-making functions, and interest amongst donors to specific causes begins to dry 
up. Genuine local collaborations, such as community decision-making procedures, can 
take months or even years, and so it is not always in the immediate interests of 
international organizations to engage in such processes. Furthermore, in so far as some of 
these processes are political, certain international organizations may hesitate to take sides 
in potentially contentious debates about education, gender equity, or other proposed 
changes in social norms, and will prefer to use non-political processes to seek changes in 
norms. 
It is important to distinguish justice-based reasons for seeking local collaborations 
from mere instrumental reasons for doing so. As Cristina Bicchieri has pointed out, in 
some contexts local deliberative processes are the best way to bring about the changes in 
normative attitudes necessary to change social norms.44 While such efficiency-based 
considerations may help motivate some international organizations to pursue local 
collaborations, I am concerned with the justice-based reasons for doing so. Those justice-
based reasons are, once again, grounded in the distinctive institutional position that 
international actors stand in vis-à-vis local populations during political transitions, as 
often the most visible and capable institutions exerting an influence on the lives and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Bicchieri Forthcoming.  
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livelihoods of individuals. In non-transitional contexts, international organizations 
working to change social norms in liberal political societies may plausibly rely on the 
local governmental institutions with which they partner, or by which their activities are 
regulated, to secure local consent for their operations; in transitional contexts, by 
contrast, this mediated form of local collaboration will often be absent. For this reason, 
the principle of local collaboration governing the efforts of international actors to achieve 
transitional transformations in social norms has a claim to be a distinctively transitional 
principle of justice.  
The second principle of transitional justice I want to propose likewise reflects the 
distinct institutional position international organizations frequently occupy during 
liberalizing political transitions. This is the principle of selective norm conservation. This 
principle holds that international actors should selectively choose not to seek to change 
particular social norms, even when such changes are central to their organizational 
mission, in cases where doing so would pose a significant threat to the success of efforts 
to found new stable domestic institutions.  
The principle of selective norm conservation is in some ways analogous to the 
principle of transitional prioritization discussed above. In the case of social norms, 
however, there are not generally considered to be guiding principles akin to the principles 
of the rule of law that could restrain efforts to change particular social norms in 
transitional contexts. The principle of selective norm conservation supplies this need. 
Unlike the principle of prioritization, however, it is hard to see why the principle of 
selective norm conservation should apply in non-transitional, as well as transitional 
contexts. In non-transitional contexts, legal norms and government institutions are 
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generally well enough established that attempts to change social norms cannot be a very 
great threat to social and political stability. In transitional contexts, by contrast, social 
norms may often serve as important points of continuity between modes of life existing 
before social breakdowns and transitional patterns and practices.  
What does the “selective” portion of this principle entail? As I noted at the 
beginning of this section, liberalizing political transitions often open institutional space 
for international actors to seek to change social norms which have little to do with 
whatever political turmoil or large-scale violence preceded transitions. Clearly, insofar as 
certain social norms contributed causally or structurally to large-scale crimes, attempts to 
change those social norms will be an important task of transitional justice, and not one 
that should be ignored. In many cases, however, the norms targeted for transformation by 
international actors will have had nothing to do with past criminality; and when attempts 
to change such norms threaten stability going forward, then there is at least a pro tanto 
reason to refrain from seeking changes.  
The two principles of transitional justice I have identified are clearly limited in 
their application; they hardly exhaust the practical challenges faced by domestic and 
international actors during liberalizing political transitions. It may be that there are other, 
distinctively transitional principles of justice that surpass these two in the scope of their 
application; it is certainly the case that other, ‘ordinary’ principles of justice apply to 
transitional efforts at norm transformation, along with these two principles. However, I 
believe these two principles do apply to an important, insufficiently studied part of the 
“phenomenology” of liberalizing political transitions, which occurs alongside transitional 
transformations in legal norms. In the final section of this chapter I will consider in more 
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detail a case study of the efforts of one particular non-state actor, the United Nations, to 
regulate changes in both legal and social norms during its mandate as the effective 
governing power in East Timor. Through that case study, I hope to show both how these 
principles of transitional justice might be applied, and that the phenomenon of norm 
transformation is in fact a defining feature of liberalizing political transitions. 
 
6.4 Transitional Norm Transformation in Practice: The Case of East Timor 
Having reviewed some key problems of transitional justice, and identified two 
specific principles of justice that apply to international actors engaged in transitional 
transformations in social norms, I want finally to illustrate my account using a concrete 
historical case. In this section, I will use UN and international efforts to rebuild state 
institutions in East Timor (formerly East Timor) following the violence that occurred in 
that country in 1999 in order to show that transforming social norms was a key aim of 
these international actors, and a core element of their overall efforts to promote 
sustainable justice sector reforms.  
I will develop this argument in several steps. First, I will provide a brief historical 
account of the ongoing liberalizing political transition in Timor Leste, focusing 
particularly on the chief “rule of law dilemmas” faced by variously-positioned legal and 
political actors in that country. The case of Timor Leste is especially interesting in this 
regard, since for several years it was in fact international legal actors, associated with the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), who were directly 
confronted with these transitional rule of law dilemmas. The actions taken by the 
UNTAET to solve several of these dilemmas have been sharply criticized by both 
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indigenous Timorese and international observers, and my account will pay due attention 
to these criticisms.  
Next, I will review some of the broader lessons that scholars of international rule 
of law promotion have taken from the example of Timor Leste, and show that both critics 
and proponents of the “rule of law industry” agree that the transformations in legal norms 
sought by such practitioners generally cannot be accomplished without simultaneous 
transformations in social norms.   
Finally, in my conclusion, I will argue that, while the notion of normative shift is 
a powerful tool for theorizing liberal, rule of law-based political transitions, it must be 
expanded to include transformations in social as well as legal norms.  
 
6.4.1 UN Administration and Justice Processes in East Timor: A Mixed Record 
Modern Timor-Leste occupies the eastern half of the island of Timor, situated in 
the far eastern portion of the Indian Ocean. Its closest neighboring countries are 
Indonesia to the west, Papua New Guinea to the east, and Australia to the south. Timor-
Leste has a long history of colonial occupation: nearly 500 years under Portuguese 
governance.45 As we shall see, that history of colonial rule deeply affected the difficult 
course of the transition to democratic, autonomous government currently taking place in 
this country.46 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The territorial division of the island between East and West Timor dates to the 17th 
century, when Dutch colonial administrators gained control of the western half of the 
island, and Portuguese administrators the eastern half.  46	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In 1974, a bloodless coup in Lisbon (known as the “Carnation Revolution”) led to 
the cessation of Portuguese claims to possession of numerous territories abroad, including 
Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique, and East Timor. Political aspirations of residents of 
East Timor at this time were divided, with some factions seeking complete independence, 
and others favoring maintaining some political ties to Portugal, with the status of an 
autonomous province. Civil war broke out in August 1974 between supporters of each of 
these positions. In September 1974 the Portuguese administration withdrew, and shortly 
thereafter, forces from neighboring Indonesia invaded East Timor. The following year, 
the Indonesian occupation received the endorsement of those factions in East Timor that 
had supported maintaining political ties to Portugal. In 1976, the East Timor legislature, 
packed with representatives picked by Indonesian authorities, officially ratified 
integration with Indonesia.  
The de facto Indonesian annexation of East Timor never won legal acceptance 
from the United Nations. However, no strenuous action was taken to force the end of 
Indonesian occupation, despite severe human rights violations and incidents of mass 
starvation. In 1998, the resignation of Indonesian president Suharto provided an 
opportunity for the pro-independence movement to assert itself more forcefully, and in 
the following year Suharto’s successor, President Habibie, agreed to hold a referendum 
on the question of independence. Portuguese, Indonesian, and Timorese leaders, along 
with UN officials, collaborated on designing the referendum, which was strongly 
contested by some segments of the Indonesian population, in particular the military and 
Islamic religious leaders. Under the agreement, the United Nations was to have 
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responsibility for staging the referendum, while the Indonesian military was to provide 
security support. 
The vote on independence was held on August 30, 1999. Even before the vote, 
numerous acts of intimidation and violence against known pro-independence leaders 
were recorded. Nevertheless, participation in the referendum was strong, at nearly 99 
percent of the population; and support for independence was decisive, at 78 percent of all 
ballots cast.  
After the referendum, a brief but intense period of violence and destruction 
ensued, propelled by local pro-Indonesian militias, as well as by passive (and in some 
cases active) collaboration by portions of the Indonesian security forces. More than a 
thousand Timorese civilians were killed, many in mass killings in churches and other 
refugee assembly points. Beyond the loss of life, massive destruction of property took 
place, estimated at more than 70 percent of all infrastructure in the territory. The 
extensive damage to buildings, roads, and communications networks proved particularly 
problematic for subsequent efforts to rebuild the justice system in East Timor, as will be 
discussed below.  
A month and a half after the referendum, the United Nations dispatched an 
Australian-led peacekeeping mission to East Timor, known as the UN International Force 
in East Timor (INTERFET). At the same time, the Security Council created the 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). This Transitional Administration 
would take on responsibility for everyday government operations in East Timor, for 
rebuilding the political and institutional capacities necessary for autonomous government 
in that country, and for ensuring that adequate justice procedures for perpetrators of 
	   	  193	  
serious crimes in the period before and after the vote for independence. As observers 
noted at the time, this was an enormous undertaking for the United Nations, nearly 
unprecedented, and inevitably precedent-setting. 
Legal scholars and other international observers have commented extensively on 
the ongoing transition in Timor-Leste, focusing particularly on the UN’s efforts to rebuild 
institutions and to pursue justice for wrongdoers both during and after the mandate of the 
UNTAET, which ceded day-to-day responsibility for governance in 2002. Some of these 
scholars are concerned specifically with assessing how well (or how poorly) the UN 
discharged its duties as administrator of East Timor and as defender of international law 
and legal processes.47 Others attempt to connect events in East Timor with larger themes 
and problems in the current literature on transitional justice and transitional rule of law 
promotion. Within the latter group, some theorists look to events in East Timor for 
examples of problems associated with legal pluralism, or the condition of having more 
than one legal system in effect within or across a single jurisdiction.48 Others use the case 
of East Timor to assess the challenges that confront international actors seeking to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 For an early assessment by scholars who served as legal consultants to the UNTAET, 
see Jonathon Morrow and Rachel White, “The United Nations in Transitional East 
Timor: International Standards and the Reality of Governance,” Australian Yearbook of 
International Law 22 (2002), 1-45. For more critical assessments of the UN’s efforts to 
pursue accountability for perpetrators of atrocities prior to and immediately following the 
vote for independence, see David Cohen, “Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is the East 
Timor Tribunal Really a Model for the Future?” Analysis from the East-West Center no. 
61, August 2002, 1-8, and also David Cohen, “ ‘Justice on the Cheap’ Revisited: The 
Failure of the Serious Crimes Trials in East Timor,” Analysis from the East-West Center 
no. 80, May 2006, 1-12. 
48 Laura Grenfell, “Legal pluralism and the challenge of building the rule of law in post-
conflict states: a case study of Timor-Leste,” in The Role of International Law in 
Rebuilding Societies After Conflict: Great Expectations, Brett Bowden, Hilary 
Charlesworth and Jeremy Farall, eds., New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 78-
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contribute to the rebuilding (or new creation) of domestic governmental institutions, such 
as courts and legislatures, which are both compatible with international law and in some 
ways continuous with local customs and traditions. 49 
One of the most serious challenges confronted by the UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor was the reconstruction of a functioning justice system in 
that country, capable of interpreting and applying both ordinary, domestic law in 
everyday cases and the complex and novel international laws considered particularly 
applicable to the pursuit of justice against perpetrators of atrocities before and after the 
vote on independence. During the period of the UN Administration Hansjörg Strohmeyer 
documented the many impediments to implementing justice sector reform (abbreviated 
JSR in the literature) in East Timor, some of which were bluntly material: court buildings 
and offices had been destroyed, court records, case files, and law books had been burned 
or dislocated.50 
Other impediments consisted in a lack of personnel. As Strohmeyer and others 
have reported, during the quarter century of Indonesian control over East Timor few non-
Indonesian Timorese had obtained legal degrees, let alone practiced law in their native 
country, and thus it was impossible to find sufficient qualified lawyers and judges to staff 
courts and prosecutors’ offices, or to serve as defense counsel for citizens accused either 
of ordinary or serious crimes. In the latter case, a further problem presented itself: many 
of the individuals suspected of having carried out the most serious crimes prior to and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Morrow and White 2002; Jane Stromseth, David Wippman and Rosa Brooks, Can 
Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law After Military Interventions, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, 334-339. 
50 Hansjörg Strohemeyer, “Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United 
Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor,” The American Journal of International 
Law 95, no. 1 (January 2001), 50.  
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following the August 1999 vote for independence were no longer within the territorial 
jurisdiction of East Timor, but were rather residing in Indonesia.  
The UN, for better or worse, approached the task of justice sector reform by 
designing policies that aimed to address a number of these material and personnel-related 
impediments at the same time. One of the more prominent steps taken was the 
establishment of a special court to hear cases involving atrocities prior to and after the 
vote for independence. This court was attached to the district court in Dili, the capital of 
East Timor. In establishing the protocols for this special court, the UN sought to achieve 
both the goal of applying international criminal law to crimes in East Timor, and the goal 
of building local judicial capacity. It did so by composing each of the trial panels of two 
international judges, and one judge from East Timor, who, it was thought, would benefit 
from mentoring by their international colleagues. 
The East Timor special crimes process has been the target of numerous criticisms. 
Some observers accuse the UN of seeking “justice on the cheap” by employing a so-
called “hybrid” panel based in Dili, rather than the much more elaborate and costly ad 
hoc tribunals created to try crimes in the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda 
(ICTR).51 Such criticisms connect the form of the trial process with the substantive 
quality of justice it achieved⎯pointing to cases, for example, where defendants were 
convicted of crimes of which they had not been accused, or where defense attorneys 
failed to call any defense witnesses, due to lack of funds.52 Other critics have argued that 
the special crimes process was designed in such a way that it was asked to do too much: 
both providing high-quality justice to individual defendants, and creating conditions for 	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52 Cohen 2006. 
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reconciliation. Though “aiming at several aims of transitional justice,” the special crimes 
process (and the UN organizations which oversaw it) failed to achieve any of them.53 
 
6.4.2 Justice Sector Reform and Shifts in Social Norms 
Earlier, I argued that one important function of social norms is to structure and 
sustain institutions. In principle it would be possible to analyze any particular institution, 
in any particular context, and discover the various ways in which particular social norms 
influence the operations of that institution and the conduct of its members. Here I will 
briefly discuss a few ways in which social norms, shifts in social norms, and clashes 
between conflicting social norms have affected efforts at justice sector reform in East 
Timor.  
The first point I want to highlight concerns efforts to develop a particularly liberal 
self-understanding amongst judges in East Timor. As an especially visible, fairly well-
defined category of legal actors, judges in liberal political societies typically behave in 
ways that reflect a whole host of specialized social norms, ranging from fairly mundane 
codes of dress to deeply felt norms prescribing independence and imperviousness to 
outside influence. These social norms help ground the social identity of judges and 
lawyers in liberal political societies, while also creating accountability. Amongst legal 
professionals in newly independent East Timor, however, little precedent existed for such 
common liberal institutional norms. As Hansjörg Strohmeyer writes, post-independence 
programs to train East Timor’s judges “had to focus not only on conveying legal and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Jovana Davidovic, “Timor-Leste and Transitional Justice: Should We Pursue 
International Prosecutions for the Crimes committed in East Timor in 1999?” in Larry 
May and Andrew Forcehimes (eds.), Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International Law 
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practical skills, but, equally importantly, on fostering appreciation of the crucial rule of 
the judiciary in society and the benefits of a culture of law.”54 Under Indonesian rule, 
Strohmeyer suggests, such a marked distinction between the judiciary on the one hand 
and the political branches of the government had been lacking. As David Dyzenhaus has 
argued, failures on the part of the judiciary to maintain a distinctive role are common in 
societies marked by political repression.55 Strohmeyer adds that, “in a society that had 
never experienced respect for the rule of law, and in which the law was widely perceived 
as yet another instrument for wielding authority and control over the individual, the 
meaning of independence and impartiality of the judiciary had to be imparted 
gradually.”56 
Few would object to the claim that, particularly in liberal political societies, 
judiciaries form a group apart, both in terms of the crucial function they perform in 
creating what are sometimes called “rule of law cultures,” and in terms of the distinctive 
practices they adopt that allow them to perform that function. But whereas norms such as 
maintaining independence and resisting undue influence from the political branches of 
government are highly abstract, and easily idealized, many much more mundane, 
practice-grounded social norms also became relevant in the effort to build up the East 
Timorese judiciary. One of the most straightforward, but also most controversial, of these 
norms concerned language use. It is not surprising that, in the serious crimes process 
panels, composed as they are of both international and Timorese judges, problems of 
language and of interpretation have arisen. More salient, however, is the fact, as David 
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Cohen points out, that there has been a concentrated effort by the central government in 
East Timor to make Portuguese the official language (an effort reflected, for example, in 
the 2005 name-change to Timor-Leste).57 The fact that few of the Timorese judges were 
used to working in, or even knew, Portuguese prior to their appointment (most were 
accustomed to working in Bahasa Indonesia)58 meant that this imposed rule exacerbated 
already-existing language difficulties, whatever its other practical or symbolic merits. In 
my view, this imposition of a working language constitutes a clear example of an 
attempted institution of a social norm, albeit one where the practice in which it is 
supposed to be grounded does not extend much farther than the particular executive 
organization imposing it. 
Less abstract than the notion of judicial independence, but less concrete than rules 
regulating judicial language, are the various judicial skills in which Timorese judges 
received training in on-site as well as off-site seminars and workshops during and after 
the period of UN administration. Judges received training in the contents and application 
of international criminal law and in basic principles of procedural justice. Some 
commentators have suggested that Timorese judges might have benefitted more from 
training in more fundamental judicial skills, such as decision-writing and courtroom 
management.59  
How do the two principles of transitional justice identified in the last section 
apply to these different attempted and achieved transformations in social norms in 
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58 Caitlin Reiger and Marieke Wierda, “The Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste: In 
Retrospect,” International Center for Transitional Justice Prosecutions Case Studies 
Series, March 2006, 16.  
59 Ibid, 17; Stromseth et al 2006, 234. 
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transitional East Timor? In the first place, the efforts to build social norms contributing to 
the social identity of judges and lawyers in that country seem broadly in accordance with 
the principle of local collaboration. Indeed, these efforts provide a clear example of how 
international actors enter transitional contexts as considerably more established than local 
counterparts, while at the same time actively working to build up and secure local 
institutions that will render their presence superfluous.  
The effort to make Portuguese the working language of the judiciary may have 
violated the principle of selective norm conservation, as I have described it. Importantly, 
we should note that it in this instance it was not international actors directly, but rather 
the central government in East Timor, that sought to impose this linguistic rule. 
Nevertheless, international actors are implicated in this situation, since there seems to 
arise a tension between the two principles I have identified: the proposed change in 
language requirements came from local actors, and thus satisfied the principle of local 
collaboration, but insofar as it posed a challenge to timely and effective adjudication of 
cases of alleged perpetration of past atrocities, it seems to have challenged the principle 
of selective norm conservation.60  
Efforts to advance justice sector reform in East Timor were also significantly 
influenced by the particular aims and commitments of the various international 
organizations and donor groups involved in that process. It is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to investigate the particular practices and norms that circulate within and across 
these different groups, but it is nevertheless worth pointing out that political scientists are 
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For this reason, I do not mean to claim that there is, or might be, a problem in the long 
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paying increasing attention to the efforts of such actors to promote rule of law and 
international law in countries undergoing transitions.61 Given that these actors often have 
substantially different conceptions of what the rule of law entails (with some adopting a 
primarily economic perspective emphasizing the importance of markets, and others 
adopting a primarily political perspective, emphasizing the importance of fair elections 
and independent judiciaries) it is not surprising that their representatives often differ 
substantially in both the main obstacles to the rule of law that they perceive, and in the 
solutions that they propose.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
The ongoing transition to liberal, democratic government in Timor-Leste has 
required legal and political actors in a variety of positions, both in that country and 
internationally, to undertake the difficult task of instituting changes in both legal and 
social norms, as part of the process of rebuilding or newly creating local institutions 
capable of sustaining and satisfying duties of justice. Both during the period of direct UN 
administration and afterwards, significant rule of law dilemmas, of the kind discussed by 
Teitel, presented themselves. Timorese officials worried, for example, that stringent 
pursuit of justice against Indonesian perpetrators of atrocities might jeopardize trade 
relations between the two countries, relations critical to rebuilding efforts in East Timor. 
UN administrators, for their part, labored under the necessity of building up the local 
Timorese judiciary, on the one hand, while also being responsible for assuring that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 For a critical examination of the work of international rule of law promoters associated 
with organizations like the World Bank, the EU, USAID, and others, cf. Humphreys 
2010. For a more positive, though still cautious, assessment cf. Richard Sannerholm, Rule 
of Law After War and Crisis, Portland: Intersentia, 2012.  
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defendants in both ordinary and serious crimes proceedings received adequate counsel 
and procedural justice.  
Although the case study of East Timor provided here can be used to illustrate 
various points made in the debate between Teitel and her critics, this is not my aim. 
Instead, I have sought to expand upon one aspect of the debate upon which there is 
significant agreement amongst participants: namely, the claim that transitional justice can 
be theorized using the notion of normative shift. Whereas Teitel and her critics focus on 
shifts in legal norms undertaken during political transitions, I have argued in this chapter 
that those shifts in legal norms, when successful, are accompanied and supported by 
shifts in social norms within the various more and less specialized groups of legal and 
political actors that compose the political society undergoing the transition. I have 
illustrated this claim by focusing on the relationship between efforts at rule of law 
promotion and justice sector reform in transitional East Timor.  
Ultimately, the focus on transformations in norms displayed by scholars of 
transitional justice mirrors the focus on transformations in norms exhibited by scholars of 
mass atrocity. The former group of scholars is concerned mainly with prospective, 
normative questions: such as how social and political institutions should be reformed or 
established in accordance with principles of justice, and how rule of law principles ought 
to be prioritized where they conflict. The latter group of scholars is concerned mainly 
with retrospective, descriptive questions: such as how it is possible that ordinary 
individuals come to participate in extraordinary crimes. Nevertheless, these different lines 
of inquiry are clearly mutually informing. In order to understand how to reconcile the 
aims of stability and accountability during transitions that follow atrocities, it is necessary 
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to understand how those atrocities occurred. And in order to understand how atrocities 
occur, it is helpful to understand the changes in norms that are the mark of political 
transitions, both liberal and non-liberal or anti-liberal – as well as to understand the 
criteria by which we might assess the justice of such transitional norm transformations.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Recent philosophical research on normativity has clarified the nature and 
dynamics of social norms. Social norms are distinguished from legal and moral norms on 
the basis of their scope, their grounds, their characteristic forms of accountability, or 
some combination of these features. Because of their distinct character, social norms can 
reinforce practical prescriptions, prohibitions, and permissions provided to particular 
actors by legal or moral norms. They also can conflict drastically with those 
prescriptions, prohibitions, and permissions – resulting in serious practical dilemmas.  
 The identification of normative principles capable of resolving practical dilemmas 
arising from conflicts between different kinds of norms is a major aim of contemporary 
moral and political philosophy. My goal in this dissertation has been to contribute to this 
aim by establishing the significance of conflicts between social norms and legal or moral 
norms during mass atrocities and liberalizing political transitions. I have argued that 
social norms, and changes in social norms, are critical components of accurate 
descriptions and responsible evaluations – both legal and moral – of the actions of 
individuals and groups before, during, and after mass atrocities. I have contended, 
further, that distinct principles of justice apply to transitional efforts by non-state actors to 
transform social norms in societies recovering from large-scale crimes. 
  Three principal results follow from my efforts in this dissertation to integrate the 
conceptual framework of social norms into the study of mass atrocity. First, I have 
clarified and extended the historiographical thesis of norm transformation, according to 
which participation by ordinary individuals in mass atrocities is at least partially 
explained by transformations in basic norms that structure social and political life. 
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Second, I have identified a novel basis on which to apportion legal and moral 
accountability for mass atrocities between individuals and groups or collectivities – i.e. 
on the basis of the specific contributions of social norms. Third, I have provided new 
support for the disputed claim that distinct principles of justice apply to the various actors 
involved in liberalizing political transitions. 
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